

A Functional Approach toward Sentence Connectives in English: A Case Study on Adversatives

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**A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TOWARD SENTENCE CONNECTIVES IN ENGLISH:
A CASE STUDY ON ADVERSATIVES**

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博士論文

英語における文接続の機能論的研究

---反意の接続詞と接続副詞を中心に---

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. The Purpose of Research

The purpose of this thesis is to reconsider and crystallize functions of the adversative coordinate conjunction *but* and the other discourse connectives, *however*, *still* and *yet*, based on Relevance Theory. Previous studies on connectives based on Relevance Theory are not perfect and I will indicate that there is room to reconsider them.

So what is Relevance theory? The section 1.2 will give you detail explanation on Relevance Theory, but I would like to briefly mention on it here. In Hagashimori and Yoshimura (2003), Relevance Theory is introduced as follows:

Relevance Theory is considered to develop an inference model of the two competing models which have been suggested on communication. One is a code model. In this model, communication is accomplished by encoding and decoding a message. ... In this theory, inferences, which in reality play an important role in communication, do not have any room to contribute to the interpretation.

Another theory is an inference model proposed by Grice (1975). ... Sperber and Wilson (1986) suggest Relevance Theory as a revised model of Grice's and emphasize the importance of the role of inference

in the interpretation of utterances.

(Hagashimori and Yoshimura 2003:11)

In Grice's (1975) inference model, 'what is said' and 'what is implicated,' have to be separated. Grice (1975) first made a sharp distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is implicated,' concerning the content of utterance (Hagashimori and Yoshimura 2003:24).

In this thesis, I will focus on adversative connectives. Grice (1975) and Relevance Theory both are based on inference models, but the hypotheses on connectives are different from each other. In Grice's theory, connectives are considered to carry conventional implicature. Carston (2002)'s summary on Grice's theory is concise and easily understandable. "While the 'what is said' of an utterance is the propositional component of the basic (or ground-level) speech acts of the utterance, such as asserting, telling, and asking, these implicature-generating elements of conventional meaning comment on, or relate one to another, the ground-level speech acts (Carston 2002:108)."

(1) He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave. (Grice 1989:25)

(2) a. He (John) is an Englishman.

b. John is brave.

c. (b) is a natural conclusion of (a).

The utterance of (1) would be divided into two ground-level statements shown in (2b) and (2c). (2c) shows the higher-level comment on those

statements. Grice (1989:362) says, ‘the truth or falsity of his words is determined by the relation of his ground-floor speech acts to the world.’ To put it simply, ‘conventional implicature’ is encoded meaning, which does not ‘touch the truth-value of speaker’s words (Grice 1989:362).’

In Relevance theory, there are also two types of meaning; the conceptual and the procedural. It is assumed that the connectives bear procedural information. I would like to think about whether all the connectives really have procedural information. In my opinion, some connectives should have conceptual information.

Additionally, I will focus on what difference will be brought by positioning of adversative conjunctions. Mainly functions of *however* will be analyzed in this thesis.

1.1.1. Types of Conjunctions and Conjunctive Adverbs

We will see types of conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs in 1.1.1. The section 1.1.2 specifically describes main problems to be discussed.

Coordinate conjunctions may be used to show the relationship between the idea expressed in a clause and the idea expressed in the rest of a sentence. Sometimes, they are used to indicate the relationship between the ideas expressed in separate sentences in informal English. On the other hand, conjunctive adverbs are used to give a sign of the relationship between the idea expressed in a preceding clause, sentence or paragraph. They are also used to show the relationship between the ideas expressed in separate sentences in formal English. Conjunctive adverbs are similar to coordinate conjunctions in that both can be used to introduce a clause and to indicate

the relationship between the ideas expressed in separate sentences.

To clarify functions of each, I will weigh differences between coordinate conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs, comparing the two. Araki et al. (1992) divide coordinate conjunctions into four groups; (a) copulative conjunctions, (b) disjunctive conjunctions, (c) adversative conjunctions, and (d) causal conjunctions. Classification of conjunctive adverbs is not always uniform, but I would like to group conjunctive adverbs into four classes as shown below, based on Otsuka's (1970) classification.

	coordinate conjunctions	conjunctive adverbs
(a) Copulative	and	also, besides, moreover, etc.
(b) Disjunctive	or	otherwise, else, etc.
(c) Adversative	but	however, nevertheless, still, yet, though, etc.
(d) Causal	so	so, therefore, thus, etc.

Figure 1

For the purpose of clarifying what functions adversative coordinate conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs have, I will try to answer some questions, which are presented in the next section.

1.1.2. Problem Presentation

It is well-known that the coordinate conjunction *but* can be replaced with *however* in many cases.

- (3) a. John is a Republican, but he's honest.
b. John is a Republican; however he's honest. (Blakemore 2002:119)
- (4) a. New York was the windiest city in the United States today, but Chicago had light winds.
b. New York was the windiest city in the United States today; however Chicago had light winds. (ibid.)
- (5) a. A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?
B: The 85 and 86 do, but the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.
b. A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?
B: The 85 and 86 do; however the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street. (ibid.)

- (6) [speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whisky]
- a. But I don't drink.
- b. ? However, I don't drink. (Blakemore 2002:118)
- (7) a. He's not clever, but hardworking.
- b. ? He's not clever; however not [*sic.*] hardworking. (op.cit.:117)

not preferable.

(8) a*You can phone the doctor if you like, *but however*, I very much doubt whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

b.?You can phone the doctor if you like, *but* I very much doubt, *however*, whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

(Quirk et al. 1985:646)

In fact, however, there are many tokens in published matters.

(9) When she was only fifteen, there was a gentleman at my brother Gardiner's in town, so much in love with her, that my sister-in-law was sure he would make her an offer before we came away. **But** *however* he did not.

(Jane Austen (1813/1906). *Pride and Prejudice*, p64. Edinburg: J. Grant)

(10) The chief diplomatic and military officers of this Government all were instructed to follow the same course. And since that night on March 31, each of the candidates has had differing ideas about the Government's policy, **but** generally speaking, **however**, throughout the campaign we have been able to present a united voice, supporting our Government and supporting our men in Vietnam.

(November 1, 1968, Text of President Johnson's Broadcast to the Nation Announcing a Bombing Halt. Following is a transcript of President Johnson's address to the nation last night as recorded by *The New York Times*)

The examples show that the acceptability of the co-occurrence is lower when *however* occurs at the beginning of the sentence than in the middle of the sentence. Some grammarians observe the difference of the acceptability, but can it be true? As you can see in (9) and (10), both cases are found in literature, articles, and transcripts of programs. Questions arise here: what makes the co-occurrence possible? If *but* and *however* function in exactly the same way, it should be redundant.

Remember that other adversative connectives *still* and *yet* can be used with the co-ordinate conjunction *but*.

(11)a. It's certainly cold, **but still** it might be colder.

(Otsuka et al. 1969:506)

b. Clare didn't do much work, **but** she **still** passed the exam.

(LDOCE³)

(12) It's very fine weather for a walk, **but yet** I don't think I'll go out.¹

(Otsuka et al. 1969:506)

Why is it possible that the adversative *still* and *yet* co-occur with the adversative conjunction *but*?

By the way, *however* can appear in some positions of a sentence, differently from conjunctions. In the next example, you can see *however* in sentence-initial position. Rudolph (1996:320) says that the example (13) and (14) are 'examples of the application of *however* in scientific texts with the counter-argument expressed an objection to the thesis in the foregoing

¹ *Yet* is immobile in front of its clause.

sentence.’ ‘This underlies the observation that it is typical of written language where it is even used for introducing a new paragraph (Rudolph 1996:321).’

(13) The theory is quantum gravity. We do not yet know the exact form the correct theory of quantum gravity will take. **However**, certain features can be expected to be present in any viable theory.

(Rudolph 1996:320, The Times 1993)

(14) The two elements, the presupposing and the presupposed, may be structurally related to each other, or they may not; it makes no difference to the meaning of the cohesive relation.

However, there is a sense in which the sentence is a significant unit for cohesion precisely because it is the highest unit of grammatical structure: it tends to determine the way in which cohesion is EXPRESSED.

(Rudolph 1996:320)

However is positioned right after the subject of the sentence in the following example.

(15) One could assume that this style would soon be superseded by something sterner. But the general impression was of cleanness, alertness, a pleasant readiness to take responsibility. This, **however**, seemed not to be his attribute, but rather the result of an act of will—the collective act of will.

(Rudolph 1996:320, Lessing Summer 180)

In the example (15), you will find *however* in the final position. Rudolph (1996:321) alleges that ‘the connective in final position can be understood as if the writer of this letter to the editor wished to give his words a marked adversative touch at the end. In his endeavour to emphasize the contrast, he continues with another explicit adversative expression pointing into the same direction.’

(16) All my studying for my professional and university examinations was by homework in my spare time as I could not afford the fees for law school or university. These difficulties did not make me feel aggrieved, **however. On the contrary,** I felt privileged to work and learn my trade with a very fine firm of solicitors.

(Rudolph 1996:320, The Times 1993)

In the following example, *however* cannot be substituted by *but*. That is because, in relative clause, the first position is regularly reserved for the relative pronoun and *but* cannot be positioned in the first position of the clause.

(17) At the moment the boat slowly sank beneath them to the accompaniment of piteous cries from the rest of the passengers, who soon, **however,** found that they are floundering in only two feet of water, their vessel having fortunately drifted over a sandbank.

(Rudolph 1996:320, Lodge SW 225)

We confirmed here that middle, final, and initial positions are equally acceptable. Rudolph (1996:320) claims that the difference depends on stylistic and semantic reasons. What are the stylistic and semantic reasons?

Rudolph's (1996) words remind me of the function of intensifiers. Let us have a look at one of intensifiers here. To take an instance of *only*, *only* is supposed to be placed near the segment which it modifies; *only* appears right before a verb, an adjective, or an adverb. Otherwise, *only* comes right before or after nouns and pronouns. In most cases, *only* is positioned before the word it modifies. Only if *only* modifies a pronoun, *only* occurs after it.²

- (18) a. He had *only* six apples. (not more than six)
b. He *only* lent the car. (He didn't give it.)
c. He lent the car to me *only*. (not to anyone else)
d. I believed *only* half of what he said.

(*Practical English Grammar* 1986)

The scope of an adverb does not always change by positioning adverbs. *Just* also appears prior to the word it modifies like *only*. (The outer frames are the author's.)

- (19) a. I'll buy just one.
b. I had just enough money. (op.cit.)

² It is indicated by Mr. Yoshio Kawahira that *only* can occur after preposition phrase, too.

However, *just* can be placed right before a verb as shown in (19a), and in that case the meaning does not differ from that of the examples (19a). In short, it seems that the meaning does not necessarily change with a shift of an adverb. (The outer frames are the author's)

- (20) a. I'll just buy one.
b. I just had enough money. (op.cit.)

In spoken language, it is common that *only* occurs before a verb and the segment it focuses is put stress on. That is illustrated below. (The outer frames are the author's.)

- (21) (a) He *only* had [|] six apples
(b) He *only* lent the car to [|] me
(c) I *only* believed [|] half of what he said. (op.cit.)

Since adverbs and conjunctive adverbs have a lot of properties in common with each other, the scope of adverbs can be true of that of conjunctive adverbs. So, I would like to tackle especially the following questions: Does positioning of conjunctive adverbs make any differences in interpretation? Are there any functions which conjunctive adverbs have, while conjunctions do not?

1.2. Theoretical Framework

Since they are connectives, it would be a good idea to do research from the

perspective of Pragmatics. Pragmatics specifically focuses on how context influences the interpretation of meanings. “The central concern of studies in Pragmatics has been factors influencing the decisions of choices of writers/speakers as they use words in the service of a communicative goal (Crupi 2004:1).” In the rest of this Chapter, I will introduce the basic ideas of theories that I will touch on for my research. The basic ideas of Relevance Theory will be summarized in 1.2.1, and Discourse Analysis in 1.2.2

1.2.1. Relevance Theory

1.2.1.1. Code Model and Inference Model

There are two models proposed on communication, which are competing with each other (Kinsui and Imakuni 2000:11). According to Kinsui and Imakuni (2000:11), one is the code model, which has nothing to do with inference, and the other is the inference model, which is proposed by Grice (1975). Sperber and Wilson (2002:250) say the Relevance Theory is based on another of Grice’s central claims: that utterance automatically creates expectations which guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning.

Wilson and Sperber (2002:249) briefly explain those two models as follows.

(22) The code model:

A communicator encodes her intended message into a signal, which is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of code.

(Wilson and Sperber 2002:249)

(23) The inference model:

A communicator provides evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided. (ibid.)

Wilson and Sperber (2002:249) continue, “An utterance is, of course, a linguistically coded piece of evidence, so that verbal comprehension involves an element of decoding. However, the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding is just one of the inputs to a non-demonstrative inference process which yields an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning.”

1.2.1.2. Principles of Relevance

Relevance Theory assumes that every aspect of communication and cognition is governed by the search for relevance. This is expressed in the first principle of relevance. It is unique to overt communication that, approaching an utterance addressed to you, you are entitled to have not just hopes but steady expectations of relevance. This is defined in the second principle. The principles of relevance proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995:260-78) are illustrated below.

(24) Principles of Relevance

1. First (cognitive) principle of relevance:

Human cognition is geared towards the maximization of relevance (that is, to the achievement of as many contextual (cognitive) effects as possible for as little processing effort as possible.

2. Second (communicative) principle of relevance:

Every act of ostensive communication (e.g. an utterance)
communicates as assumption of its own optimal relevance.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:260-78)

In 1.2.1.2.1, we will see about cognitive principle of relevance. In 1.2.1.2.2, communicative principle of relevance will be briefly described. In 1.2.1.2.3, I will get on to what Sperber and Wilson (1995:260-78) mean by “optimal relevance.” Pragmatic inference based on semantic decoding will be briefly explained in 1.2.1.2.4.

1.2.1.2.1. Cognitive Principle of Relevance

Sperber and Wilson (2002:250) claim that the central claim of relevance theory is that the expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are precise enough, and predictable enough, to guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995:260-78) argue that relevance is defined in term of cognitive effects and processing effort. Cognitive effects are achieved when newly-presented information interacts with a context of existing assumptions. Newly presented information produces one of three possible contextual effects:

(25)a) it may yield a contextual implication.

b) it may strengthen an existing assumption.

c) it may contradict and lead to the elimination of an existing assumption.

(Blakemore 2002:61)

Let's take a look at each case. First one is the case of (a).

(26) Joan is lying in bed. She decides that if it's raining she won't go for a run. She gets up, opens the shutters and sees that it's raining.

(Iten 2005:63)

Iten (2005:63-64) notes that, in (24), the new information that *it's raining* interacts with Joan's existing assumption that *she won't go for a run if it's raining*. And the two assumptions together logically imply the third assumption that *Joan won't go for a run*. This third assumption is a contextual implication of the new information.

(27) Joan is lying in bed. She can hear a patter on the roof and conclude that it's raining. She gets up, opens the shutters and sees that it is indeed raining. (ibid.)

Iten (2005:63) states that, in this scenario, the new information Joan gains from looking out of the window interacts with a belief she's already formed. The new information – realization that it's raining- strengthens Joan's existing assumption that it's raining.

(28) Joan is lying in bed. Given that there's no audible patter on the roof, she assumes that it isn't raining. She gets up, opens the shutters and sees that it is raining. (ibid.)

Iten (2005:63) says that, in (28), the new information that it's raining again interacts with an existing assumption that it's raining. Here, the new information contradicts and eliminates Joan's existing assumption.

As for processing effort, Sperber and Wilson (1998:9) claim "the greater the cognitive effects, the greater the relevance will be." The processing effort requires time and effort in two ways (Blakemore 1987: 54-60). To use Crupi's (2004) words, I will summarize it as follows.

(29) 1) The cost related to the complexity of linguistic structure.

2) The cost involved in assessing and using contextual assumptions.

(Crupi 2004:4)

Sperber and Wilson (1998:260-78) argue that the greater the processing effort is required, the lower will be the relevance, and the greater the risk of losing the hearer's attention.

1.2.1.2.2. Communicative Principle of Relevance

Within the framework of Relevance Theory, linguistic communication is seen in the border context of human cognition and ostensive communication (Iten 2005:63). Now, let's start taking a look at what the ostensive communication is. Wilson and Sperber (2002:255) argue that it must realize two kinds of speaker's intentions.

(30) Ostensive-inferential communication

a. The informational intention:

The intention to inform an audience of something.

b. The communicative intention:

The intention to inform an audience of one's informative intention.

(Wilson and Sperber 2002:255)

According to Wilson and Sperber (2002:255), understanding is achieved when the communicative intention is fulfilled.

Here is an example. Iten (2005:66) states that, for Joan to communicate ostensively that she is Irish, she not only must have an informative intention, but she must also intend this informative intention to be mutually manifest to her and Peter. Both (31a) and (31b) are the cases of the ostensive communication.

(31) a. Peter asks Joan where she's from. In reply she utters:

'Why, what could she have done, being what she is?' Was there another Troy for her to burn? In an obviously Irish accent.

b. Peter asks Joan where she's from. She says 'I'm Irish.'

(Iten 2005:66)

Iten (2005:66-67) says that there is nothing about the linguistically encoded content of Joan's utterance in (31a) that means she is Irish. According to Iten (2005:66-67), Peter will derive that assumption purely inferentially, on the basis that someone's Irish accent means that they are Irish. On the

other hand, in (31b), Joan makes it mutually manifest that she wants to make it manifest that she's Irish by saying that she is (Iten 2005:66-67).

Wilson and Sperber (1986:39) define notion of mutual manifestness as follows.

- (32) a. An assumption is manifest to an individual at a certain time if and only she capable of entertaining the assumption at that time and accepting it as true or probably true. (Wilson and Sperber 1986:39)

Iten (2005:67) claims that an assumption A is mutually manifest to two (or more) people if and only if they are capable of entertaining and accepting as true or probably true, not only A but also the assumption that A is manifest to them.

1.2.1.2.3. Optimal Relevance

In the communicative principle of relevance, the relevance-theoretic term “optimal relevance” is used, as we saw above. With regard to “optimal relevance,” Sperber and Wilson (1995:270) define as follows.

(33) Optimal Relevance

An utterance, on a given interpretation, is optimally relevant iff:

- (a) It is relevant enough for it to be worth addressee's effort to process it;
- (b) It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences. (Sperber and Wilson 1995:270)

Sperber and Wilson (2002:256) say that, according to clause (33a) of this definition of optimal relevance, the audience is entitled to expect the ostensive stimulus to be at least relevant enough to be worth processing. Sperber and Wilson (2002:256) continue; “For example, if you just happen to notice my empty glass, you may be entitled to conclude that I *might* like a drink. If I deliberately wave it about in front of you, you would generally be justified in drawing the stronger conclusion that I *would* like a drink (Sperber and Wilson 2002:256).”

The example related to clause (33b) is as follows: “the communicator’s goal might be to inform her audience that she has begun writing her paper. It may be effective for her, in pursuit of this goal, to volunteer more specific information and say, ‘I have already written a third of the paper.’ In the circumstances, her audience would then be entitled to understand her as saying that she has written only a third of the paper. For if she had written two thirds, she would normally be expected to say so, given clause (33b) of the definition of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 2002:256).”

1.2.1.2.4. Pragmatic Inference Based on Semantic Decoding

Sperber and Wilson (2002:261) state that Relevance Theory treats the identification of explicit content as equally inferential, and equally guided by the Communicative Principle of Relevance, as the recovery of implicatures. The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure can be broken down into a number of tasks (Sperber and Wilson 2002:261):

(34) Sub-tasks in the overall comprehension process

- a. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (in relevance-theoretic terms, EXPLICATURES) via decoding, disambiguation, reference resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment processes.
- b. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED PREMISES).
- c. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED CONCLUSIONS).

(Sperber and Wilson 2002:261)

Sperber and Wilson (2002:261-262) notes that “comprehension is an on-line process, and hypotheses about explicatures, implicated premise and implicated conclusions are developed in parallel against a background of expectations (or anticipatory hypotheses) which may be revised or elaborated as the utterance unfolds.”

Sperber and Wilson (2002:262) take one illustration as follows.

- (35) a. *Peter*: Did John pay back the money he owed you?
- b. *Mary*: No. He forgot to go to the bank.

(Sperber and Wilson 2002:262)

(36)

(a) Mary has said to Peter, 'Hr forgot to go to the BANK ₁ / BANK ₂ [He _x =uninterpreted pronoun] [BANK ₁ =financial institution] [BANK ₂ =river bank]	<i>Embedding of the decoding (incomplete) logical form of Mary's utterance into a description of Mary's ostensive behaviour</i>
(b) Mary's utterance will be optimally relevant to Peter.	<i>Expectation raised by recognition of Mary's ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the presumption of relevance it conveys.</i>
(c) Mary's utterance will achieve relevance by explaining why John has not repaid to the money he owed her.	<i>Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact that such an explanation would be most relevant to Peter at this point.</i>
(d) Forgetting to go to the BANK ₁ may make one unable to repay the money one owes.	<i>First assumption to occur to Peter which, together with other appropriate premises, might satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit premise of Mary's utterance.</i>
(e) John forgot to go to the BANK ₁ .	<i>First enrichment of the logical form of Mary's utterance to occur to Peter which might combine with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of (c). Accepted as an explicature of Mary's utterance.</i>
(f) John was unable to repay Mary the money he owes because he forgot to go to the BANK ₁ .	<i>Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and accepted as an implicit conclusion of Mary's utterance.</i>
(g) John may repay Mary the money he owes when he next goes to the BANK ₁ .	<i>From (f) plus background knowledge. One of several possible weak implications of Mary's utterance which, together with (f), satisfy expectation (b).</i>

(Sperber and Wilson 2002:263)

Sperber and Wilson (2002:262) explain comprehension process as follows.

Table (36) is a schematic online of how Peter might use the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure to construct hypotheses

about the explicatures and implicatures of Mary's utterance, 'He forgot to go to the bank.' Peter assumes in (36b) that Mary's utterance, decoded as in (36a), is optimally relevant to him. Since what he wants to know at this point is why John did not repay the money he owed, he assumes in (36c) that Mary's utterance will achieve relevance by answering this question. In the situation described, the logical form of the utterance provides easy access to the contextual assumption in (36d) that 'forgetting to go to the bank may prevent one from repaying money one owes.' This could be used as an implicit premise in deriving the expected explanation of John's behaviour, provided that the utterance is interpreted on the explicit side (via disambiguation and reference resolution) as conveying the information in (36e): that John forgot to go to the BANK₁. By combining the implicit premise in (36d) and the explicit premise in (36e), Peter arrives at the implicit conclusion in (36f), from which further, weaker implicatures, including (36g) and others, can be derived. The resulting overall interpretation satisfies Peter's expectations of relevance.

(Sperber and Wilson 2002:262)

On the relation between decoding and inference in comprehension, Blakemore (2002:60) states that this distinction - between the process of decoding messages and the process of making inferences from evidence - is the basis of their distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Concerning the process of decoding, Blakemore (2002:60) notes that it is performed by an autonomous linguistic system, - the grammar- which is

dedicated to the performance of mapping between a linguistic stimulus (utterance) and a semantic representation for that utterance. On the other hand, the process of inference integrates the output of the decoding process with contextual information in order to deliver a hypothesis about the speaker's informative intention (Blakemore 2002:60).

1.2.1.3. Explicature and Implicature

In Relevance Theory, the assumptions communicated by utterance are divided into two classes, or 'explicature' and 'implicature.' Sperber and Wilson's (1986:182) definitions are illustrated below.

(37) An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit [hence an 'explicature'] if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.

(38) An assumption communicated by an utterance U is not explicit is implicit [hence an 'implicature'] (Sperber and Wilson's 1986:182)

Carson's (2002) definitions are much clearer than Sperber and Wilson's (1995:182) definitions.

(39) explicature: an ostensively communicated assumption which is inferentially developed from one of the incomplete conceptual representations (logical forms) encoded by the utterance.

(Carston 2002:377)

(40) implicature (conversational): an ostensibly communicated assumption which is not an explicature; a communicated assumption which is derived solely via processes of pragmatic inference. An alternative characterization: a contextual assumption or contextual implication intended (communicated) by the speaker; hence an implicature is either an implicated premise or implicated conclusion. (ibid.)

Here is Carston's (2006:635) explanation. Let's take a look at the following example.

(41) X: How is Mary feeling after her first year at university?

Y: She didn't get enough units and can't continue.

(Carston 2006:635)

(42) a. MARY DID NOT PASS ENOUGH UNIVERSITY COURSE UNITS TO QUALIFY FOR ADMMISSION TO SECOND-YEAR STUDY AND, AS A RESULTS, MARY CONNOT CONTINUE WITH UNIVERSITY STUDY.

b. MARY IS NOT FEELING VERY HAPPY. (ibid.)

Carston (2006:635) tells us to suppose that, in particular context, X takes U to have communicated the assumptions shown in (41). Carston (2006:635) argues that (41a) is an explicature of Y's utterance and (41b) is an implicature on the basis of the definitions. According to Carston (2006:635), "the decoded logical form of Y's utterance, still more or less visible in (41a), has been taken as a template for the development of a

propositional form, while (42b) is an independent assumption, inferred as a whole from (42a) and a further premise concerning the relation between Mary's recent failure at university and her current state of mind."

To sum up, "the conceptual content of an implicature is supplied wholly by pragmatic inference, while the conceptual content of an explicature is an amalgam of decoded linguistic meaning and pragmatically inferred meaning (Carston 2006:636)."

1.2.1.4. Two Kinds of Meaning

Blakemore (2002:78) states that "there are two distinct processes involved in utterance interpretation-decoding and inference, the first being an input to the second, and, second, that the inferential phase of utterance comprehension involves the construction of conceptual (or propositional) representations which enter into inferential computations." Blakemore (2002:78) continues; "this means that, in principal, linguistic form could encode not only the constituents of the conceptual representations that enter into inferential computations but also information which constrains the computations in which these computations are involved. In other words, it is possible for linguistic form to encode either conceptual information or procedural information."

Blakemore (1987) claims that discourse connectives introduce contextual implications. They do not contribute to a propositional representation, but simply encode instructions for processing propositional representations. In other words, "such expressions are considered to contribute to relevance by leading hearers to derive an intended cognitive

effect and by reducing needed processing efforts as a whole (Kinsui and Imakuni 2000:77)”.
Here is Blakemore’s (2002:89-90) analysis.

(43) Ben can open Tom’s safe. After all, he knows the combination.

(Blakemore 2002:89)

(44) a. Ben knows the combination of Tom’s safe.

b. If Ben knows the combination of Tom’s safe, then he can open Tom’s safe.

c. Ben can open Tom’s safe. (op.cit.:90)

Blakemore (2002:89) explains on the example above as follows: “A hearer who interprets (43) will take the conceptual representation in (44a) together with the conceptual representation in (44b) and derive the conceptual representation in (44c). The effect of this inference will be to strengthen an assumption, or, in other words, a conceptual representation which is held with a degree of strength that is higher than it would have been proper to the interpretation of the second segment.” Blakemore (2002:90) continues; “while *after all* plays a role in the recovery of this conceptual representation, it does not do this by encoding anything that is a constituent of it. Rather it encodes information about the inferential process that the hearer should use.”

1.2.2. Discourse Analysis

Crupi (2004) and Lenk (1998) pay attention to the pragmatic functions that

discourse connectives have for structuring discourse, especially when looking at longer stretches of discourse. What are analyzed in Relevance Theory are functions of discourse connectives in rather short discourse segments, often even only looking at utterance pairs. Both Crupi (2004) and Lenk (1998) concentrate on the functions that discourse connectives have in longer stretches of discourse, that is, not from a local viewpoint but from a global one.

As a means toward understanding whatever semantic distinction might exist between *yet*, *but* and *still*, Crupi's (2004:2) claims that the study reserves the semantics-to-pragmatics directionality by using easily accessible pragmatic phenomena. Crupi (2004:17) states that the goal of study is to investigate common features of messages that coincide with a writer's choice of *yet*, *but* and *still* in written texts. Crupi (2004:2) notes that the term *semantics* is used to describe the relationships that exist between the conceptual correlates of words and pragmatics will be used to refer to the communicative goals that underlie or motivate the choices that language users make as they implement this inventory of conceptual tools to construct messages. Therefore, Crupi (2004:3) considers pragmatics or communicative purpose as the key to understanding semantics. Crupi (2004:4) says that, "since the directionality of this research is from pragmatic interpretation to word meaning, the analysis can be characterized as writer-oriented rather than reader-oriented." That is because "words do not appear randomly in a text; writers/speakers choose the words they do because each contributes in some way to the overall messages they are trying to communicate (Crupi 2004:3)." In reference to the distinction between

meaning and *message*, Crupi (2004:3) defines *meaning* as interrelated conceptual constructs encoded in language, and *message* as pragmatic interpretation ultimately assigned to spoken or written texts. Crupi (2004:3) claims that by examining the overall message or pragmatic interpretation of texts, it is possible to look for a common semantic feature that accompanies all instances of a particular form. The term “meaning” seems similar to the relevance-theoretic term “explicature” and the term “message” seems like the relevance-theoretic term “implicature.” The difference between Relevance Theory and her research is that Crupi (2004) “extends beyond analytical scope of traditional sentence-based linguistics to the more global focus of discourse analysis (Crupi 2004:5).” Crupi (2004:5) states that the analysis is framed within a discourse perspective that assumes individual sentences cannot provide adequate data for understanding why *yet*, *but*, or *still* are chosen.

The goal of Lenk (1998:4) is to “give an account of how discourse markers, while signaling the relevance of the current utterance within the conversational context, are also used to facilitate the hearer’s understanding of how that particular contribution fits into the entire conversation, or into parts of it, i.e. how they are used to suggest coherence.” The data Lenk (1998) uses is gathered from spoken language.

Lenk (1998) argues that marking of global coherence relations is one essential means that a speaker can use to (willingly) influence a hearer’s understanding of her contribution. “Through marking the relations of her contribution to prior discourse as she perceives them, the speaker gives more information about her utterance to the hearer than its mere propositional

content (Lenk 1998:35).” Lenk (1998:49) shows how discourse markers are used as discourse structuring elements for signaling ideational, rhetorical and sequential relations, and how they are effective as coherence indicators on a global coherence level within spoken discourse, when topical inconsistencies or topic changes seem to be threatening a coherent understanding of the overall discourse. According to Lenk (1998:49), “the term *discourse makers* is used to refer solely to these items; they are considered a group of *pragmatic items* since their function within discourse does not involve the propositional level of the utterance, but applies on a non-propositional, pragmatic plane of the discourse.” Lenk (1998:53) distinguishes *the discourse maker function* from *the propositional uses*. According to Lenk (1998:53), propositional meanings are the meaning given in dictionary definitions, whereas the pragmatic meaning is rarely found in dictionary definitions. However, Lenk (1998:108-109) mentions that there are some cases where it is very difficult to determine whether *however* is used in either one or the other of the two functions.

- (45)a ...does operational research is it is it ..primarily concerned with questions of distribution marketing
- b. indeed no .. operation research started.. by studies of military problems .. one of the first exercises ever carried out .. took place during the war .. when .. the question of whether . small boats should carry anti-craft guns .. was considered .. these small boats had been equipped .. with anti-craft guns but they weren't shooting down .. any more enemy aircraft .. and therefore certain people concluded

that these guns weren't fulfilling their function **however** when the operation research man looked .. at the data more closely he discovered that fewer boats were being sunk in other words

Lenk (1998:109) explains the example as follows; "On one hand, the use of *however* in his example could be considered an indicator of contrast between the situation as it had been narrated earlier, and the actual outcome of the investigation by operational researchers as narrated after the use of *however*. On the other hand, it can be also be interpreted as a discourse marker, because it marks the ends of a short digression which was considerable importance to the development of the topic."

1.3. Summery

In this Chapter, the goal of my research was shown: to reconsider and crystallize functions of adversative coordinate conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs. To do the research, several problems were presented. The first question is why *however* is more restricted than *but*. The second question is what makes it possible that adversative connectives *however*, *still* and *yet* can be used with the co-ordinate conjunction *but*. The third question is whether *however* in the middle of the sentence has another function.

Then, I outlined the basic ideas of theories that I will touch on for my research.

Chapter 2

An Adversative Conjunction *But*

2.1. Introduction

As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the goals of this dissertation is to clarify functions of a coordinate conjunction *but* and conjunctive adverbs *however*, *still*, and *yet*, weighing differences among them. Before making detailed examinations of these words, we will take a look at previous studies on *but* in this chapter so that we can compare the conjunction with adverbial connectives such as *however*, *still*, *yet* in the subsequent chapters.

Since *but* is one of the subjects which have aroused enthusiasm and controversy, I will review briefly some recent important studies on the conjunctive before proposing a new description of functions of the word.

In section 2.2, a range of different uses of *but* will be summarized, following Hall (2004, 2005/2007). In section 2.3, we will see Fraser (1998), who argues that the core meaning of *but* is to signal contrast. Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002), Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten (2005) offer a counterargument against the hypothesis that the core meaning of *but* is contrast. Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002), Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten's (2005) analyses are based on Relevance Theory, where *but* has procedural information. You can see different ideas between Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002)/Iten (2005). In section 2.4, Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) analysis on functions of *but* will

be taken up. In section 2.5, we will briefly take a look at the debate over Blakemore's (2002) proposal between Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten (2005). In section 2.6, the consideration on which is more plausible, Hall (2004, 2005/2007) or Iten (2005) will be given. Section 2.7 is the conclusion of this chapter.

2.2. A Range of Different Uses of *But*

In this subsection, following Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) classification, five interpretations of *but* will be described briefly; that is, denial of expectation, contrast, correction, objection, and diversion.

Let's begin with denial of expectation. Most of the previous studies on *but* recognize this use. The following is R. Lakoff's (1971:67) famous example.

(1) Denial of expectation

John is a Republican **but** he is honest. (Lakoff 1971:67)

To borrow Hall's (2005:4) words, 'the first clause implies some conclusion which is then denied by the clause introduced by *but*.'

- (2) a. John is a Republican. (preceding context)
- b. John is dishonest. (derived assumption)
- c. John is honest. (assumption modification)

The next use of *but* we consider is the contrastive one. In this

example, *but* seems to simply indicate the contrasts in symmetric utterances (Fraser 1998, Hall 2005).

(3) Contrast

- a. John is English **but** Bill is Welsh. (Hall 2004:222)
- b. Anna likes reading **but** Tom likes tennis. (Blakemore 2002:103)
- c. Tom likes tennis **but** Anna likes reading. (ibid.)

Now, we will look at an example of *but* which has the correction meaning. When *but* had the correction meaning, it has different distributional properties from *but* which has a denial of expectation meaning. The first segment including correction *but* must contain an explicit unincorporated negation. In addition to that, the second clause containing correction *but* undergoes conjunction reduction obligatorily and the *but*-clause replaces the negated assumption. These are not the case of utterances related to denial of expectation. (Blakemore 2002:110, Hall 2004:202)

(4) Correction

- He isn't clever, **but** hardworking. (Blakemore 2002:110)

The fourth interpretation of *but* is the objection use. (5) is an example of a discourse-initial use of *but* which is used to introduce an objection.

(5) Objection

- a. [speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whisky]

But I don't drink. (op.cit.:105)

- b. A: We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.

B: **But** what about the money? (op.cit.:119)

The last use of *but* is diversion. See (6). In (6a), after the first clause of B's utterance, there is nothing to stop the speaker continuing with something like ...*and so do the 84 and the 87*.... While highly unlikely to be an expectation of the hearer's, it is one possible route that is left open after the first clause. So the use of *but* is acceptable, as the hearer is being diverted from a potential conclusion. In (6b), it's perfectly conceivable that A and B could be meeting on both Tuesday and Wednesday, so after the first clause of B's reply, there's nothing to exclude B continuing with ... *and on Wednesday 15*. So this is what the hearer could be diverted away from by the use of *but*.

(6) Diversion

- a. A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?

B: The 85 and 86 do, but the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.

(op.cit.:104)

- b. A: Are we meeting on Tuesday or Wednesday?

B: We're meeting on Tuesday, but not on Wednesday.

(Hall 2004:227)

The question is: What can be a unified description of these five usages? In the next section, we shall see Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) observation, one of the previous studies based on Relevance Theory, which says connectives have procedural meanings not conceptual meanings for the first time in the Linguistics.

2.3. Is the core meaning of *but* to signal CONTRAST?

There are many previous studies on *but*. Lakoff (1971) studies semantic and denial of expectation *but*. Halliday and Hasan (1976) observe internal and external *but*. Schffrin (1987) observes referential, functional, and contrastive *but*. Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002), Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten (2005) tries to capture denial of expectation and contrast *but* by arguing that *but* has procedural information. Roughly speaking, there are two viewpoints. Some argue that the core meaning of *but* is to signal contrast. Grice (1975/1989), Schffrin (1987), Rieber (1997), Fraser (1998), and Bach (1999) use a notion of contrast at least, in order to explain the meaning of *but*. The other claim that it is to signal denial of expectation; for example, Lakoff (1971), Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002), and Iten (2005). In this section, we will see the former argument.

Bach (1999) is the latest research, but his goal is to counterargument Gricean approach where the notion of conventional implicature is used, and not to claim that the meaning of *but* is contrast. Therefore, I will review Fraser (1998) here. Fraser (1998) claims that the core meaning of *but* is to signal contrast. Fraser (1998:310) says:

I find that the core meaning of *but* is to signal simple contrast, nothing more, and the speaker will select it when intending to highlight a contrast. However, the S1 message with which the direct S2 message is contrasted—the target—may be the direct, indirect, presupposed, or entailed message of S1. But whichever the message, there is only one core meaning of *but*, although the precise nature of the contrast may be interpreted from the S1 message involved and the context.

(op.cit.:310)

Let us have a look at each case one by one. In the following example, the target of contrast is the direct S1.

(7) Direct S1 message

John gave toys to Mary, *but* Sara gave dolls to Jane.

(Fraser 1998:310)

Fraser (1998:310) says that ‘the two messages contrast in at least two corresponding areas.’ The example (7) has three areas of contrast (Fraser 1998:310).

The next examples show that S2 may be (roughly) the negative of S1.

(8) protest

a. A: Harry is honest.

B: *But* he’s NOT honest.

b. A: We can go.

B: *But* I CAN'T go since I'm not ready.

(op.cit.:310-311)

Fraser (1998:310) observes that 'S2 directly contradicts S1, and in so doing denies S1.' Fraser (1998:310) thinks that 'the denial arises from contrast of a special sort, which involves the content of S2 and S1, not as a function of the core meaning of *but*.'

Bach (1999:358) also doesn't think that protest use of *but* shows simple contrast, saying that "sentence-initial *but* is generally the *but* of rebuttal, used to introduce a reason or evidence against something previously asserted. If someone says that Shaquille O'Neal is well-coordinated and you reply, 'But Shaq can't make free throws,' you are not expressing a contrast of the sort expressed in (9) but rather are objecting to the claim just made."

(9) Shaq is huge *but* he is agile. (Bach 1999:327)

- a. Shaq is huge and, *unlike most huge people*, he is agile.
- b. Shaq is huge and, *unlike others on the list*, he is agile.
- c. Shaq is huge and, *contrary to what you said*, he is agile.

(op.cit.:346)

Fraser (1998:310) says that 'S2 may consist of only the reason or justification for an assertion which had been deleted.'

(10) a. Well, she's nearly always in by 10. *But* (she may be in after 10 since) she has lot of work to do at the library.

b.[Context: a stranger taking away Jimmy's bike]

Jimmy: *But* (you should not take that away since) that's my bike.

(Fraser 1998:311)

In the next example, the target of contrast is presupposed message of S1.

(11) Presupposed S1 Message

A: Three of my kids are in school. [Presupposed:The fourth is not.]

B: *But* all of your children are in school. (ibid.)

There are cases where the hearer is forced to find an entailed message of S1.

(12) Entailed Message

A: Nancy is enjoying being a bachelor. [entailed:Nancy is a male]

B: But Nancy is female. (ibid.)

Fraser (1998:310) regards the following example as the case where the target of contrast may be implied.

(13) Implied S1 Message

John is a politician. [Politicians are dishonest.] *But* he is honest.

(op.cit:312)

The problem with Fraser (1998) is that they seem to treat rebuttal usage as a special contrast. In addition to that, the core meaning of *but* cannot be to signal a simple contrast. Blakemore (1987:134-7, 1989) claims that the core meaning of *but* cannot be contrast. To prove this, Blakemore (1987:134-137, 1989) takes up the following examples where a contrast reading is inevitable because of the contrastive stress. If contrast were encoded by *but*, it should be used in the context where there is a contrast between two things. As can be seen below, however, the usage of *but* is awkward.

(14) A: What's the capital of Germany now?-Bonn or Berlin?

B: It's BERLIN, **and** not Bonn.

B': ??It's BERLIN, **but** not Bonn.

(Blakemore 1987:134-7; Hall 2004:219)

Hall (2004:219) supports Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) argument that a contrast reading of *but* cannot be the core meaning of it, showing the examples below.

(15) A: Why did your landlord send round the one armed plasterer again when the other guy worked twice as fast?

B: Because he's half price, whereas/while the other guy charges more to work on a weekend.

B': Because he's half price; the other guy, in contrast/on the other hand, charges more to work on a weekend.

B'':??Because he's half price, but the other guy charges more to work on a weekend. (Hall 2004:219)

In (15), *but* is unacceptable in context where contrastive connectives such as *whereas* and *in contrast* can appear. Hall (2004:219) states that “if *but* means contrast, there would seem to be no reason why it cannot replace other indicators of contrast.”

Besides, Fraser (1998) does not analyze the correction usage of *but*. It is impossible to capture the correction case by contrast.

In the next subsection, we will review previous studies based on Relevance Theory, where it is stated that *but* has procedural information on how the hearer should make an inference.

2.4. Relevance Theory

One of the goals of this thesis is to demonstrate how Relevance Theory can explain functions of connectives well. I will review here some important studies. Blakemore (2002) is the pioneer in the field of procedural meanings. Challenging Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002), Hall (2005/2007) tries to establish a unitary theory for interpretations of *but* in a different way. Iten (2005), on the other hand, defends and revises Blakemore's (2002) assertion.

Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) studies the function of connectives, based on the Relevance Theory and makes intriguing suggestions. She suggests that *but* is related to one of the three types of contextual effects that Sperber and Wilson (1995:83-117) suggested. Contextual effects are defined as follows:

- (16) a. The derivation of contextual implications: the derivation of a new assumption in a deduction which crucially involves the synthesis of P and C.
- b. Strengthening existing assumptions: the effect derived when an assumption in C is independently derived from a new set of premises that includes P, or in other words, when P is involved in a ‘backwards’ inference.
- c. Contradiction & elimination: the effect derived when a contradiction between P and C is resolved by eliminating C.

(Blakemore 2000:478)

The remainder of this section will describe the analyses by Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002), which tried to give a unified account of the five usages of *but* using the notion of cognitive effects.

Blakemore (2002) claims that the function of *but* is to bring about the cognitive effect which ends in contradiction and elimination of an assumption A.

(17) *But* encodes the information that the hearer is expected to follow an inferential route which results in the contradiction and elimination of an accessible assumption A. (Blakemore 2002:122)

(18) *But* does not encode any information about the contexts where the effect of contradiction and elimination is achieved. (op.cit.:118-121)

Now how can Blakemore's proposals account for the five uses of *but* in the section 2.2? Let us start with the case of denial of expectation. Blakemore (2002:106) attempts to make it clear what the difference is between the utterance in (19a) and Lakoff's original example in (19b), which has a similar contrast. (The emphases are the author's. In the rest of this chapter, the emphases are the author's unless there is a notice.)

- (19) a. John is a Republican **and** he is HONEST. (op.cit.:106)
b. John is a Republican **but** he is honest. (= (1))

Blakemore (2002:106) argues that *but* in (19b) activates an inferential process which results in the contradiction and elimination of the assumption that *John is dishonest*. On the other hand, Blakemore (2002:107) says, the use of *and* is justified only if the speaker can be understood to be expressing an attitude to the truth of the conjoined proposition expressed. Blakemore (2002:106) adds, however, that the fact that the speaker of (19a) can be interpreted as communicating an emotional attitude (for example, of surprise or outrage) does not mean that *and* encodes emotional involvement.

The examples of the contrast use of *but* in (3) are repeated here.

- (20) a. Anna likes reading **but** Tom likes tennis. (Blakemore 2002:103)
b. Tom likes tennis **but** Anna likes reading. (ibid.)

Blakemore (2002:103) does not expound upon how *but* functions in these examples, but she mentions that the similarities between examples (20a) and (20b) are superficial and disappear when we consider the context in which they are appropriate. Blakemore (2002), perhaps, means that in (20a) it will fit the context where the assumption that if Anna likes reading, Tom likes reading is eliminated. In (20b), on the other hand, it will be suitable for the context where the assumption that if Tom likes tennis, Anna likes tennis is eliminated. In this sense, there is no need to distinguish between a contrast *but* and a denial of expectation *but*, both of which activate an inferential process which results in the contradiction and elimination of an assumption.

The examples (4) as a “correction” reading of *but* will be repeated in (21). Blakemore (2002:117) shows the examples (21) as a “correction” reading of *but*, which means “it is not clever that he is, but rather hardworking,” borrowing Schourup’s (2005:87) expression.

(21) Correction

- He isn’t clever, **but** hardworking. (Blakemore 2002:110)

Blakemore (2002:110-111) says that the correction reading of these examples as depending on a double elimination of the same assumption ‘*he is clever*,’ by virtue of both the negation in the first segment, and the contradiction and elimination initiated by *but* itself.”

(22) He is clever.

According to Blakemore (2002:111), “if *but* is a means of activating an inference which results in the contradiction and elimination of an assumption manifest to the hearer which is contradictory to an assumption he is communicating.” Provided that the first segment is itself relevant as a contradiction, (22) is an assumption which would be presumed to be manifest to the hearer. The first segment is denying the truth of (22) and *but* activates an inference which results in elimination of the manifest assumption. In short, the manifest assumption, “*He is clever*” is denied by the first segment, “*He isn’t clever*” and *but*.

The *but* in (23) represents its fourth interpretation, that is, ‘objection.’

(23) [speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whisky]

But I don’t drink.

(op.cit.:118)

Speaking of the function of *but*, in (23), it is to indicate that an assumption like (24) must be eliminated.

(24) The speaker of (23) can be expected to drink the whisky that is being offered.

(op.cit.:121)

From this example, it can be said that the eliminated assumption does not always need to be derivable from a previous explicit discourse segment.

Now, the diversion use of *but* will be described. I repeat the example

(6) as (25).

(25) A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?

B: The 85 and 86 do, but the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.

(op.cit.:104)

Blakemore (2002:104-105) gives an account of the process of inference that *but* guides the hearer. B's reply in (25) may be understood to contradict the assumption in (27a), but this assumption is not derived from the first segment of the utterance. With the appropriate intonation, this segment would suggest that there are other buses from the stop which are not like the 85 and the 86 in this respect, which given the contextual assumption in (27b), contextually implies that the 84 and the 87 do not go to Piccadilly Gardens. *But*-segment achieves the relevance through informing the hearer not just where the 84 and the 87 buses go, but where they go given that they do not go to Piccadilly Gardens.

(26) 84 and 87 buses go to Piccadilly Gardens.

(27) a. All the other buses from this stop do not go to Piccadilly Gardens.

b. 84 and 87 buses go from this stop. (op.cit:104)

There is another case. In the case of lack for the contextual assumption in (27b), the hearer may find it relevant to know which buses do not go to Piccadilly Gardens, and the speaker would thus be provided with reason for encouraging the hearer to see the relevance of the second segment as lying in

the contradiction and elimination of (27b).

In this section, we saw Blakemore's proposal that *but* activates an inference which results in the contradiction and elimination of an assumption, which she claims can account for the five uses of *but*.

Although Blakemore's analysis has many interesting points and has been very influential, it has been criticized by some authors. Hall (2004, 2005/2007) argues that *but* does not activate an inference but it suspends an inference. Iten (2005) maintains that the assumption to be eliminated must be manifest. In the next subsection, we will see the detailed discussions by Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten (2005).

2.5. Hall (2004, 2005/2007) vs. Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002)/Iten (2005)

In this subsection, we will review two alternatives to Blakemore's analysis. First, we will take a quick look at proposals by Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten (2005). Next, we will see how they account for the five uses of *but* in detail.

Hall (2004:223) challenges Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) proposal, suggesting that *but* does not encode results in the elimination of a manifest assumption. According to Hall (2004:226), *but* can derive any of the three kinds of cognitive effects. Hall (2004:226) alleges that the case of correction *but* on Blakemore's (2002) analysis derives the cognitive effect of strengthening. To be more precise, Hall (2004:226) states that the main relevance, even in denial uses, lies not in the contradiction and elimination of the assumption, but in getting the hearer to entertain the implicated

premise and the fact that the state of affairs introduced by the *but*-clause is an exception, from which the cognitive effects of the utterance follow. In sum, she claims that Blakemore's account of *but* as encoding contradiction and elimination is too restrictive; the constraint encoded by *but* is to suspend an inference that would result in a contradiction with what follows, so diverts him from a conclusion that he could potentially have drawn.

(28) The constraint encoded by *but*

The function of *but* is to 'suspend an inference that would result in a contradiction with what follows.'
(Hall 2004:228)

For Hall (2004, 2005/2007), different interpretations of *but* is derived from the degrees of salience of some particular conclusion that is undermined, and this depends on the relation between the two conjuncts. In the 'denial-of-expectation' use, it's obvious what is denied by the clause introduced by *but*: in (29a), for example, the *but*-clause is cutting off the inference to (29b). If the *but*-clause contradicts an assumption that was easily accessible on the basis of the first clause, it makes this assumption more salient, and the utterance has a denial-of-expectation reading.

- (29) a. Anne is rich but unhappy.
b. Anne is happy.

In the 'contrast' use on the other hand, it is not clear what line of inference is being cut off: there may be a range of weakly salient potential

implications of the first clause that are in some way inconsistent with implications of the *but*-clause, and any one of these would satisfy the constraint encoded by *but*. For example, the first clause of (30) may license a conclusion like *we don't have a candidate for our basketball team*; or the hearer might have asked a question that assumes that John and Bill will be alike in some relevant respect—whether they are alike or not is left open by the first clause.

(30) John is tall but Bill is short.

In the meantime, Iten's (2005) proposal is as follows, which is the revised version of Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) original one:

(31) What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context. (Iten 2005:147)

Iten (2005:146) claims that there is every reason that the assumption to be denied should be manifest. First, it is hard to see how something that was never represented as true or probably true could be contradicted and eliminated. Second, if an assumption need be simply accessible rather than manifest, *but* should be acceptable in (32), because the *but* clause would deny the assumption that Mary is nice, which is surely made accessible by the first clause.

(32) ?John doubts that Mary is nice but she isn't. (op.cit.:146)

Iten (2005:155) counters Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) argument saying that if there's an inference to be cut off, then there is also likely to be an assumption (conclusion) that is (or would be) the result of such an inference. Since the *but* clause only occurs after the assumption that might have triggered an inappropriate inference, it's likely that the inference will have yielded an undesirable conclusion, which will have to be eliminated if the inference is cut off (Iten 2005:155).

Now let's compare their analyses to make differences clearer. Firstly, Hall (2004:221) points out that indirect denial proves somewhat problematic for Blakemore's (2002) proposal.

(33) A: Do you think we can rely on him?

B: Well he is honest, but he is a Republican, so I don't know.

(Hall 2004:221)

Here, the *but*-clause doesn't seem to be eliminating an assumption, but just introducing an argument that points in a different direction. In B's reply, the first clause implicates *We can rely on him*; the second implicates *We can't*. If the assumption *We can rely on him* has been eliminated by the time the hearer gets as far as the end of the *but*-clause, then, on hearing *I don't know*, he would have to go back and reprocess B's reply, and it should sound marked. However, there is nothing marked about this utterance, indicating that the cognitive effect here is not one of contradiction and elimination. (Hall 2004:221)

Iten (2005:153-154) doubts this reasoning and takes up the following

example for a rebuttal.

(34) A: Do you think we can rely on him?

B: Well, he is honest, but he is a Republican, so I don't know.

B': I don't know.

B'': ?Well, he is honest, but he is a Republican, so it could go either way.

(Iten 2005:153-154)

Iten (2005:154) makes a point that *I don't know* itself is most likely to be interpreted as a negative. The response, '*I don't know*,' is most likely to be interpreted as meaning that John probably can be trusted by A. In addition to that, Iten (2005:154) adds that the conclusion is not genuinely up in the air, because '*it could go either way*' is less appropriate as you can see.

Secondly, Hall (2005:20) claims that Blakemore's (2002:100) account that *but* activates an inference which results in the contradiction and elimination of an assumption runs into difficulties with 'contrast' uses of *but*.

(35) John is English **but** Bill is Welsh.

(Hall 2004:222)

Blakemore's (2002:101-102) account is that they simply involve a denial of expectation that there's no contrast. To borrow Hall's (2004:222) words, 'in (35), the hearer would have to expect that Bill will be English, the same as John.' Hall (2004:222) argues that there is a problem that Blakemore (2002) doesn't explain why the hearer might have been holding any such

assumption. Besides that, Hall (2004:222) states that ‘it seems to be enough for the hearer to recognize that the speaker is drawing attention to the fact that the things are different, which may or may not have been manifest to him already.’

Blakemore (2002:111) argues that ‘for an utterance to achieve relevance as a contradiction, it must communicate an assumption which is contradictory to an assumption which the hearer believes to be true. According to Hall (2005:20), however, it doesn’t seem that any expectation of hearer’s gets denied in (35) or that any assumption supported by the first clause is contradicted.’

For Iten (2005), on the other hand, the claim that the denied assumption is required to be manifest does not mean that the assumption is ‘represented’ or ‘expected’. In fact, she also admits that it is far from obvious that the first clause in (35) raises an expectation that the second clause denies.

Following the line of thought proposed by Iten (2005:149), it is at least possible that John is English makes manifest the assumption that Bill (or any other person that might be talked about next) is English, even if just very weakly. It could be that the mere fact that the speaker is talking about John and Bill in the same utterance makes it more likely that they share the property being talked about.

Here are two questions. First, how ‘salient’ a manifest assumption should be? Second, is there any specific assumption, manifest or not, that is denied in the ‘contrast’ uses of *but*?

As for the first question, the answer is clear in the Relevance Theory. As Sperber and Wilson (1986/95:39) put it, ‘for an assumption to be manifest

does not necessarily mean that it is mentally represented—just that it's capable of being represented (and accepted as true or probably true).' We do not see any discrepancy in this point between Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten (2005).

As for the second question, Hall (2004, 2005/2007) says 'apparently, no,' while Iten replies 'yes, though it's very weakly manifest.' I would like to support Iten (2005), because there should be an assumption if an inference is suspended as Iten (2005) points out.

This 'manifestness' problem¹ reappears in the analysis of Diversion uses of *but*. Let us see how Hall (2004:222-223) reanalyzes Blakemore's (2002) example below. The example in (25) will be recited as (36).

(36) A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?

B: The 85 and 86 do, but 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.

(Blakemore 2002:104)

¹ Iten (2000:228) also takes a skeptical view of the requirement by Blakemore (1987, 1989) that the contradicted and eliminated assumption be manifest to the hearer. She suggests that this assumption is required to be only accessible to him. Hall (2004:225) refutes this downgrading of manifestness and alleges that if *but* guides the hearer to make inference that results in the contradiction and elimination of assumption, then this assumption must be manifest. Hall's (2004:222) observation is that it might 'be enough for the hearer to recognize that the speaker is drawing attention to the fact the two things are different, which may or may not have been manifest to him already.'

Blakemore (2002:104) claims that the assumption which is underlying A's question is "that all buses from the stop are alike in respect of whether they go to Piccadilly Gardens, and that there is a single 'yes' or 'no' answer to her question here." Hall (2004:223) argues that "it doesn't look like any assumptions that A is making about B's answer are manifestly getting contradicted," because "the assumption underlying A's question has to be that at least some of them do. Otherwise, she would have asked whether any of them do, not all of them do."

Hall (2004:227) takes up the following examples in order to show the advantage of her proposal.

(37) A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?

B: The 85 and 86 do, but the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.

B':??Only the 85 and 86 do, but the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.

B'':Only the 85 and 86 do. The 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.

(Hall 2004:227)

Here is Hall's (2004:227) explanation: In (25B), after the first clause, there is a potential inferential route, such as *and so do the 84 and 87...*, which is highly unlikely to be an expectation of the hearer's. Therefore, the use of *but* is acceptable. In (25B'), on the other hand, the use of *only* excludes any potential inferential route. That is why *but* is unacceptable.

Iten (2005:154-155) takes up a counter-example.

(38) A: Not all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens, do they?

B: No. The 85 and 86 do, but the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.

(Iten 2005:154-155)

Iten (2005:154-155) analyzes as follows: it can be said that *not all buses from this bus stop go to Piccadilly Gardens* is the assumption that is manifest to A. However, the first part of B's utterance is likely to make it weakly manifest that the next buses mentioned will also go to Piccadilly Gardens. For example, there is a possibility of B's saying like (39).

(39) The 85 and 86 do, as do the 84 and 87. The 116 and the 195 don't, though. (op.cit:155)

Fourthly, Hall (2004:225) mentions that "for an utterance to achieve relevance as a contradiction, there must have been a possibility that the hearer would have presented the contradicted assumption as true. So if the relevance of *but*'s contribution lies in the contradiction and elimination of assumption, then this assumption must be manifest." With 'correction reading,' however, Hall (2004:225) claims that "it is difficult to identify the exact assumption in question."

As to the example in (40), Hall (2004:224) states as follows: since the first clause was obviously intended to achieve relevance as a denial, (40b) is no longer manifest to the hearer for the interpretation of the *but*-clause, so a constraint requiring that a manifest assumption be contradicted and eliminated won't be satisfied.

(40) a. That is not my sister, but my mother.

b. She is my sister.

(Hall 2004:223)

Hall (2007:172) limited herself to suggest that a full account of correction *but* is likely to involve the interaction of the conjunction reduction which encourages the correction reading, plus metalinguistic negation, and contextual factors which determine whether the correction or denial reading is preferred.

Iten's (2005) proposal, on the other hand, is clearer. Let us see Iten's (2005:149-150) observation.

(41) A: Your sister looks a lot like you.

B: That is not my sister, but my mother.

(Iten 2005:149)

In (41), A's utterance tells us that he thinks that woman in question (let's call her C) is B's sister. The more strongly A believes this, the more likely it is that B's assertion that C isn't her sister is not enough to make A discard the assumption that C is B's sister. The assertion C is B's mother is likely to succeed in eliminating A's mistaken assumption.

Umbach (2004:172) also alleges that both contrast and correction *but* are related to denial of expectation. According to Umbach (2004:172), there are different implicit questions which bring about different expectations. The contrast induces the expectation that John went to Berlin and to Paris, while the correction induces the expectation that John went to Berlin.

- (42) a. John didn't go to Berlin but he went to Paris.
 b. Did John go to Berlin and also to Paris?
 c. John might have gone to Berlin, in addition to Paris.
- (43) a. John didn't go to Berlin but to Paris.
 b. Did John go to Berlin?
 c. He might have gone to Berlin instead of Paris.

(Umbach 2004:172)

Iten's (2005) argument is supported by this observation.

Iten's (2005) proposal need not exclude the correction use, whereas Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) and Hall (2004, 2005/2007) appear to treat it as an exception. In that point, Iten (2005) is superior to Hall (2004, 2005), although Iten (2005) does not show any evidence against the suggestion that correction *but* should be treated separately.²

² In some other languages, there is a different word for correction *but*. In Spanish and German, for example, *but* is translated into *pero/aber*, and *sino/sondern* is used for correction *but*.

- (i) a. It wasn't her but Sheila who told me.
 b. No fue ella sino Sheila quien me lo dijo.
 not was she but Sheila who me it told
- (ii) a. It appears that she's not Greek but Albanian.
 b. Parece que no es griega, sino albanesa.
 It.appears that not is Greek but Albanian
- (iii) a. Not only did she hit him, but she also ...

2.6. Considerations

As we saw in the previous section, only Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) and Iten's (2005) framework can preserve a unitary analysis of *but*. Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) suggestions are almost the same as Iten's (2005). However, Iten (2005) appears to succeed in capturing the correction use better than Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002). Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) and Hall (2004, 2005/2007) seem to treat it as an exception, saying that conjunction reduction is related to the correction use. For that reason, Iten (2005) demonstrates an advantage over Hall (2004, 2005/2007). In this section, I will take up some other problematic examples to Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and demonstrate the superiority of Iten (2005).

2.6.1. Presence of Cognitive Effect

First, it should be pointed out that Hall's (2004:226) assertion that *but* does not encode the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination is open to dispute. Let us take a look at the following examples.

-
- b. No sólo le pegó sino que también ...
not only him hit but that as.much
- (iv) a. not that book but this one
b. nicht das Buch, sondern dieses
- (v) a. not only ... but also
b. nicht nur ... sondern auch

(44) A:John and Peter don't live in the same place, do they?

B:No, John lives in Amsterdam and/?? but Peter lives in Rotterdam.

(45) A:John and Peter both live in the same place, don't they?

B:No, John (indeed) lives in Amsterdam but/?? and Peter lives in
Rotterdam. (Iten 2005:138)

These examples appear to be problematic to Hall (2004, 2005/2007). In (44B), after the first clause, there cannot be a potential inferential route, such as *and so do Peter*, because B already answers 'No.' On the other hand, Iten (2005) does not claim that the previous segment triggers inference. A's question conveys the expectation that John and Peter both live in the same place. The expectation is denied by *but*-clause.

2.6.2 Additional Topic Use

Let us go on to the next problem with Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) analysis. Umbach (2001/2005) argues that in contrast examples, *but* denies an expectation while *and* does not. Let us take a look at Umbach's (2001/2005) analysis on the topic change use of *but*. Umbach (2001:175) explains the following examples as follows: in (46) Adam asks about all of the children, and Ben addresses one part of the children in the first conjunct and the other part in the second conjunct.

(46) The Topic Change³

a. Adam: What did the children do today?

b. Ben: The **small** children stayed at HOME and/but the **bigger** ones went to the ZOO.

c. Ben's quaestio when using *and*:

What did the small children do and what did the bigger ones do?

d. Ben's quaestio when using *but*:

What did the small children do, and did the bigger ones do the same?

(Umbach 2005:228)

In (47), although Adam asks about the small children only, Ben first refers to the bigger ones, and Adam had to wait for the second conjunct to get the required information.

(47) a. Adam: What did the small children do today?

b. Ben: The **bigger** children went to the ZOO, but/*and the **small** ones stayed at HOME.

3 Boldface type denotes a contrastive topic accent and CAPS denote a focus accent.

She suggests distinguishing between the overt question posed in a dialog and the implicit "quaestio" addressed in the answer. The quaestio of an utterance is supposed to be a question which is a posteriori reconstructed from the utterance. In the unmarked case in (46), for example, the quaestio reconstructed from Ben's answer is equal to Adam's question. But in (47) and (48) the quaestio of the answer is slightly different from the overt question.

c. Ben's quaestio:

What did the bigger children do, and did the small ones do the same?

In (48) Adam's question is already answered by the first conjunct and the conjunct gives information Adam did not ask for.

(48) a. Adam: What did the small children do today?

b. Ben: The **small** children stayed at HOME, but/*and the **bigger** ones went to the ZOO.

c. Ben's quaestio:

What did the small children do, and did the bigger ones do the same?

(Umbach 2001:175-176)

As you can see, in (46b), both *and* and *but* are acceptable. Umbach (2001:185/2005:227-228) argues that it is because Ben may intend his answer as either referring to the question (46c) or to the one in (46d). The crucial difference is that *but*-quaestio triggers the expectation that the bigger children did the same thing as the small ones did, while *and*-quaestio does not. Umbach's (2001:186/2005:228) observation is as follows: Ben deliberately conveys this expectation by using *but*. It is true that Ben deviates from the original topic of Adam's question, but Ben presents the additional topic as being closely related to the original one. Umbach (2001:186/2005:228) adds that Ben suggests that the additional topic is relevant, too, and the deviation is reasonable.

In (47) and (48), the use of *but* instead of *and* render and

over-informative answer acceptable. The dialogues in (47) and (48) can be explained in the same way.

The problem with Hall's (2004:226) proposal is that in (48), Adam's question is only about the small children, so it is difficult for the hearer Adam to find out a potential inference after the first conjunct. That is because it's likely that the inference will have yielded an undesirable conclusion to be eliminated if the inference is cut off, given that the *but* clause only occurs after the assumption that might have triggered an inappropriate inference, as Iten (2005:155) point outs. Following Iten (2005), the assumption to be denied should be manifest to the hearer after the whole utterance emerges. The clause proceeding *but*, 'The bigger children went to the ZOO' can make an assumption manifest, even if very weakly.

(49) The small ones went to the ZOO, too.

The hearer will find what the assumption is and the relevance is accomplished by eliminating it.

Schiffrin (1987) also recognizes this use of *but*. Schiffrin (1987:160) mentions that *but* prefaces the part of the answer which, although extraneous to the actual information requested, provides a more socially cooperative response.

(50) Sally:Did you ever have a dream, where you woke up and you found
yourself like on the floor:or...sleepwalking or anything like that?

Zelda: No I didn't. But my eh yeh. My older boy

Sally: kids?

Zelda: uh: eh: he: especially s- he- he used t'talk, in his sleep, before he married.

(Schiffrin 1987:160)

There seems to be no potential inference because Zelda gives the requested information by Sally when Zelda utters 'No, I didn't.' This problem can be solved by Iten (2005) in the same way as the previous example. In Iten (2005), an assumption is supposed to be manifest to the hearer when *but*-clause is processed. The previous sentence, 'No, I didn't' makes an assumption manifest even if weakly.

(51) I have nothing to do with this kind of disorder.

This assumption will be deleted by the *but*-clause. It can be said that *but*-clause contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context.

2.6.3 Crupi's (2004) Analysis on the Function of *But*

Another evidence of the validity of Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) and Iten (2005) comes from Crupi (2004). Crupi suggests that the segment following *but* is thematically relevant and shows us the evidence from the perspective of communicative purpose. Her analysis seems to be in favor of Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) and Iten (2005). In this subsection,

Crupi's (2004) examination will be briefly described.

First of all, I will show the essential point of Crupi's (2004) proposal on the function of *but* below.

(52) *But*, OVERRIDE: Abandon assumption of information A in favor of more thematically relevant information B. (Crupi 2004:138)

Crupi (2004) suggests that the distributional prediction of *but* can be formalized in the following manner.

(53) *But* will be found more frequently than *yet* or *still* in context where information A receives little elaboration (-ELAB) or no additional mention; and information B is highly elaborated (+ELAB) in the subsequent text.

Information A **but** information B... information B

(Crupi 2004:140)

As you can see, Crupi's (2004) proposal requires the previous segment to be explicit, but the requirement seems to be improper to capture the various functions of *but*. Anyway, the intention of referring to Crupi's (2004) analysis is not to find fault with it, but to show it can support Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) and Iten (2005).

Now, I will illustrate Crupi's (2004) explanation on the function of *but* from the perspective of communicative purpose. To show OVERRIDE effect

of *but*, Crupi (2004:98) cites the following passage from Jane Goodall's (1999) autobiography, *Reason to Hope*.

(54) The hoping, praying, desperately seeking a way to cope, damning myself for failure, praying. [New Paragraph] You see: *damning myself for failure*. Illogical, but we are not logical in situations such as this (1999, p.160). (Crupi 2004:98)

According to Crupi (2004:98-99), "in this segment of text, Goodall describes her emotional and spiritual turmoil during the illness and eventual death of her husband." In this case, information A, "Goodall's illogical behavior in blaming herself for her inability to save her husband" is a specific instance of information B, "We all are illogical in emotionally trying situations." The flow of informational content is as follows: "the informational content of A, specific aspects of Goodall's 'illogical' response, are repeated and highly elaborated in the subsequent text; whereas information, the general emotional tendencies of all human beings is not mentioned again in this segment of the book." Crupi (2004:99) states this kind of the flow of information seems inconsistent with her own formula of *but*.

However, Crupi (2004:99) extends her proposal, shown in (52), "to abandon the assumption of information A." Crupi (2004:99) claims that what is important here is that information B does not override the information content of A, rather B overrides the communicative purpose of A. Crupi (2004) gives an account of it as follows:

Information A is a self-criticism—Goodall, the scientist, condemns herself for being illogical. Information B is dismissal of that criticism on the general principal that her reactions are consistent with what most of us do under emotional stress. In the light of information B, Goodall feels justified in continuing the description of her struggle to cope with her husband’s death. While she once again picks up the theme of information A, she does not repeat the attitude of self-criticism.

(Crupi 2004:99)

Crupi’s (2005:195) proposal will be supported by the frequency rates as well. Crupi (2005:195) shows the frequency rates of *but* found in ten books. I will take up some results from her research. The source of the first one is Kingsolver 5.

Figure 1

Full text	Information A	Information B	comments
Even now they resist affinity like cats in a bag.... But gamely enough they climb together over logs of rank decay that fallen across the path.	Even now they resist affinity like cats in a bag [disunity of sisters]	gamely enough they climb together over logs of rank decay [unity(?) of sisters in movement]	Repeat B: [logs] that have fallen across the path. Rest of passage children act in unison: The children..forgot to complain about food...they swallow, shake off crumbs and drift downstream for a swim..

(Crupi 2004:305)

Information A is the conjunct prior to the connectives and information B is

the conjunct following the linking word. –ELAB (low elaboration) means that the repeat is just a single word or two or an oblique reference. In this case, information B is repeated and elaborated information B is found. See figure 2.

Figure 2

Info B previous	Info A repeat	Repeat A +elaborate	Repeat A -elaborate	Info B repeat	Repeat B +elaborate	Repeat B -elaborate
0	0	0	0	1	1	0

(Crupi 2004:305)

The source of the second one is Kingsolver 103.

Figure 3

Full text	Information A	Information B	comments
I've always believed any sin was easily rectified if only you let Jesus Christ into your heart, but here it gets complicated.	I've always believed any sin was easily rectified	here it gets complicated.	Prior B: it's hard to know what to pray for; Info A:simple solution to sin; Info B Leah's conflict in applying info A in Africa; Text turns to African women who know on conflict; Repeat A (-Elab) Mama B2 is not fazed by "her situation" [state of sin].

(Crupi 2004:305)

Figure 4 shows that you can see information B in the early part. Besides, repeated information A and a little elaborated information A are recognized.

Figure 4

Info B previous	Info A repeat	Repeat A +elaborate	Repeat A -elaborate	Info B repeat	Repeat B +elaborate	Repeat B -elaborate
1	1	0	1	0	0	0

(Crupi 2004:305)

The source of the third one is Bryson 191.

Figure 5

Full text	Information A	Information B	comments
From time to time over the ages since the continents have held a kind of grand reunion, floating back to some central spot and bumping together with slow but crushing force.	continents ...bumping together with slow [force]	[continents bumping with] crushing force.	Repeat A: Four hundred seventy million years is a span pretty much beyond grasping...it's a long time. Repeat B: ruptured outposts of the Appalachians...India is plowing into Asia like a runaway truck into a snowbank.

(Crupi 2004:307)

In the text shown in Figure 5, information A and B are repeated. Elaborated information A and B are also found.

Figure 6

Info B previous	Info A repeat	Repeat A +elaborate	Repeat A -elaborate	Info B repeat	Repeat B +elaborate	Repeat B -elaborate
0	1	1	0	1	1	0

(Crupi 2004:307)

You can see Crupi's (2005:195) research results below. The table 1 shows percentages of repeat information in conjunctive contextual model.

Table 1: Percentages of Repeat Information in Conjunctive Contextual Model

	Repeat A	(+)ELAB	(-)ELAB	Repeat B	(+)ELAB	(-)ELAB	RptB- RptA
BUT	24%	10%	14%	98%	93%	5%	74%

(+)ELAB: highly elaborated/(-)ELAB: low elaboration

(Crupi 2005:195)

Crupi (2005:195) says that the table 1 reveals that *but* is used to link conjuncts of unequal importance to a writer's communicative goals, consisting with the OVERRIDE hypothesis. According to Crupi (2005:195), the lower thematic importance of information A is clearly reflected in its percentage of repeats, only 24 %, the lowest for repeat A. On the other hand, the predicted high degree of thematic importance of information B is robustly confirmed by 95 % repeat rate. Crupi (2005:195) claims that the total percentage of +Elab (highly elaborated) information A repeats for *but* stands at just 10% of the total sample, which is a strong indication of its reduced relevance in the subsequent text. Crupi (2005:195) continues, 'the striking difference between the repeat percentages of information A and B offers convincing support for the structuring value posited for *but*: abandon assumptions of information A for the more thematically relevant assumptions of information B.'

2.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, some previous studies on functions of *but* were reviewed and I examined which is better, Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) proposal or Iten's (2005) one, for the purpose of my research. In terms of the core meaning of *but*, Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) hypothesis should be replaced with Iten (2005). Hall (2004, 2005/2007) claims that it is not good to define the core meaning of *but* as denial of expectation as Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) suggests. Hall (2004, 2005/2007) asserts that the assumption to be eliminated is not manifest to the hearer after the first segment, when *but* has a contrast reading, although the assumption to be eliminated should be manifest to him. Based on the analysis, Hall (2004:223) argues that *but* does not encode results in the elimination of a manifest assumption. Hall (2004:229) claims that the hearer doesn't have to recognize nor represent what is being denied for the use of *but* to be acceptable. Hall (2005:228) shows us that, for the purpose of unifying wide range of functions of *but*, its core meaning should be to 'suspend an inference that would result in a contradiction with what follows,' and that *but* has the cognitive effect 'denial of expectation' only if the assumption is manifest to the hearer.

However, I showed that there are some problematic examples to Hall (2004, 2005/2007) and Iten (2005) could capture the examples successfully. Crupi (2005) fails to create a unitary explanation, but captures the most common usage of *but* successfully. Iten's (2005) and Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) assertion that *but* has the procedural meaning which results in contradiction and elimination of an assumption will be well supported by her research.

Here is Iten's (2005) proposal. I will repeat (31) as (55) below.

(55) The functions of *but*

What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is
manifest in the context. (Iten 2005:147)

In the succeeding chapters, I will adapt Iten's (2005) suggestion to
compare the conjunction with adverbial conjunctions such as *however*, *still*,
yet.

Chapter 3

The Previous Studies on *However*

3.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review earlier studies and indicate some problems to be solved. In chapter 2, we showed five uses of *but*: denial of expectation, contrast, correction, objection, and diversion. Now, let us usages of *however*. There are two approaches in the previous studies. One is the local-level approach. The other is the global-level approach.

3.1.1. *However* in a Local Domain

In 3.1.1, we will see *however* in a local domain. Denial of expectation use, a contrastive use and a diversion use will be illustrated, following Halliday and Hassan (1976), Fraser (1998), and Blakemore (2002). In 3.1.2, two more functions of *however* in a global domain will be demonstrated from the perspective of the communicative purpose, based on Lenk (1998).

But and *however* have contrastive usage, which is a little bit different from denial of expectation usage (Halliday and Hassan 1976:252, Fraser 1998:135, Greenbaum 1969:65). Fraser (1998:135) illustrates it as follows.

- (1) a) I hope you understand my dilemma. **On the other hand/However/But**, I'm not sure I understand it myself.

- b) Descartes thought that ideas were innate. **On the other hand/However/But**, Hume thought they came from experience.
- c) New York used to be a nice city. ***On the other hand/However**, today, it stinks.
- d) Janie's good at jumping rope. ***On the other hand/However**, today, she fell and hurt herself. (Fraser 1998:315)

The examples in (1) show the distinction between *on the other hand* and *however*. According to Fraser (1998:135), the former discourse marker has narrower range of use than the latter. The insufficient symmetry of the alternative in (1c-d) prevents *on the other hand* from being used. If *on the other hand* is classified into contrastive connectives, we can say that the examples in (1a-b) are the cases of contrastive uses and those in (1c-d) show denial of expectation uses.

In fact, Blakemore (2002) observes three interpretations common to *but* and *however*. (2b) is an example of denial of expectation, (3b) shows a contrastive use, (4b) a diversion use. (The emphasis in the following examples is the author's. In the rest of this chapter, the emphases are the author's unless there is a notice.)

- (2) a. John is a Republican, **but** he's honest.
- b. John is a Republican; **however** he's honest. (Blakemore 2002:119)
- (3) a. New York was the windiest city in the United States today, **but** Chicago had light winds.

- b. New York was the windiest city in the United States today;
however Chicago had light winds. (ibid.)
- (4) a. A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?
 B: The 85 and 86 do, **but** the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.
- b. A: Do all the buses from this stop go to Piccadilly Gardens?
 B: The 85 and 86 do; **however** the 84 and 87 go to Cross Street.
 (ibid.)

Blakemore (2002) further demonstrates that *however* does have neither objection uses nor correction uses, the account of which will be discussed in section 3.2.1.

- (5) [speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whisky]
- a. **But** I don't drink.
- b. ? **However**, I don't drink. (op.cit.:118)
- (6) a. He's not clever, **but** hardworking.
- b. ? He's not clever; **however** not [*sic.*] hardworking.
 (op.cit.:117)

In section 3.2, formulations by Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) on functions of *however* will be briefly explicated. Based on the Relevance Theory, they suggest that *however* has the same procedural information as *but*. They also refer to the difference between *however* and *but*. They argue that *however* requires the context where the assumption should be derived from the explicit previous segment. Although their research was

conducted with regard to *however* in a local domain, there is another approach in a global domain.

3.1.2. *However* in a Global Domain

In this subsection, we will take a look at the communicative purpose of *however*, which is analyzed by Lenk (1998). I will separate between propositional use and discourse marker use according to Lenk (1998). Denial of expectation, contrast uses and diversion use will come under propositional use.

Lenk (1998) examines functions of *however*, based on the discourse theory. Lenk (1998:104) distinguishes *however* of propositional use and *however* as a discourse marker, following Quirk et al. (1972:674).

- (7) When *however* is positioned initially, it is sometimes used in the spoken language to indicate that the speaker wishes to dismiss the topic he is dealing with as one that he does not want to pursue any further.

(Quirk et al. 1972:674)

Lenk (1998:111) comments on *however* as a discourse marker, “*however*, when positioned ‘initially’ or as single element in a tone unit, is usually employed as a discourse marker in spoken discourse.”

The functions of *however* as a discourse marker is described as follows. According to Lenk (1998), there are two uses in *however* as a discourse marker.

(8) To Show the End of a Digression

However is used to signal the end of a digression which was relevant to the development of the main topic or had some interactional significance, and the subsequent return to the main topic, or in very rare cases-a shift to a new topic. (Lenk 1998:119-120)

(9) “Floor-Holding Device”

A minor function of *however*, which is used as if signaling upcoming interesting material through adding contrastive aspects to the material just talked about, is to bridge a planning pause by the speaker. The material that follows does not necessarily and the contrastive aspect that was ‘promised’ through the use of *however*. (op.cit.:120)

According to Lenk (1998:111-112), the topics that are being “dismissed” by *however* as discourse marker are not considered as independent topics in themselves by the speaker, but as digression from the main topic which were included because of their relevance to the development of the main topic, or because they bear interactional significance.

As for “Floor-Holding Device,” Lenk (1998:118) mentions that “the speaker indicates that he wants to continue talking, and that that continuation ‘promises’ to be of special interest to the hearer as it will add a contrastive aspect to what had been said before.” For that reason, ‘an interruption or speaker change during a planning pause is prevented through a ‘promise’ of more, and exciting (i.e. contrasting) detail to follow (op.cit.).’

Let us take a look at an example of the return to the main topic. Lenk (1998:108) states that “speaker *a* asks the interviewee *b* what ‘operational

research' is concerned with, and *b* answers by explaining 'operational research' as a field that originated from the study of military problems." Lenk (1998:108) continues, "he then tells her about the first problems operational researchers were confronted with during the war. First he recounts the original problem and then enters into a digression explaining what had been happening with the boats before the segment, "these small boats had been equipped". He closes the digression with *however* and then gives a short overview of the situation as it was perceived by the operational researchers when they began their investigation, which is in contrast to what had been mentioned during the digression."

(10)a does operational research is it is it primarily concerned with questions of distribution-marketing

b indeed no --- operational research started --- by studies - of military problems --- one of the first exercises ever carried out -- took place during the war --- when -- that question of whether small boats should carry anti-aircraft guns - was considered --- these small boats had been equipped -- with anti-aircraft guns -- but they weren't shooting down -- any more enemy aircraft --- and therefore certain people concluded - that these guns weren't fulfilling their function --- *however* when the operation research man looked -- at the data more closely - he discovered that fewer boats were being sunk -- in other word. (op.cit.:109, quoted without irrelevant signs)

Lenk (1998:108-109) mentions that the story which is not closely related to

the main topic is contrasted with the segment following *however*. However, it seems to me that the part following *however*, ‘when the operation research man looked -- at the data more closely - he discovered that fewer boats were being sunk – in other word,’ contradicts the previous part, ‘and therefore certain people concluded - that these guns weren’t fulfilling their function.’ The assumption derived from message being ahead of *however*, ‘these guns were not useful at all’ is eliminated by the following message, ‘fewer boats were being sunk,’ which means, ‘in reality, it was of use.’ From this observation, it can be said that the discourse marker *however* also has the same function of propositional use. Lenk (1998) herself states that it is difficult to tell functions of discourse marker from propositional use, but, if so, I wonder if there is any need to differentiate the two usages of propositional use and discourse marker.

Now let us take a look at an example of *however* as “Floor-Holding Device.”

(11) B ((to)) take it

A has he Mhm

B over in anyway. ((but)) I think that it’s possible for us to have new links which didn’t in any way cut out

A Mhm

B old ones. **however** this we’ll we’ll have to see if not Imola

A m

B Cyprus- which is once again I think. (op.cit.:119)

According to Lenk (1998:118), the example (11) shows that that speaker B uses *however* as if he wanted to add (another) contrastive aspect to the discussion about whether new business links would be possible without cutting out already existing links. Lenk (1998:119) mentions that what follows after *however* is merely an attenuation of what had been said before. The utterance before B utters *however* is a clear statement of B's personal opinion and it cannot be proven at that point in the conversation. As Lenk (1998:120) points out, in (11), in reality, the segment that follows *however* does not add contrastive aspect.

Although Lenk (1998) does not mention it, the segments both before and after *however* seem to be connected to the main topic; whether new business links would be possible without cutting out already existing links. In that point, the "Floor-Holding Device" use is different from the end of digression use

Lenk (1998) claims that there is discourse marker use which is different from propositional use. I will examine whether Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) can capture all the examples of *however* as a discourse marker and, moreover, point out problems with Lenk (1998) in section 3.3. In section 3.4, I will show you some remaining problems with Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005). Section 3.5 is the summary of this chapter.

3.2. Previous Studies on *But* and *However*

In chapter 2, we saw functions of *but*. There are intriguing previous studies comparing *but* with *however*. They are based on Relevance Theory and the unitary definition of *however* is proposed there. In this section, I will go

over Blakemore's (2002) and Schourup's (2005) discussions among previous studies on *but* and *however*.

As was mentioned above, there are a lot of cases where the coordinate conjunction *but* and the conjunctive adverb *however* can be exchanged with each other. However, it is not always possible to replace one with the other as illustrated in (12)-(16).

(12) [speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whisky]

a. **But** I don't drink.

b. ? **However**, I don't drink. (Blakemore 2002:118)

(13) A: We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.

B: **But** what about the money?

B': ?**However**, what about the money? (op.cit.:119)

(14) A: She's had a very difficult time this semester.

B: **However**, I think she should hand in at least some of the work.

(op.cit.:121)

(15) a. He's clever, **but** not hardworking. (op.cit.:110)

b. He is clever; **however**, not hardworking. (op.cit.:118)

(16) a. He isn't clever, **but** hardworking. (op.cit.:118)

b. ?He is not clever; **however**, not [*sic.*] hardworking.¹ (op.cit.:117)

From the point of view of Relevance Theory, Blakemore (2002) and Schourup

¹ As Schourup (2005) points out, this example in Blakemore (2002:117) contains an additional *not* before *hardworking*. Judging from the context, this *not* should have been omitted.

(2005) claim that both *but* and *however* share the constraint on a contextual effect, that is, the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination of an assumption, but only *however* has the restriction on the context where the cognitive effect is activated. Blakemore (2002:118-122) claims that the procedural meanings of *but* include information that the preceding context has no relevance, while the procedural meanings of *however* contain information that the segment preceding *however* is of relevance.

Regarding the second restriction, there is a subtle difference between Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005). I will briefly review each of them in Sections 3.2.1. and 3.2.2. respectively.

3.2.1. Blakemore's (2002) Analysis

In this subsection, I will briefly demonstrate how the grammaticality of the examples (12) through (16) is explained, following Blakemore's (2002) formulation. The points are summarized as follows:

- (17) a. Both *but* and *however* activate an inferential procedure which results in the contradiction and elimination of an assumption available/accessible to the hearer.
- b. *However*, but not *but*, restricts the recovery of the effect of contradiction and elimination to contexts which include assumptions carrying a guarantee of relevance accepted by the speaker and whose cognitive effects do not include the elimination of the assumption. (Blakemore 2002:122)

In other words, *but* and *however* are both linked the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination, only *however* encodes the restriction on the contexts in which this effect is recovered. Let's see how the formulation (17) can account for (12)-(16).

According to Blakemore (2002:118-121), the difference between (12a) and (12b) is explained by the fact that *but* does not encode any information about the contexts where the effect of contradiction and elimination is achieved. That means the eliminated assumption does not always need to be derivable from a previous explicit discourse segment. In addition to that, in (12a), the function of *but* is to indicate that an assumption like (18) must be eliminated. In such a context, *but* cannot be replaced with *however*.

(18) The speaker of (12) can be expected to drink the whisky that is being offered. (Blakemore 2002:122)

To put it differently, in the example (12), no information is communicated which could achieve relevance.

Both example (13) and example (14) are understood to preface an objection. The examples (13) and (14) are recited below.

(13) A: We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.

B: ?**However**, what about the money? (op.cit.:119)

(14) A: She's had a very difficult time this semester.

B: **However**, I think she should hand in at least some of the work.

(ibid.)

Blakemore (2002) explains the difference as follows. In (13), “B will be taken to be suggesting that the information communicated by A is of no relevance at all (Blakemore 2002:121).” Therefore, *however* is not acceptable. In (14), “he will be taken to be suggesting that the information that has been communicated by A has some relevance, or in other words, that he has accepted the guarantee of relevance communicated by A (Blakemore 2002:121).” That is, the context satisfies the restriction on *however*. In this example, an assumption derived from A’s utterance, such as (19), is replaced with ‘she should hand in at least some of the work.’

(19) She does not need to hand in any work.

In other words, *but* is a discourse marker which has a procedural meaning that an assumption derived from the preceding explicit or implicit context has no relevance and no cognitive effect; therefore, the assumption must be eliminated. On the other hand, *however* is a discourse marker which has a procedural meaning that an assumption derived from the preceding explicit context has relevance and cognitive effect, but the assumption must be modified. In short, the function of contradiction and elimination is shared by both *but* and *however*, only *however* encodes the information which activates a particular kind of context.

(15) can be accounted for in the same way. The use of *but/however* in (15) is based on the speaker’s assumption that the hearer will derive (20) as an implicature from the first segment *he’s clever*.

(15) a. He's clever, **but** not hardworking. (op.cit.:110)

b. He is clever; **however**, not hardworking. (op.cit.:118)

(20) He is hardworking.

The relevance of the second (reduced) segment lies in the elimination of this assumption (20).

Let us move to the example (16). It is cited again below.

(16) a. He isn't clever, **but** hardworking. (op.cit.:118)

b. ?He is not clever; **however**, not [*sic.*] hardworking. (op.cit.:117)

The first segment in (16), on the other hand, might derive the assumption that he will not pass the examination, which will not be eliminated by the second segment. The interpretation of each segment involves an inferential procedure that results in the contradiction and elimination of the same assumption. In other words, the cognitive effect activated by the first segment and the one derived by the second segment are one and the same. *However* is excluded in this context.

Blakemore (2002:117) takes up the examples (15a) and (16a) to show *but* is used with a "correction" reading; that is, "it is not clever that he is, but rather hardworking," in Schourup's (2005:87) phrase. On the other hand, '*however* is not compatible with a correction interpretation (Blakemore 2002:118).' The sentences in (15b) and (16b) cannot be given a correction reading because of the absence of an explicit negation. To use Schourup's (2005:89) words, "Blakemore (2002) sees the correction reading of these

examples as depending on a double elimination of the same assumption ‘he is clever,’ by virtue of both the negation in the first segment, and the contradiction and elimination initiated by *but* itself.”

We have seen the difference between *but* and *however*. Now, let us have a look at contrastive use of *however*, which can be replaced with *but*.

(21)a. New York was the windiest city in the United States today, *but*
Chicago had light winds.

b. New York was the windiest city in the United States today; *however*,
Chicago had light winds. (op.cit.:119)

As we saw in Chapter 2, *but* in contrastive uses also activates the procedure of contradiction and elimination. The accessible assumption to be eliminated here is shown in (22).

(22) Chicago had strong winds. (ibid.)

Blakemore (2002:120) mentions that the eliminated assumption in (22) is not derived as an implicature from the first segment. It is one that is presumed to be part of the hearer’s encyclopedic knowledge. In this case, Blakemore (2002:120) says, the speaker can be understood to be communicating her assumption that this segment will have relevance that does not involve the elimination of (22). In other words, *however* requires the contexts which include assumptions carrying a guarantee of relevance accepted by the speaker and whose cognitive effects do not include the elimination of the

assumption.

Blakemore (2002) successfully captures differences between *but* and *however*. As will be discussed later, however, the restrictions of *however* leave room for further research. Schourup (2005) comments that Blakemore's (2002) restriction on context is intricate and it is a stopgap negative condition. In the following subsection, we will see Schourup's (2005) analyses.

3.2.2. Schourup's (2005) Analysis

Schourup (2005) proposes a simpler alternative, claiming Blakemore's (2002) constraint on contexts is complicated and that it is an ad hoc negative condition. The constraint on cognitive effects (contradiction and elimination) is the same, so let me focus on the restriction on the context where the cognitive effect is to be derived.

(23) The assumption A is inferentially contingent on the explicit content of a previous utterance segment. *However* affirms this content to ensure its availability for deriving A. (Schourup 2005:102)

I will briefly demonstrate how Schourup's (2005) formulation accounts for the acceptability of the examples (13) through (16).

First, *however* cannot grant the explicit content of a prior utterance because none is present. Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) both agree that *but* does not need an explicit preceding context, while *however* needs it.

Let us begin with (13) and (14). They are quoted again below.

(13) A: We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.

B: ?**However**, what about the money? (op.cit.:119)

(14) A: She's had a very difficult time this semester.

B: **However**, I think she should hand in at least some of the work.

(ibid.)

For the example (13B), Schourup claims that it is not unacceptable but only somewhat awkward. He explains this awkwardness by the fact that A's second assertion is of a particularly subjective nature. Since it is 'affirmation' that is involved in uses of *however*, awkwardness is expected: B is not well positioned to affirm that A's lobster was excellent, which would seem to require evidence beyond A's own statement. In other words, the awkwardness derives from the presumptuousness implicit in affirming an interlocutor's private mental experience. In fact, if A's utterance is not subjective, B's utterance ceases to be awkward as in (13).

Now, we will see Schourup's (2005:95) analysis on (15) and (16).

(15) a. He's clever, **but** not hardworking. (op.cit.:110)

b. He is clever; **however**, not hardworking. (op.cit.:118)

(16) a. He isn't clever, **but** hardworking. (op.cit.:118)

b. ?He is not clever; **however**, not [*sic.*] hardworking. (op.cit.:117)

The example (15b) is perfect since *however* affirms the content 'he is clever' and the hearer use this content to infer an assumption to be denied. In the meantime, correction reading is out in (16b), because the assumption to be

denied 'he is clever' cannot be derived from the previous segment, if the content of the prior segment 'he is not clever' is affirmed by *however*.

Schourup (2005:95) explains that example (16b) is awkward because the speaker of (16b) is aiming primarily at correcting 'he is clever' to 'he is hardworking.' Therefore, it is not clear what purpose such an affirmation would serve.

Note that Schourup's (2005) proposal does not mean the previous clause must not be a sentence with negative polarity, since *however* affirms the CONTENT of the previous segment.

(24) A face-to-face interview, at this time, is not acceptable. **However**, I might be willing to correspond on matters that interest you.

(New York Times Magazine: April 29, 2007)

(25) Expectations were not high. **However**, he displayed a remarkable independence that confronted the paper's long-held prejudices.

(Washington Post: Tuesday, February 28, 2006; Page B07)

In (24), *however* affirms the previous proposition 'A face-to-face interview, at this time, is not acceptable.' The hearer is supposed to infer an assumption to be eliminated from it.

(26) I am not willing to contact you.

The assumption contradicts the message conveyed by the segment containing *however* and then is eliminated. The example (25) will be explained in the

same way.

Schourup (2005) succeeds in explaining the marginality of (16b) more simply than Blakemore (2002). At this point, Schourup (2005) seems to be superior to Blakemore (2002). In either case, however, there are some problematic cases to be solved.

3.3. Two Functions of *However* as a Discourse Marker

As we have already seen in 3.1.2, Lenk (1998) proposed that *however* has two discourse functions: *however* as a “Floor-Holding Device” and *however* as an indicator of end of a digression. I will show some problematic examples to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) in 3.3.1. In 3.3.2, problems with Lenk (1998) will be taken up.

3.3.1. Counterexamples to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005)

The first discourse function of *however* is to indicate the end of digression and the return to the main topic.

(27) B but I’m which

c dear me

B didn’t sort of help you know and I did not sort of got on with anything
very quickly because I felt lousy—and then now I have broken my best
glasses so (laughs)

c ((you’ve)) what

B broken my best glasses. so it hasn’t been a very sort of successful
(time) so yesterday I had to go up

c dear me

B to the optician's hoping to get tem back for Tuesday

c [m]

B I'm wearing some some old ones you know at the moment well
they're not old but they're they're not very elegant.

c yeah.

B *however*

c have you been stuck with any preparation for your college work

B well I've been trying but [m] –((I'm awfully)) I haven't really got on
very fast {I must day}

(op.cit.:114, quoted without irrelevant symbols for transcription)

Lenk (1998:114) says that 'example (27) illustrates how the participant in the conversation who was not the speaker of the digression can redirect the conversation to the main topic after the speaker of the digression has signaled the end of the digression with *however*.' Lenk (1998:114) explains this example as follows: "the current topic of conversation prior to the excerpt was 'how B spent her Ester vacation': where she went over the Ester weekend, that she tried to clean her flat, the she has a cold which and kept her from working quickly and efficiently, and the she had now had the misfortune to break her glasses. Speaker B evaluates her vacation as a "not very sort of successful time" and enters into digression about what she has done about the glasses, how she is coping without them at the moment, and ends this digression with *however*. Speaker c then redirects the conversation to the prior main topic of B's occupation over Ester holidays by

asking B how she got on with her preparation for her college work.”

There is no contrastive aspect in this example. Speaker B’s utterance has an absence of the segment after *however*. We cannot find any contradiction between what precedes and follows *however*. No assumption to be eliminated is clear. In other words, this is not the context where an assumption derived from the segment following *however* is eliminated. Therefore, it can not be captured by Blakemore (1987, 2002) and Schourup (2005).

However in the next example also shows the end of digression, but it indicates introduction of a new topic instead of the return to the main topic.

- (28) C they all thought his name was funny you know
 b I suppose they’d never heard of him
 C no
 b no
 C but I made them take notes it was an exercise in taking notes
 b **
 C as much as anything you know they couldn’t do that either
 however
 b **
 C how’s Dan
 b she’s splendid. Blossoming she’s getting a bit short of breath
 now because there’s only
 I suppose six weeks or so to go by physically

(op.cit.:120, quoted without unnecessary signs)

Lenk's (1998:114) explanation about the example (28) is as follows: Before this conversation, speaker C talked about her experiences with her new job. Speaker C is still telling speaker about it. Speaker C had told her students about the project and the aim of the research, and reports on their reactions. From the topic of telling her students about the survey and so on, Speaker C enters into a digression about how she made use of the Survey story to teach her incapable students how to take notes. Speaker C ends this digression and subsequently embarks on completely new topic, b's wife. There is an aspect of contrast here, because b's wife's pregnancy probably is considered a more enjoyable topic to be talking about than incapable students.

It might be also problematic to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005). It is because the assumption to be eliminated has to be definite from the previous segment if *however* guides a listener or a reader to make an inference which ends in contradiction and elimination of an assumption. The assumption that is supposed to be derived from the segment following *however* is not manifest when listeners catches the word *however*.

We have seen two types of "end of digression" usage of *however*, that is, "the return to the main topic" and "the introduction of a new topic." Let us examine an example of "Floor-Holding Device."

(29) B ((I mean)) he doesn't realize he thinks this is high((er)) powered negotiation. in fact

A m. m. m. m. m. m.

B he's making people sick **however** there was this but there was also the fact that he specifically mentioned [Peter] Harrington. you've met Harrington. (Lenk 1998:119)

The example above is explained by Lenk (1998:119) as follows: *however* is used as if to indicate that some contrastive aspect will be added to the description of the unpleasant characteristics of Mallett, the person who is the current topic of the conversation. After *however*, in effect, speaker B starts to make another report about what Mallett had done, which immediately shifts into talk focusing on the person mentioned by Mallett. In this case, the material that follows *however* does not add contrastive aspect (Lenk 1998:120). I would like to point out that, unlike the end of digression use, the segments both before and after *however* are related to the main topic. In this conversation, the main topic is considered to be about Mallett.

It seems to be problematic to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005). We cannot find an assumption which is derived from what is mentioned before *however* and contradicted what follows after *however*.

The framework of Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) can in all likelihood account of the propositional use, but it is not always possible to extend the analysis to *however* as a discourse maker. How should we solve the problem? Chapter 4 explores these questions.

3.3.2. Problems with Lenk (1998)

There are two problems with Lenk (1998). Firstly, it is not clear whether Lenk's (1998) observation holds true for written discourse. Secondly, is it really necessary to distinguish discourse marker use from propositional use? We will consider the first subject in 3.3.2.1. It will be investigated whether there are any things in common with those usages in 3.3.2.2.

3.3.2.1. Discourse Marker Use in Written Discourse

I would like you to recall Lenk's (1998:111) words on *however* as a discourse marker, "*however*, when positioned 'initially' or as single element in a tone unit, is usually employed as a discourse marker in spoken discourse." Lenk (1998) seems to say that digression ends when *however* is uttered. However, it is impossible in the cases of the sentence-internal *however*. Let us have a look at some examples.

The following example shows the return to the main topic. If Lenk (1998) were right, the digression would have to end after 'there is' in (30). Moreover, that means what precedes *however*, 'there is,' has nothing to do with the main topic. (Emphasis, and italics in the following example are the author's. In the rest of this chapter, they are the author's unless there is a notice.)

(30) Sir, The Government's drive to raise the amount of time devoted to physical education and sport (reports and leading article, November 25) is welcome. One cannot argue with any initiative aimed at raising activity levels amongst children and young people.

There is, however, a distinction between PE and sport. PE is provided for all pupils, whereas sport tends to describe children's activities before, during (breaks) and after school.

(*The Times*; November 27, 2004)

Here is another example of the return to the main topic. In (31), the digression would have to end after 'if.' In addition to that, only what follows would have to be related to the main topic, which would mean 'if' has to be excluded.

(31) If someone says "the Nazis didn't kill so many Jews and had no plan for their systematic extermination", he is a distorter of history who deserves to be intellectually refuted and morally condemned, but not imprisoned. **If, however,** someone says "kill the Jews", or "kill the Muslims", or "kill the Americans", or "kill the animal experimenters", and points to particular groups of Jews, Muslims, Americans or animal experimenters, they should be met with the full rigour of the law.

(*The Guardian*; Thursday March 2, 2006)

At a glance, it appears that the cases of end of digression do not necessarily problematic to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005).

The next example shows the function of “Floor-Holding Device.” Following Lenk (1998), *however* would signal interesting things after the words, ‘the worst thing.’ It does not make sense.

- (32) The former Yugoslavia is like a jigsaw puzzle, and Western leaders have over the past few years found themselves trying to make peace by piece. So far, none of the pieces contributes to a coherent whole, and the ones that remain to be dealt with remain just that.

The worst thing, *however*, is that, just as tens of thousands of troops flood in to pacify Kosovo, no one can guarantee conflict will not break out somewhere else.

(*The Observer*, Sunday June 13 1999)

In this subsection, I showed that Lenk’s (1998) suggestion faces difficulty in the case of the sentence-internal *however*. In the following subsection, we will examine whether or not there is the key to integrate three *however* into one, that is, propositional use, end of digression use, and “Floor-Holding Device” use.

3.3.2.2. The Possibility of Integrating Several Usages into One

Lenk (1998) distinguishes three uses. One is the propositional usage and the others are discourse marking usages. Denial of expectation, a contrastive use and a diversion use could be classified as propositional use. The end of digression and Floor-Holding Device uses would be labeled as discourse marker use. Are the three uses totally distinct and do they have

to be analyzed independently?

Here, it will be examined whether or not both discourse marker use and propositional use are found in an example at the same time.

(33) a does operational research is it is it primarily concerned with questions of distribution-marketing

b indeed no --- operational research started --- by studies - of military problems --- one of the first exercises ever carried out -- took place during the war --- when -- that question of whether small boats should carry anti-aircraft guns - was considered --- these small boats had been equipped -- with anti-aircraft guns -- but they weren't shooting down -- any more enemy aircraft --- and therefore certain people concluded - that these guns weren't fulfilling their function --- *however* when the operation research man looked -- at the data more closely - he discovered that fewer boats were being sunk -- in other word. (op.cit.:109, quoted without irrelevant signs)

Lenk (1998:108-109) mentions that the segment which is not so closely related to the main topic is contrasted with the segment following *however*. It seems to me that the part following *however*, 'when the operation research man looked -- at the data more closely - he discovered that fewer boats were being sunk -- in other word,' contradicts the previous part, 'and therefore certain people concluded - that these guns weren't fulfilling their function.' An assumption like (34) will be derived from message being ahead of *however*, 'these guns were not useful at all'

(34) In reality, it was of no use.

Then, it will be eliminated by the following message, ‘fewer boats were being sunk,’ which means, ‘in reality, it was of use.’

From this observation, it can be said that the discourse marker *however* also has the same function of propositional use. Lenk (1998) herself states that it is difficult to tell functions of discourse marker from propositional use, but, if so, I wonder if there is any need to differentiate the two usages of propositional use and discourse marker.

Now, we will see the third example of “Floor-Holding Device,” or the example of signaling upcoming interesting material about the main topic. Lenk (1998:120) observes that “Floor-Holding Device” cases do not always have contrast between the utterances before and after *however*.

(35) B ((to)) take it

A has he Mhm

B over in anyway. ((but)) I think that it’s possible for us to have new links which don’t in any way cut out

A Mhm

B old ones. **however** this we’ll we’ll have to see if not Imola

A m

B Cyprus- which is once again I think (Lenk 1998:119)

According to Lenk (1998:118), the example (35) shows that speaker B uses *however* as if he wants to add (another) contrastive aspect to the discussion

about whether new business links would be possible without cutting out already existing links. Actually, however, ‘what follows after *however* is merely an attenuation of what had been said before (Lenk 1998:119).’ The utterance before speaker B says *however*, is a clear statement of speaker B’s personal opinion and it cannot be proven at that point in the conversation. Lenk (1998:120) says that, in (35), the segment that follows *however* does not add contrastive aspect, after all.

There is no explicit contrast in this example. In any case, the hearer will derive an assumption like (36) from the segment before *however*.

(36) We do not need to see this, since it is true.

This assumption will be eliminated, for it contradicts what is said in the segment after *however*. Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) could explain this example, because contradiction and elimination of a manifest assumption can be recognized.

We have seen some examples where discourse marker use and propositional use co-exist in an example. It seems to me that there must be some link between discourse marker use and propositional use.

Now, let us examine if Lenk’s (1998) suggestion hold true for written language. I will examine the function of the return to the main topic first and then the function of “Floor-Holding Device,” signaling upcoming interesting material about the main topic. Regrettably, I could find no examples of change of topics. It may be because written language is more coherent than spoken language. Writings are usually polished so that they

have coherency before they are published. As Lenk (1985) says, this usage is rare even in spoken discourse, and it might be impossible to find examples of change of topics in formal writings, since the author are supposed to avoid unrelated topics in one text.

So, let us start with examples of returning to the main topic. The passage quoted from an article of *Washington Post*. Its title is *The Ups and Downs of 'Yo-Yo' Dieting*. In (37), *however* appears in the sentence-initial position. This is an article about repetition of losing and gaining weight which can cause diseases.

(37) FRIDAY, Oct. 24 (HealthDay News) -- For some frequent dieters, weight loss is a vicious cycle. They're gung-ho in the beginning, and the pounds melt away, but not for long. Once they stray from their diet, all the weight that was lost makes a comeback.

This weight cycling, also known as "yo-yo" dieting, has been vilified over the years. Studies have linked it to everything from high blood pressure and high cholesterol to diabetes and depression.

In fact, a 2006 review in the International Journal of Obesity by Swiss researchers of the scientific evidence noted an association between weight fluctuations and cardiovascular disease and death.

"I agree that data on weight cycling are mixed, particularly on weight regain, decreased energy expenditure, etcetera," said lead author Dr. Jean-Pierre Montani, professor and chair of physiology at the University of Fribourg.

*"However, **there is** increasing evidence that weight cycling may*

lead to cardiovascular and metabolic disorders," such as hypertension and diabetes, he added. "And the risk of complications of weight cycling seems greater in people with normal weight or slightly overweight than in obese people."

But other experts say the news on weight cycling may not be as bad as it seems, and it shouldn't discourage people from trying to lose weight. (*Washington Post*: Friday, October 24, 2008)

In the first paragraph, it is mentioned that some frequent dieters experience weight fluctuations, losing and gaining their weight over again. In the second paragraph, the weight cycling can cause diseases, such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol, diabetes and depression. The underlined part means that some data on weight cycling might be unreliable. On the other hand, the segment preceded by *however* says that there is more and more evidence that weight cycling may lead to cardiovascular and metabolic disorders. This article's main topic is that repetition of losing and gaining weight can cause diseases. Therefore, what precedes *however* is unfavorable to the argument, while what follows it is favorable to the argument. In this example, it can be said that end of digression is completed when *however* appears, and it can be said that *however* signals the return to the main topic.

In this case, from the context, the following assumption becomes manifest. Then, the message containing *however* eliminates it.

(38) If data on weight cycling are mixed, the argument would be unreliable.

Propositional use and the return to the main topic are recognized in this example.

The next example is a pair of the previous one. *However* in this example appears after ‘there is,’ while *however* in the previous one is positioned before ‘there is.’ This excerpt comes from the article of *The Times*, whose title is *Welcome for Government's plans for PE and sport*.

(39) Sir, The Government’s drive to raise the amount of time devoted to physical education and sport (reports and leading article, November 25) is welcome. One cannot argue with any initiative aimed at raising activity levels amongst children and young people.

There is, however, a distinction between PE and sport. PE is provided for all pupils, whereas sport tends to describe children’s activities before, during (breaks) and after school.

(*The Times*; November 27, 2004)

The article starts with the first paragraph in (39). The underlined part supports the fact that the Government’s drive to raise the amount of time devoted to physical education and sport is welcome. The segment containing *however* indicates that the government should distinguish PE from sport. After the second paragraph to the last one, the author appears to claim that quality PE is the key to success of the government’s drive. For the reason, it is considered that the main topic is about the importance of

quality PE. It means that the segment containing *however* is related to the main topic, while the underlined part seems to be a digression, which is less connected to the main topic.

Then, let us examine if we can recognize propositional use here. The underlined part makes an assumption like (40) manifest. It contradicts the segment ‘There is, *however*, a distinction between PE and sport.’ Then, the assumption is eliminated after all.

(40) There is no distinction between PE and sport.

In this example, also, propositional use and the return to the main topic are recognized.

We will see another pair of examples. In (41), *however* is positioned at the beginning of the sentence, or before “if.”

(41) It relies on holding on to most of the states Bush won four years ago, even as the economic crisis casts a pall over the race and the public craves a new direction after eight years of Republican rule in the White House. These states include hotly contested Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia, Indiana and Ohio – all states where most polls show the race even or Obama slightly ahead.

Sweeping those would give McCain 260 electoral votes, though doing so is far from certain.

However, if he succeeded, the Republican then would need to pick up 10 more votes by triumphing in a combination of Bush-won states:

Nevada (5 electoral votes) and Colorado (9), which public surveys show are close, as well as Iowa (7) and New Mexico (5), where polls show Obama comfortably ahead.

(*Washington Post*: Saturday, October 25, 2008)

This article from *Washington Post* is entitled *McCain sows doubts on Obama in campaign end game*. The article reports that McCain is having difficulty defeating Obama. In the first paragraph, it is described that Obama is likely to get more votes than McCain in Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia, Indiana and Ohio. The underlined part says that McCain would become superior to Obama if he could sweep those. This is opposite information to the main topic. The segment containing *however* imparts information that McCain would be still in a difficult position if he succeeded. Consequently, it is conceivable that the segment followed by *however* is what is called “digression,” and the segment preceded by *however* has a more close connection with the main topic. In short, the function of *however* here is to reconnect to the main topic.

Here, can we find out propositional use, too? The reader may derive an assumption like (42) from the underlined part.

(42) if he succeeded in sweeping those, the victory goes to McCain in the presidential election.

This assumption contradicts what follows *however*, and then it be eliminated. Both propositional use and the return to the main topic are found out in the

example above, too.

The example (43) is a pair of the example (41). *However* follows ‘if’ in this example, while it precedes ‘if’ in (41). The excerpt comes from an article of *The Guardian*. It is entitled *Space Solves--Then we'll answer it. Here, the Space Solves experts help readers make do and mend*.

(43) A shower tray must be able not only to cope with the weight of the body, but also to withstand movement. It must be well supported and perfectly level to avoid the danger of cracking. It is possible that in your case the support legs weren't adjusted correctly, thereby putting the tray under strain. Acrylic trays are particularly vulnerable, because they flex a lot anyway, and a hairline crack will quickly develop into something bigger. **If, however,** your tray is made from stone resin, it can be repaired.

(*The Guardian*: Saturday, October 25, 2008)

It is part of the answer to the inquiry on what they should do when their shower tray is cracking up. Here, how to deal with the hairline crack in the shower tray is in question. The underlined part is considered to be the worst case where it is impossible to repair the crack. The segment containing *however* conveys the condition of the case where it is possible to repair it. People usually want easier solutions. Thinking of it, what the reader wants is the information on the cases where it can be repaired. Accordingly, we could say that the segment containing *however* is related to the main topic. The underlined part is the worst case which the reader has no solution. It is opposite information to what the reader wants. Thus, the

digression ends before the segment containing *however*.

How about propositional use in this example? The reader would derive an assumption like (44) from the underlined part.

(44) It cannot be repaired.

The assumption contradicts the message ‘If your tray is made from stone resin, it can be repaired.’ Then, the assumption will be eliminated. We find both of the usages, that is, propositional use and the return to the main topic, in this example, too.

Let’s proceed to examples of *however* which signals upcoming interesting material about the main topic. The first example is quoted from an article entitled *My worst job*.

(45) I chose to do a shift from 2am to 6am once a week. It's tough because you're tired yourself at that time of night and even though you're always working with one other person, it can feel lonely.

However **the worst thing** about this shift is that the phones at that time are clogged up by what is known in the Samaritans as TMs - telephone masturbators. Samaritans aren't allowed to put the phone down on callers; to do so you would have to get a supervisor - difficult at that time of night. So you had to deal with it as best you could.

(*The Guardian*: Saturday, January 26, 2008)

The paragraph before *however* describes the night shift, which is

contributing to the main topic. The paragraph opening with *however* is about the worst aspect concerning the night shift, or about what made her most uncomfortable during the night shift. Both of the sentences preceding and following *however* are linked to the main topic. However, the latter adds more exciting and interesting aspects to the material just talked about.

Are there any manifest assumptions to be eliminated here? Since the title is *My worst job*, the reader may think the situation described in the underlined part should be the worst things and derive an assumption like (46).

(46) if it is tough to work at night when you are tired and feel lonely,
nothing is worse than that.

What follows *however* contradicts the assumption and then eliminates it.

Let us go on to the next example where *however* is located in sentence-internal position. This example is a pair of the example (45). The title of the article is *Kosovo peace fails to heal ancient ethnic feuds-- The end of the Balkan conflict may well shift tensions to neighbouring countries*.

(47) The former Yugoslavia is like a jigsaw puzzle, and Western leaders have over the past few years found themselves trying to make peace by piece. So far, none of the pieces contributes to a coherent whole, and the ones that remain to be dealt with remain just that.

The worst thing, however, is that, just as tens of thousands of

troops flood in to pacify Kosovo, no one can guarantee conflict will not break out somewhere else. (*The Observer*, Sunday June 13 1999)

This article starts with the first paragraph in (47). As is indicated in the title, the main topic is about ancient ethnic feuds which might not end. Even tens of thousands of troops to keep Kosovo peaceful might work negatively. The first paragraph in (47) says that it is difficult to unify the former Yugoslavia, which is associated with the main topic. The sentence where *however* occurs in the middle refers to an ironical result of pacifying Kosovo, which proves how difficult it is to heal ancient ethnic feuds. It is also related to the main topic. In this example, also, the segment containing *however* is providing with more interesting information concerning the main topic than the underlined part.

An assumption derived from the underlined part will be as follows.

(48) The worst thing is to fail to end the Balkan conflict.

The assumption will be eliminated since it contradicts the information reported by the segment containing *however*.

In this section, I showed the function of *however* which Lenk (1998) suggests can be applied to *however* at the beginning of the sentence in written language, although Lenk (1998) has a problem with *however* in the middle of the sentence. Regardless of the position of *however*, we could recognize its functions of returning to the main topic and signaling upcoming interesting material about the main topic

In all the examples from (33) to (47), whether *however* in the sentence-initial position or in the sentence-internal position, we ascertained presence of propositional use and discourse maker use in one example. Things in common with all the examples are that there are explicit previous contexts and the segments containing *however* is what the speaker or writer wants to say. The messages closely connected to the main topic and suggestions to change topics are both considered to be the speaker's or writer's arguments. I will propose alternative definition of *however* to support this observation in chapter 3.

3.4. Some Remaining Problems

In this section, I will indicate some problems concerning formulations by Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005). The first problem to be discussed in 3.4.1 is the position of *however*. Since both Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) only analyze sentence-initial *however*, we need to consider whether the positioning of *however* can make a difference. The second problem we will consider in 3.4.2 is the possibility of occurrence of *but* and *however*. Although *however* and *but* function in a similar way, why can it be possible for them to be used at the same time in a sentence without redundancy? In 3.4.3, I will show that neither Blakemore (1987, 2002) nor Schourup (2005) can explain how *however* works in the case of "Floor-Holding Device" observed by Lenk (1998:120), which is not taken into consideration by them.

3.4.1. On Positioning of *However*

Quirk et al. (1985:646) states that *however* cannot be placed just after the coordinate conjunction, as illustrated below. However, the acceptability is improved if *however* is not right after *but*.

(49) a*You can phone the doctor if you like, ***but however***, I very much doubt whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

b.?You can phone the doctor if you like, ***but*** I very much doubt, ***however***, whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

(Quirk et al. 1985:646)

Garner (1998) suggests that *however* in the middle of the sentence has a different function from that of initial *however*. Garner's (1998) argument is as below.

(50) *however* in the middle of the sentence has a function of indicating that a part of the previous constitutes is emphasized and what are the contrasted elements.

(Garner 1998:342)

Both Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) only analyze sentence-initial *however*, so we will consider whether the positioning of *however* can make a difference. The difference of acceptability by positioning of *however* will be taken up in chapter 5.

3.4.2. The Co-occurrence of *However* and *But*

In 3.4.1, I introduced Quirk et al.'s (1985:646) observation that *however*

cannot be adjacent to the coordinate conjunction *but*. When *however* is not right after *but*, the acceptability is improved but not perfectly acceptable. However, Halliday and Hassan (1976:250) mention that *however* can be used with *but* in a sentence, but not with *yet*. In fact, we can see the co-occurrence of them in articles, magazines, newspaper and literature.

The following example is quoted from a passage of a novel by Jane Austen (1813/1906) and from a transcript of President Johnson's address to the nation night before as recorded by The New York Times.

(51) When she was only fifteen, there was a gentleman at my brother Gardiner's in town, so much in love with her, that my sister-in-law was sure he would make her an offer before we came away. **But however** he did not.

(Jane Austen (1813/1906). *Pride and Prejudice*, p64
Edinburg : J. Grant)

(52) The chief diplomatic and military officers of this Government all were instructed to follow the same course. And since that night on March 31, each of the candidates has had differing ideas about the Government's policy, **but** generally speaking, **however**, throughout the campaign we have been able to present a united voice, supporting our Government and supporting our men in Vietnam.

(*The New York Times*: November 1, 1968)

According to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005), *however* and *but* function in a similar way. Then, the co-occurrence should be redundant, as

Quirk et al.'s (1985) argues. We need to consider what makes it possible. The speculation on this issue is picked up in chapter 4.

Based on Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005), there is only one difference between *but* and *however*. *However* has a constraint on the context, while *but* does not. The examples (54) and (55) show their suggestions are not good enough to capture the co-occurrence of *but* and *however*. We need to consider why *but* and *however* can co-occur, even though they are regarded as quite similar words. We will pursue an alternative proposal to capture the reason of it in chapter 3.

3.5. Summary

In this chapter, I critically reviewed Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) as representative studies in Relevance Theory on the functions of *however*, and indicated some problems with them.

Firstly, I claimed that two communicative uses of *however* observed by Lenk (1998) might present knotty problems for Blakemore (1987, 2002) and Schourup (2005). Whether *however* is used to “hold floor” or to signal the end of digression, neither Blakemore (2002) nor Schourup (2005) can account for the usages in question. Their approach is limited to local level and do not take into consideration global communicative purposes. In order to find any cues to integrate several usages of *however* observed by Lenk (1998) into one, we investigated whether *however* in written discourse can be captured by Lenk (1998). Although Lenk's (1998) suggestion seems to have a problem with *however* in the middle of the sentence in written discourse, it was confirmed that there appears to be some commonalities in most cases.

Secondly, as pointed out by Halliday and Hassan (1976), *however* can be used with *but* in a sentence. If *however* differs from *but* only in having a contextual restriction, what makes it possible for them to appear at the same time in a sentence without redundancy?

Lastly, Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) focus on *however* at the beginning of a sentence although the positioning of *however* can vary. It should be studied whether the positioning of *however* can make a difference.

Chapter 4

Alternative Proposal for *However*

4.1. Introduction

In chapter 3, it was reported that Quirk et al. (1985:646) claims that *however* cannot be placed just after the coordinate conjunction *but* and that the acceptability is low even when *however* and *but* do not lie next to each other.

(1) a*You can phone the doctor if you like, *but however*, I very much doubt whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

b.?You can phone the doctor if you like, *but* I very much doubt, *however*, whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

(Quirk et al. 1985:646)

As we have seen in chapter 3, Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) postulate that *however* and *but* encode almost the same information. According to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005), there is a single difference between *but* and *however*. They observe that *however* has a constraint on the context, while *but* does not. If so, the co-occurrence should be redundant, as Quirk et al. (1985) argues.

However, Halliday and Hassan (1976:250) mention that *however* can be used with *but* in a sentence, but it can not be used with *yet*. In reality, we

can see the co-occurrence of *but* and *however* in articles, magazines, newspapers and literary works. Section 4.2 will provide several tokens of co-occurrence from them. Those tokens will be a piece of evidence to show Quirk et al.'s (1985) suggestion is not good enough to capture the co-occurrence of *but* and *however*. Thus, we need to consider why *but* and *however* can co-occur, even though they are considered to be quite similar words. An alternative proposal to capture the reason for it will be provided in section 4.3. The speculation on this issue will be picked up in section 4.4. Section 4.5 will provide my explanation on co-occurrence of *although* and *however*. Section 4.6 is the summary of this chapter.

4.2. Co-occurrence of *But* and *However*

It is not only Quirk et al. (1985) who argue that it is undesirable for *but* to be used with *however* at the same time in a sentence. Araki et al. (1985:543) also say that the co-occurrence of *but* and *however* as shown in (2) is verbose in literary style and should be avoided.

(2) *But* these plans, *however*, cannot be carried out without money.

(Araki et al. 1985:543)

Morris ed. (1969:261) says too much contrast can ruin a sentence, and that the contrastive conjunction *but* is redundant when used with *however*. According to Morris ed. (1969:261), it is hard to justify the sentence illustrated below.

(3) ***But*** the army, ***however***, went on with its plans. (Morris ed. 1969:261)

In colloquial style, *however* sometimes follows just after *but*. As pointed out by Quirk et al. (1985:643), emphatic endorsement by conjunct co-occurrence of the same class is more characteristic of loose informal talk rather than formal writings. The co-occurrence of *but* and *however* is no exception. Araki et al. (1985:543) points out that this kind of co-occurrence can be often recognized in conversation. In addition to that, Araki et al. (1985:543) deliver an opinion that the adjacency gives the reader/hearer the impression that it is not a careless mistake. This comment does not correspond to the degree of the acceptability of (1a) and (1b). Whatever the case, I found that both patterns are recognized in materials with colloquial style.

The difference between literary style and colloquial style should not be ignored when we think of the co-occurrence of *but* and *however*. As Araki et al. (1985:543) mention, it is not always unacceptable that *however* immediately follows *but*. In very truth, many tokens were found in publication. Now, we will look at examples. Let us start with the cases where *however* is adjacent to *but*. The sequence of “*but however*” can be found in classic literature. In literature, exaggeration for effect is allowed, so it would be all right to use *but* and *however* at the same time. (The emphasis and italics in the examples below is the author’s. In the rest of this chapter, they are the author’s unless there is a notice.)

(4) a. When she was only fifteen, there was a gentleman at my brother Gardiner's in town, so much in love with her, that my sister-in-law was sure he would make her an offer before we came away. **But however** he did not.

(Jane Austen (1813/1906). *Pride and Prejudice*, p64. Edinburg: J. Grant)

b. 'Yes. Betwixt you and me, ma'am,' returned Mr. Bumble, 'that's the great principle; and that's the reason why, if you look at any cases that get into them owdacious newspapers, you'll always observe that sick families have been relieved with slices of cheese. That's the rule now, Mrs. Corney, all over the country. **But, however,**' said the beadle, stopping to unpack his bundle, 'these are official secrets, ma'am; not to be spoken of; except, as I may say, among the porochial officers, such as ourselves.

(Charles Dickens (1838), *Oliver Twist Or The Parish Boy's Progress*,

Chapter XXIII, p214. London: Chapman & Hall: Humphrey Milford)

c. 'I'll tell you that, too, at some future period. I happened to be in a very good humour just then; but, though I was complaisant and gracious enough, I took care not to compromise myself in any possible way. **But, however,** the conceited wretch chose to interpret my amiability of temper his own way, and at length presumed upon my indulgence so far--what do you think?--he actually made me an offer!'

(Anne Brontë (1911), *Agnes Grey*, Chapter 14: The Rector,

p189. Edinburg: J. Grant)

(5) a. Well, after Mrs. Mayoress was gone, her two daughters came in, and they called for the gentlewoman too, and they talked a long while to me, and I answered them in my innocent way; but always, if they asked me whether I resolved to be a gentlewoman, I answered Yes. At last one of them asked me what a gentlewoman was? That puzzled me much; **but, however**, I explained myself negatively, that it was one that did not go to service, to do housework.

(Daniel Defoe (1721). *the Fortunes & Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders*, Chapter 1, p13. London: Oxford University Press)

b. **But, however**, I shall so far do justice to this part of the Academy, as to acknowledge that all of them were not so visionary.

(Jonathan Swift (1906), *Gulliver's Travels*, Chapter VI,
p174 London: J.M. Dent)

c. "To be certain," said the boy, "it is honestly worth two, when your ladyship considers what a risk I run; **but, however**, if your ladyship will promise me the two guineas, I'll e'en venture: to be certain it is a sinful thing to ride about my measter's horses; but one comfort is, I can only be turned away, and two guineas will partly make me amends."

(Henry Fielding (1882). *The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling*,
Book X - Chapter IX, p83 London: Smith, Elder)

In modern English also, such tokens can be found. The following passage comes from a program where a famous columnist answers questions over the

phone.

- (6) Dear Mr. McClintock, How long does one wait for a contractor? I understand the best are busy but I've waited for three months for this guy to start a project. His answering service is lousy, he leaves messages late, or on Friday afternoons or times when I'm not available. I don't want to be blunt; **but however**, I tempted to tell him to either start the project (In the midst of Christmas season!) or forget it.

(Washington Post; Thursday, December 1, 2005)

The following examples (7) and (8) are quoted from transcripts of live online discussions.

- (7) After an award winning portrayal, it's the challenge of the actor (and I guess their agent) to find future roles that fit the actor. That's why some people win for such obvious reasons and never win again. **But however**, sometimes continued fame (or luck) sway the judgment of existing actors performing somewhat less than stellar parts.

(Washington Post; Monday, December 22, 2003)

- (8) I am very heartened by the voices of democracy that we are growing to hear in the Middle East **but however** if supposing that elections are held, wouldn't there be a chance that terrorist and fundamentalist organization might rise to power? *(Washington Post; Monday, March 14, 2005)*

The next one is the transcript from the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment hearings when President Clinton was impeached because of Clinton-Lewinsky affair.

(9) REP. COBLE: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Davis, in a Washington Post interview comparing the impeachment process with Watergate, you indicated that we're in an uglier political time now. Now much has been said about the late President Kennedy's sexual indiscretions that were not publicized **but however** were commonly known.

(Transcripts from the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment hearings, Day Four: December 9, 1998.)

The example below is cited from *The Aubrey-Maturin series*, which is a sequence of historical novels in modern literature.

(10) 'I am afraid it is going to turn out a truly dirty night,' said Jack. He stood up and in his sure-footed seaman's way walked over to his barometer. 'Yes,' he said. 'Dirtier than I had thought.' He came back and gazed out at the darkness, full of rain and flying water from the ship's bow-wave, more and more as she increased her way. '**But, however,**' he went on, 'I am most heartily glad to be at sea.

(*Blue at the Mizzen*,

by Patrick O'Brian, W. W. Norton & Co., 1999, p.4)

The example (4) is a narrative part of a story. The examples (5) and (6) are obviously spoken language. Therefore, it can be safely said that “*But however*” can be used in colloquial expressions as Araki et al. (1985) claim.

However, I doubt that the cases where *however* does not appear immediately after *but* are found only in spoken language, because I found some examples in written language. We will see some examples of the cases where *however* does not appear right after *but*. The examples (11) and (12) are transcripts, which are evidently spoken language. The passage in (11) comes from a transcript of President Johnson’s address to the nation last night as recorded by *The New York Times*.

(11) The chief diplomatic and military officers of this Government all were instructed to follow the same course. And since that night on March 31, each of the candidates has had differing ideas about the Government’s policy, **but** generally speaking, **however**, throughout the campaign we have been able to present a united voice, supporting our Government and supporting our men in Vietnam.

(*The New York Times*; November 1, 1968, Text of President Johnson’s Broadcast to the Nation Announcing a Bombing Halt.)

The passage in (12) is quoted from the transcript of Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings.

(12) U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HOLDS A HEARING ON THE
NOMINATION OF JOHN ROBERTS TO BE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT

(snip)

HATCH: OK.

Now, the chairman and ranking member have raised some important issues, and I may turn to some of them shortly. **But** I believe, **however**, that we should start with first principles before exploring how those principles should be applied.

(*Washington Post*; Tuesday, September 13, 2005)

In articles also, ‘*but...however*’ can be found. The example (13) is cited from *The New York Times*.

(13) THIS truth-telling has not always endeared him to Indians. India’s newspapers may be filled with outraged revelations about civic inefficiency and corruption. India’s self-accusations may often be as harsh as any Mr. Naipaul has made. **But** there is, **however**, a tacit agreement that this is not for outside dissemination, that Western stereotypes of India as a backward country should not be pandered to. Thus Mr. Naipaul is regarded as the outsider with inside information, the man who betrays. (*The New York Times*; December 30, 1990)

The examples (14) to (19) come from *Washington Post*.

(14) Of course a single, hastily constructed statistical model is inadequate to prove the existence or estimate the true impact of Little Mo on early primary voting. Other models using different or more highly refined variables might produce different results. **But** it's interesting, **however**, to note that other researchers have detected somewhat similar effects. Political scientist Larry Bartels, who literally wrote the book on political momentum, argued in the late 1980s that many voters use a simple winner/loser calculation to decide which candidate to support in primaries.

(Washington Post; Polling Director; Monday, January 31, 2000)

(15) The Soviets created a second satellite system in the late 1980s – this one in geostationary orbit, meaning that these satellites remain fixed in one place above the Earth's surface. Two of these are still functioning, Podvig said, with one sited to cover some of the gaps in the original array of satellite.

But gaps remain, **however**.

(Washington Post; Wednesday, February 10, 1999)

(16) The District has its killers, as critics love to note, ignoring the steady decline in homicide victims and the improved arrest statistics. And, yes, one murder is too many.

But our city, **however**, hasn't had anything like Wichita's BTK murderer (bind, torture, kill) who terrorized that city for 30 years.

(Washington Post; Saturday, March 12, 2005)

(17)Other studies, most notably by AAA, have found dogs to be the overwhelming choice of animal travel companions, comprising nearly 80 percent of pets on trips (15 percent are cats, and the remainder include birds, fish, ferrets and rabbits).

Starwood was sold on the growing industry trend **but** did, **however**, set a per-dog weight limit of 40 pounds at Westin hotels and 80 pounds at Sheraton and W hotels.

(Washington Post; Sunday, October 12, 2003)

(18)At the Islamic Scholars Union, the mullahs told me that their countrymen had accepted the Saudi mosques for a simple reason -- they couldn't afford to build their own. But Mullah Talat Mantiq bitterly pointed out that in the years before the establishment of the U.N. Oil for Food Program in 1996, when people in the region were starving, the Saudis were building mosques -- **but** were not, **however**, donating food, clothing or medicine.

(Washington Post; Sunday, August 11, 2002)

(19)Another story tells of basic training where, for some reason, "[t]he soldiers here don't spend their time shining boots, singing cadences or doing countless push-ups." Wonderful! **But** they do, **however**, shout "Long live Iraq!" in what is described as "unison." No doubt.

(Washington Post; Thursday, December 1, 2005)

The following passages in (20) and (21) are excerpts from *The Times*.

(20) Prevention is therefore all-important. This is what justifies the drastic contingency plans now being drawn up by the World Health Organisation and the cost of measures already taken by worried governments. Britain has not yet ordered poultry to be brought indoors — a step that would be very costly for organic farmers, whose birds would lose their free-range status. These now account for 27 per cent of total egg production. **But** it has, **however**, already taken other steps that are sensible. *(The Times: August 23, 2005)*

(21) There generally isn't a problem with drinking freshly squeezed fruit juice unless you have a tendency towards an over-acidic gut, in which case you may find citrus too much to stomach. **But** you do, **however**, need to watch the combination of sugar and acids in the juice, as these can cause tooth decay. *(The Times; January 25, 2005)*

The examples (22) to (24) are quoted from *The Guardian*.

(22) It's hard to love Western Road **but** it does, **however**, boast Kambi's, a Lebanese BYOB restaurant with a takeaway counter to satisfy the quickest and pickiest of quick biters.

(The Guardian; Friday May 4, 2001)

(23) Whether Arirang can provide new momentum for engagement, or attract more tourist bucks, remains to be seen. **But** for now, **however**, it is party time - at least in the surreal city that is Pyongyang.

(The Guardian; Friday May 17, 2002)

(24) I also watch the news, just as desperate and heart-sick, **but** I do, **however**, know exactly who is on the other side of those guns, and who is sitting at home in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv watching the events on Israeli television - and why they fail to rise up in rage against their government for perpetrating all this in their name.

(*The Guardian*; Tuesday October 24, 2000)

Those examples support Quirk et al.'s (1985:643) observation that 'emphatic endorsement by conjunct co-occurrence of the same class is more characteristic of loose informal talk rather than formal writing.' In this section, I showed that the combination of *but* and *however* might not be accepted in formal writings, but it can be permissible in spoken language, literature and newspapers. What makes it possible that *but* and *however* co-occur?

In the meanwhile, other concessive conjunctive adverbs can co-occur with *but* and sometimes they can be adjacent to *but*. It is shown in (25) and (26) that *but yet* and *but still* can be used without problems. *Though* and *nevertheless* can be used with *but* in a sentence, too. In (26), *yet* is immobile in front of its clause.

(25) a. It's certainly cold, **but still** it might be colder.

(Otsuka et al. 1969:506)

b. Clare didn't do much work, **but** she **still** passed the exam.

(LDOCE³)

(26) It's very fine weather for a walk, **but yet** I don't think I'll go out.

(Otsuka et al. 1969:506)

(27) a. John doesn't look very happy **but** Mary seems all right, **though**.

b. John doesn't look very happy **but** Mary, **though**, seems all right.

(Quirk et al. 1985:646)

(28) a. Numbers have declined since the 1950s **but nevertheless** these migrant birds continued to breed in Britain until 1998 and many from Scandinavia had also appeared to colonise parts of Scotland.

(*The Times*; August 20, 2004)

b. All the money involved in these transactions was held by the UN **but** the arrangement **nevertheless** gave Saddam room to reward people outside Iraq.

(*The Sunday Times*; October 10, 2004)

Quirk et al. (1985:643) alleges that it is possible to 'have a conjunct co-occur with one or more from the same class and achieve the effect of emphatic endorsement rather than of tautology.' It will be discussed and demonstrated in detail how the co-occurrence can achieve the effect of emphatic endorsement in the following section.

4.3. An Alternative Proposal

In the previous section, we have already confirmed that *however* can be used with *but* in a sentence. How can Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) explain the co-occurrence of *but* and *however*? Remember that Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) make the point that *however* and *but* convey

quite similar information. The difference between *but* and *however* is that *however* has a constraint on the context, although *but* does not. See (29) and (30).

(29) The procedural information in common with *but* and *however*

Cognitive Effect: Contradiction and elimination of an assumption.

(30) The restriction on the context for *however*

However affirms the explicit content of the preceding segment and simultaneously connects it to an assumption inferentially.

Would the single difference enable *but* and *however* to co-occur? The idea seems to lack in persuasiveness. Instead, I will argue that *however* does not have procedural information but conceptual information, based on the observation by Higashimori and Yoshimura (2003). With regard to co-occurrence of function words which play seemingly similar roles, Higashimori and Yoshimura (2003:113-116) make an interesting proposal. In response to Andersen's (1998:164) analyses, they weigh the differences between *sort of* and *like*.

(31) a. Gradually it *sort of like* brings people out of themselves and do you know what I mean, they learn to do things.

(Higashimori and Yoshimura 2003:115)

b. *Sort of, like* when your combing your hair, innit erm, (sic) in the bath keeps on, do my hair, do my hair. (op.cit:116)

- c. Well you put another word in between each letter of the other word
sort of like. (op.cit:116)

They make an assertion that the former has the conceptual information of *not entirely*, while the latter has only procedural information which tells the hearer to extend the scope of the modified word. It is because the type of information is different that *sort of* and *like* can co-occur as follows.

Given that one has only procedural information and the other has conceptual information although they are synonyms like that, we could say as follows, on the information that *but*, *however*, *still*, and *yet* have.

(32) 1. *But* has procedural information.

2. *However*, *still*, and *yet* have conceptual information.

The combinations of *but still* and *but yet* are no problem since the types of information which *still* and *yet* have differ from *but*. The combination of the words that has conceptual information will be barred out only if it is too redundant. In 4.3.1, it will be taken up what conceptual information and procedural information are. Hereinafter, we will look at the conceptual information of *however* in 4.3.2. The conceptual information of *still* and *yet* will be dealt with in chapter 6. I will also consider the possibility of *however* being combined with *still* and *yet*.

4.3.1. Conceptual Information and Procedural Information

In Chapter 1, we have already learned that there are two kinds of information in Relevance Theory; conceptual information and procedural information. Here, it will be briefly explained again. In Relevance Theory, the intention of the speaker is considered to modify the hearer's cognitive environment (Higashimori and Yoshimura 2003:13). "The cognitive environment consists of a set of logical forms which express assumptions. It is called 'cognitive effect' to correct the cognitive environment by deleting a logical form, adding one or modifying the degree of conviction. (Higashimori and Yoshimura 2003:139)." Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) claims that *but* and *however* encodes a procedure which can be denied in terms of the cognitive effect of contradiction and elimination. This information is called "procedural meaning" and distinguished from "conceptual meaning."

Furthermore, the assumption conveyed by the utterance is divided into two, that is, 'explicature' which is an explicit meaning directly based on the utterance and 'implicature' inferred from it. In the following example, Mary's utterance in (33) will be explicature as it is, but it cannot be the answer to Peter's question. However, Peter can get the implicature (34b) through the inference based on the knowledge of encyclopedia like (34a).

(33) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?

Mary: I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:194)

(34) a. A Mercedes is an expensive car.

b. Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes. (implicature)

Explicature consists of conceptual meanings, which are the meanings of nouns and verbs, what is called, content words. There are some words and phrases which indicate how to infer when the hearer gets implicature through an inference starting from explicature. This function that conjunctions *and*, *but* as well as other discourse markers have is called procedural meanings. For instance, the example (35) has the same truth value, but the interpretations are totally different. In the context of "P so Q," *so* indicates that the conclusion Q is based on the premise P and Q should be added to the cognitive environment as a new assumption. On the other hand, in the context "P after all Q," *after all* is opposite. P is a conclusion and Q is the premise to conduct to P. It guides the hearer to consider Q as an assumption that strengthens an existing assumption.

(35) a. Ben is a New Zealander. *So* he loves rugby.

b. Ben is a New Zealander. *After all* he loves rugby.

(Blakemore 2002:33)

Concerning the characteristics of the words with the procedural information, Blakemore (2002:83) says, "It is hard to paraphrase them. If you ask a Native English speaker what *but* means, you will be told how to use it, not the paraphrase." Moreover, "Discourse makers with procedural meanings do

not have the adverbs that mean the same things (Blakemore 2002:83-84).”

4.3.2. Conceptual Information of *However*

Blakemore (2002:83) states that the word with procedural information is difficult to be paraphrased. According to Blakemore (2002:83), if you ask a native speaker of English what *but* means, you will be told how to use it. *However* seems to be different from *but*. Quirk *et al.* (1985:641) suggests that *however* can be paraphrase as ‘HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE.’

(36) He didn’t like the food. **However, [However true that may be],** he didn’t complain about it. (Quirk *et al.* 1985:641)

It means that *however* could have conceptual information but not procedural information.

Halliday (1976:254-255) hypothesizes that DISMISSIVE expression is a generalized form of the adversative relation. *In any case, either way, whether...or not* will be taken up as DISMISSIVE expression. When the meaning is more generalized, unlimited possibility can be included. The expression *no matter what* is classified into it. It requires the premise that something precedes it. Thus, ‘*however that may be*’ conveys the message that, whatever precedes it, it will be dismissed. Then, it comes right down to change of topics. Current adversative meaning of *however* was derived from the generalized meaning that, in fact, it has carried in the past. Halliday’s (1976:254-255) argument appears to support Quirk *et al.*’s

1985:641) suggestion.

I guess that dismissal *however*, ‘HOWEVER THAT MAY BE,’ started to be used as an adversative connective ‘HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE’ by loosening in the history. Wilson and Carston (2007:236-239) claims that there is a type of broadening called *category extension*. *Category extension* refers to the case where the use of salient brand names (‘Hoover,’ ‘Xerox,’ ‘Sellotape’) donates a broader category (vacuum cleaner, photocopier, sticky tape). Wilson and Carston (2007:236) argue that “personal name (‘Chomsky,’ ‘Shakespeare’) and common noun both led themselves to category extension.”

(37)a. Iraq is this generation’s *Vietnam*.

b. I don’t believe it—they’ve appointed another *Chomsky*.

c. Handguns are the new *flick-knives*.

d. Ironing is the new *yoga*. (Wilson and Carston 2007:236)

According to Wilson and Carston (2007:236), the example (37a) shows that *Vietnam* may be understood as conveying ad hoc concept. The ad hoc concept represents the category of disastrous military interventions. In (37b), *Chomsky* might be considered to convey as hoc concept which represents a broader category of forceful exponents of a particular approach to linguistics. In (37c), ad hoc concept of *flick-knives* might represent the broader category of teenage weapons of choice. The example (37d) shows ad hoc concept of *yoga* might represent the category of fashionable pastimes

for relieving stress.

Wilson and Carston (2007:236-239) examine only ad hoc concepts of nouns. However, their analyses could be applied to the lexical change of *however* in the past. The ad hoc concept will represent the broader category of reservation of inferences. I suppose that ad hoc concepts of *however* were determined, depending on the manifestness. We have already seen that the degree of manifestness is related to the interpretation in chapter 2 and 3. The manifestness seems to be the key to capture several readings. In the original use, every possibility is reserved, so *however* would have been used only in the context where the manifestness of an assumption is weak. Later, *however* would have begun to be used in the context where there is a manifest assumption or a weakly manifest one.

Wilson and Carston (2007:238-239) make an assertion that lexical adjustment may be used once and then forgotten, creating an ad hoc concept tied to a particular context that may never occur again. However, some of these pragmatically constructed senses may be regularly and frequently used in the communicative interactions of a few people or a group. The pragmatic process of concept construction becomes gradually more and more common, and eventually stabilizes as an extra lexical sense. Moreover, Hall (2004:226) makes an interesting assertion: ‘if there’s any link between certain cognitive effects and connectives, it has to be more accidental and indirect than is suggested by an attempt at this kind of categorization.’ This comment could support my hypothesis.

By the way, Blakemore (1987, 2002) and Schourup (2005) argue that

however is directly related to elimination of the contradicting assumption. I doubt that it is true. Greenbaum (1969:65) alleges that '*however* express some reservation with respect to what has been mentioned previously.' Greenbaum (1969) does not explain what the word 'reservation' exactly means, but it might mean that the elimination of derived inference would not be encoded in the information of *however*. I suppose that Hall's (2004:226) observation on *but* amounts to the same as my hypothesis on *however*. According to Hall (2004:226), 'the main relevance, even in denial uses, lies not in contradiction and elimination of this assumption, but in getting the hearer to entertain the implicated premise and the fact that the state of affairs introduced by the *but*-clause is an exception, from which the cognitive effects of the utterance follow.' I would like to argue that the conceptual information of *however* contributes to inference just indirectly. The cognitive effects of the utterance are brought about as an incidental.

On the basis of those observations, I would like to claim that the conceptual information of *however*, 'HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE,' directs the hearer to accept the preceding content as the truth. I assume that *however* does not contain procedural information of elimination of an assumption. The conceptual information of *however* just guarantees a relevance to what precedes it through its meaning and a contradicting assumption will be manifest from it. If *however* has nothing to do with the elimination, how can the interpretation of denial of expectation be recognized? As for the elimination of an existing assumption, Higashimori and Yoshimura (2003:17) states that the weaker information will be

eliminated when new and old information contradict each other. For example, person B watch person A going out of the library with Russian books and then he has an assumption shown in (38).

(38) A knows Russian. (Higashimori and Yoshimura 2003:17)

Several days later, person B hears person A saying ‘I wish I knew Russian.’ As a result, person B understands that A does not know Russian. The existing assumption that contradicts this new information will be eliminated and modified the cognitive environment. The segment in which *however* appears conveys the speaker’s or the writer’s argument and suggestion. Then, the information must be stronger than the existing assumption. Consequently, the assumption will be eliminated. Contrastingly, as we have seen in chapter 2, *but* itself has procedural information of contradiction and elimination of an assumption.

Here, I would like to explain how conceptual information of *however* contributes to the interpretations. The pronoun ‘that’ in ‘HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE’ refers to the information conveyed by the previous explicit segment. So, the affirmation of the content of the previous explicit segment is ensured by the conceptual information. As we have seen in chapter 3, what the speaker or writer wants to say occurs in the segment containing *however*. Thinking of the communicative purpose, the information must be stronger than the contradicting assumption. As Higashimori and Yoshimura (2003:17) point out, the weaker information will be eliminated.

I will sum up contribution of the conceptual information of *however* below.

(39) Contribution of Conceptual Information of *However*

a. Denial of Expectation

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and directs the readers/listeners to take it as truth. A contradicting assumption derived from what precedes it. The segment which contains *however* conveys the speaker's or writer's argument. Accordingly, the information is stronger than the contradicting assumption, and then the latter will be eliminated.

b. Change of Topics/ Floor-Holding Device

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and affirms the content. Unlimited possibilities emerge from the context, and they will be reserved because they are not manifest enough to be eliminated.

I suppose that whether to eliminate or reserve something that emerges from the context is not determined by *however* per se.

The advantage of this alternative suggestion is that the conceptual information of *however* contains the speaker's affirmation of the previous information and, therefore, the restriction on the context suggested by Blakemore (1987, 2002) and Schourup (2005) is not necessary. The specified context for *however* is quoted in (40) again.

(40) *However* affirms the explicit content of the preceding segment and simultaneously helps the reader or listener to make an inference from what precedes it to a contradicting conclusion.

Let us move on to how my alternative proposal works in accounting for two discourse functions explored by Lenk (1985): the signal of the end of digression (the return to the main topic, and the change of topics), and the introduction of interesting material about the main topic (Floor-Holding Device).

Firstly, I will consider the return to the main topic.

(41)a does operational research is it is it primarily concerned with questions of distribution-marketing

b indeed no --- operational research started --- by studies - of military problems --- one of the first exercises ever carried out -- took place during the war --- when -- that question of whether small boats should carry anti-aircraft guns - was considered --- these small boats had been equipped -- with anti-aircraft guns -- but they weren't shooting down -- any more enemy aircraft --- and therefore certain people concluded - that these guns weren't fulfilling their function --- *however* when the operation research man looked -- at the data more closely - he discovered that fewer boats were being sunk -- in other word. (Lenk 1998:109, quoted without irrelevant signs)

The function of return to the main topic is assumed to derive from the conceptual information of *however*, or ‘HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE.’ I hypothesize that *however* guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and affirms the content and simultaneously a contradiction conclusion comes up out of what precedes it. Thinking of the conceptual information, new information should follow after *however*. The natural extension should be that the speakers’ and authors’ ideas, opinions, points in dispute will be expressed after *however*.

Based on the conceptual information of *however*, the hearer learns that the speaker admits the content that “the guns weren’t fulfilling their function” as truth. In this context, an assumption like (42) becomes manifest from the segment prior to *however*.

(42) If the guns weren’t fulfilling their function, many boats would be sunk.

The wrong conclusion will be eliminated as it contradicts the information following *however* and the former is weaker than the latter. The example is not problematic to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005), since there is a manifest assumption.

The second subject is about change of topics. As we have already seen in chapter 3, Quirk et al. (1972) also observe this usage.

(43) When *however* is positioned initially, it is sometimes used in the spoken language to indicate that the speaker wishes to dismiss the topic he is dealing with as one that he does not want to pursue any further.

(Quirk et al. 1972:674)

How can this usage be captured by my alternative proposal?

- (44) C they all thought his name was funny you know
b I suppose they'd never heard of him
C no
b no
C but I made them take notes it was an exercise in taking notes
b **
C as much as anything you know they couldn't do that either
 however
b **
C how's Dan
b she's splendid. Blossoming she's getting a bit short of breath
 now because there's only
 I suppose six weeks or so to go by physically

(Lenk 1998:120, quoted without unnecessary signs)

Halliday's (1976) argument could be a cue to answer the question. There is, however, one thing that I disagree with Halliday (1976). It is not clear what

Halliday (1976) means by ‘dismiss.’ If it means elimination, I doubt if it is true that *however* ‘dismisses’ whatever precedes it as Halliday (1976) postulates. I think that neither reservation nor ‘dismissing’ would be encoded by *however*. They would be yielded incidentally. Remember that it is a precondition for elimination that a contradicting assumption should be manifest, as we have seen in chapter 2. If an assumption to be eliminated is clear from the context, the interpretation will be adversative. A contradicting assumption in the context will be eliminated because speaker’s/writer’s opinion or suggestion is presented in the segment which has *however* and it is stronger than the wrong assumption. If unlimited possibilities are reserved in the context, *however* will be taken as change of topics. The unlimited possibilities cannot be deleted, for they are not considered to be manifest enough to be eliminated.

The example below is classified into return to the main topic by Lenk (1998).

(45) B but I’m which

c dear me

B didn’t sort of help you know and I did not sort of got on with anything
very quickly because I felt lousy—and then now I have broken my
best glasses so (laughs)

c ((you’ve)) what

B broken my best glasses. so it hasn’t been a very sort of successful
(time) so yesterday I had to go up

c dear me

B to the optician's hoping to get tem back for Tuesday

c [m]

B I'm wearing some some old ones you know at the moment well
they're not old but they're they're not very elegant.

c yeah.

B *however*

c have you been stuck with any preparation for your college work

B well I've been trying but [m] –((I'm awfully)) I haven't really got on
very fast {I must day}

(Lenk 1998:114, quoted without irrelevant symbols for transcription)

Lenk (1998) is right from the global-level perspective. However, it seems to me that it is a kind of change of topics, since the topics are different between the segments before and after *however*. This example will be captured in the same way. There is no manifest assumption in this context, so Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) will face difficulty. In my proposal, unlimited possibilities are reserved in this example, and then it is not problematic.

Thirdly, let us have a look at other problematic examples with Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005). As you can see, in the following case, the material that follows *however* does not add contrastive aspect (Lenk 1998:120). The problem is that, in such cases, it is impossible to identify what is the assumption to be eliminated. Here is an example of signaling an

upcoming interesting material about the main topic without contrast, which is classified into “Floor-Holding Device” by Lenk (1998).

(46)B ((I mean)) he doesn’t realize he thinks this is high((er)) powered negotiation. in fact

A m. m. m. m. m. m.

B he’s making people sick **however** there was this but there was also the fact that he specifically mentioned. [Peter] Harrington. you’ve met Harrington. (Lenk 1998:119)

In this example, as Lenk (1985:119-120) says, it is clear that Mallett, the person who is the current topic of the conversation and the description of the unpleasant characteristics of Mallett is described before *however*. After *however*, B starts to make another report about what Mallett had done, which immediately shifts into talk focusing on the person mentioned by Mallett.

Following my alternative proposal, I would like to explain this example as follows. *However* leads the listener to affirm the previous message, ‘he’s making people sick.’ In this context, no inference that ends in elimination is manifest. Unlimited possibilities are reserved here. It is not the introduction of a perfectly new topic, but it might not be a problematic to my proposal. Before and after *however*, B is talking about Mallett, the person who is the current topic of the conversation. However, if the main topic is, strictly speaking, about how disgusting Mallett is, it could be interpreted as a change of topic although a totally new topic does

not follow after *however*. I suppose that *however* has nothing to do with introduction of the new topic, which occurs after the statement about what Mallett had done. The scope of *however* cannot cover the segment ‘you’ve met Harrington.’

Let me explain another example of signaling upcoming interesting material about the main topic without contrast.

(47) B ((to)) take it

A has he Mhm

B over in anyway. ((but)) I think that it’s possible for us to have new links which don’t in any way cut out

A Mhm

B old ones **however** this we’ll have to see if not Imola

A m

B Cyprus- which is once again I think. (Lenk 1998:119)

This example will be provided an explanation similarly. The conceptual information of *however* makes the listener affirm the previous message, ‘it’s possible for us to have new links which don’t in any way cut out old ones.’ Furthermore, we can no manifest assumption that contradicts what is said in the segment containing *however*. As Lenk (1998:119) says, what follows after *however* looks like merely an attenuation of what had been said up to that time. It is because the message ‘we’ll have to see if not Imola’ challenges B’s personal opinion mentioned before *however* is uttered. In

this case, before and after *however*, the topic is the same. It can be considered that unlimited possibilities are reserved by *however*.

We have already seen that functions of *however* are the same in both spoken language and written language in chapter 3. Now, we will have a look at an example of written language. The article's title is "Epidemics: Scientists to hunt down new viruses before they strike."

(48) This outbreak was attributed to a decision by pig farmers to plant fruit trees on their land to boost income. Fruit bats, which were subsequently found to carry Nipah, came to the trees for food, dropped excrement on pigs below and the disease was then transmitted to humans.

However, the worst known outbreak caused by such viruses - known as zoonotic organisms - is the HIV/Aids epidemic. Tens of millions of people could die of the illness, which scientists believe was caused by a disease in chimps that was passed to humans in Cameroon in the Thirties.

(The Observer, Sunday June 15 2008)

Until *however* appears, several cases of conveying viruses from animals to humans are described. The statement after *however* is about the worst case of all known outbreaks caused by such viruses. Therefore, there is no contrast between the segments preceding and following *however*. Moreover, both the segments preceding and following *however* are connected to the main topic. The conceptual information of *however* shows that the author

admits the truth of the previous statement. The reader will find unlimited possibilities derived from the segment preceding *however*. Plus, the topic is the same before and after *however*. Some might say that a possible contradicting assumption might be as follows.

(49) if fruit bats, which were subsequently found to carry Nipah, came to the trees for food, dropped excrement on pigs below and the disease was then transmitted to humans, it is the worst thing.

I am not sure about whether or not the assumption is manifest, but it is no problem. That is because *however* can work to reserve unlimited possibilities if there is no manifest contradicting assumption.

To sum up, if *however* is used in the context where an inference that ends in elimination is manifest, it will be considered to be adversative. On the other hand, if *however* appears in the context where no specific inference that ends in elimination is manifest, it will be taken as change of topics when a new topic is introduced after *however* or signaling upcoming interesting material about the main topic when both the segments preceding and following *however* are related to the main topic. In short, the interpretation of *however* can vary depending on the context, but the conceptual information does not change.

4.4. Speculation on the Co-occurrence of *But* and *However*

Now, I will demonstrate how my proposal can capture the co-occurrence of

but and *however*. Before getting into the theme of this section, we have to reconfirm the function of *but*. In chapter 2, I conclude that Iten's (2005) proposal is the most persuasive. Consequently, I will adopt Iten's (2005) hypothesis on *but* for the speculation.

(50) The functions of *but*

What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context. (Iten 2005:147)

Let us get back to the main subject now. I will pick up some examples from classic literature, transcripts, and modern literature, which are shown in section 4.2. The example (4a) is repeated as (51). It is a passage in classic literature.

(51) When she was only fifteen, there was a gentleman at my brother Gardiner's in town, so much in love with her, that my sister-in-law was sure he would make her an offer before we came away. **But however** he did not. (Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, 1813)

Remember that *but* does not require the reader/hearer to derive an assumption from the previous statement. Assumptions should be manifest in the context. In this case, the previous sentence brings about an assumption like (53).

(52) he should make her an offer.

The assumption (52) will be eliminated by the segment starting with *but*. On another front, *however* affirms the information conveyed before it appears. In this context, a contradicting assumption becomes manifest from what precedes *however*.

(53) If he is so much in love with a girl, he should make her an offer.

The wrong conclusion in (53), will be eliminated since the information preceded by *however* is stronger than the assumption.

The next one is a transcript. The example (6) is recited as (54).

(54) Dear Mr. McClintock, How long does one wait for a contractor? I understand the best are busy but I've waited for three months for this guy to start a project. His answering service is lousy, he leaves messages late, or on Friday afternoons or times when I'm not available. I don't want to be blunt; **but however**, I tempted to tell him to either start the project (In the midst of Christmas season!) or forget it.

(*Washington Post*; Thursday, December 1, 2005)

The reader/hearer is not expected to derive an assumption from the previous statement by the procedural information of *but*. The context causes the reader to have an assumption like (55).

(55) I should not tell him to either start the project or forget it.

The inference will be eliminated because it contradicts what is said in the *but*-clause. Then, let me explain how *however* contributes to the interpretation here. The reader will learn from the conceptual information of *however* that the truth of the information prior to the appearance of *however* is guaranteed. The contradicting conclusion derived from the previous segment will be eliminated because it is weaker than the message communicated by the segment where *however* appears.

(56) If I don't want to be blunt, I should not tell him to either start the project or forget it.

The example from modern literature (10) is repeated as (57).

(57) 'I am afraid it is going to turn out a truly dirty night,' said Jack. He stood up and in his sure-footed seaman's way walked over to his barometer. 'Yes,' he said. 'Dirtier than I had thought.' He came back and gazed out at the darkness, full of rain and flying water from the ship's bow-wave, more and more as she increased her way. '**But, however,**' he went on, 'I am most heartily glad to be at sea.'

(Blue at the Mizzen,

by Patrick O'Brian, W. W. Norton & Co., 1999, p.4)

An assumption to be eliminated must be manifest in the context where *but* is used. In this context, an assumption like (58) will be inferred.

(58) I am not heartily glad to be at sea.

The contradicting assumption will be eliminated. Collaterally, the conceptual information of *however* requires the reader to understand that the previous information is true. The conclusion of the derived assumption is wrong; therefore, it will be eliminated.

(59) If it is dirtier than I had thought, I am not heartily glad to be at sea.

In this section, I demonstrated why the co-occurrence of *but* and *however* can make the effect of emphatic endorsement rather than of tautology.

4.5. On Co-occurrence of *Although* and *However*

Araki (1992:333) and Quirk et.al. (1985) mention that *however* can be used along with *although* in order to strengthen the logical relationship.

(60) **Although** she had tried her best, **however**, she failed.

The co-occurrence of *although* and *however* also can be explained in the same way as the combination of *but* and *however*. In other words, given that *although* encodes procedural information while *however* encodes conceptual information, it will be well explained.

In the example (60), *however* guarantees relevance between the proposition in the subordinate clause and the main one. It is a different pattern from the examples which we have seen so far. There is another example where *however* connects the clause including it to the other. In (61), the relative adverb, *when*, grammatically connects the previous clause (*I met him in the park*) and the relative clause (*we have no time to speak*). By contrast, *however* is considered to suggest the connection through its meaning.

(61) I met him in the park, when, **however**, we have no time to speak.

(Quirk and Greenbaum 1973:250)

Now, let me introduce Iten's (2005) hypothesis on *although*. Iten (2005:180) does research on the function of *although* based on the Relevance Theory and alleges that *although* in utterances of the form Q although P/ although P, Q, encodes the following procedural information.

(62) Suspend an inference from what follows (that is, P) to a conclusion that would have to be eliminated. (Iten 2005:186)

The hypothesis is very similar to Hall's (2004, 2005/2007) suggestion on *but*. The difference is that, according to Iten (2005), *although* needs a contextual assumption that licenses an inference with undesirable result from P as well as an assumption to be eliminated.

Iten (2005) demonstrates how the analysis applies to the example (63).

(63) Peter went out **although** it was raining. (Iten 2005:180)

Iten's (2005:180) explanation is as follows: 'the hearer first processes Q (Peter went out), then *although* indicates that there is an inference from P (it was raining) that has to be suspended because it would yield a conclusion that would have to be discarded.' The contextual assumption here is that people don't go if it rains. It licenses an inference from IT WAS RAINING to PETERx DIDN'T GO OUT, which would obviously contradict the basic explicature of Q (Peter went out). Iten (2005) thinks that *although* does not encode elimination. In Iten (2005:180), it is hypothesized that the inferred conclusion would have to be eliminated because the contradicted assumption is explicitly communicated by the speaker's utterance of Q. In Relevance theory, effort of interpretation must be considered. Iten (2005:180) alleges that the use of *although* saves the hearer the effort of inferring a conclusion that would have to be discarded again immediately since it contradicts a more manifest assumption.

Quirk et.al. (1985:644) finds a difference between *though* and *yet*.

(64) a. **Though** (he is) poor, he is satisfied with his situation.

b. He is poor, **yet** he is satisfied with his situation.

(Quirk et.al. 1985:644)

‘The major difference is that [(64b)] states his poverty as a fact, whereas in [(64a)] his poverty is presupposed as a given assumption (Quirk et.al. 1985:644).’ We will think of the function of *yet* in chapter 6.

Iten (2005:184) and Halliday and Hassan (1976) recognize that there is a difference between Q *although* P and *although* P, Q. Iten (2005:184) remarks that two pairs of examples are given to show a difference in acceptability. There was a tendency to prefer (65b) to (65a) and (66b) to (66a) if the intended interpretation corresponds roughly to indirect denial.

(65) a. I need some fresh air **although** it’s raining.

b. **Although** it’s raining, I need some fresh air. (Iten 2005:184)

(66) a. Bill is short **although** John is tall.

b. **Although** John is tall, Bill is short. (ibid.)

According to Halliday and Hassan (1976:252), the subordinate conjunction including *although* expresses different meaning, depending on the position, either before or after the main clause. When the subordinate conjunction including *although* occurs before the main clause, it has the only one meaning, “in spite of.” On the other hand, when the subordinate conjunction including *although* appears after the main clause, it means either “as against” or “in spite of.” The example (67b) shows that it cannot mean ‘as against,’ so the sentence in (68) does not make sense (Halliday and Hassan 1976:252).

(67) a. She failed, **although** she's (sic) tried her best.

b. **Although** she's (sic) tried her best, she failed.

(Halliday and Hassan 1976:252)

(68) ?**Although** he's got brains, he's not exactly good-looking.

(Halliday and Hassan 1976:252)

Halliday and Hassan (1976) do not explain how the difference is caused. In Iten's (2005:184) opinion, this difference can be explained from the viewpoint of processing. To meet the requirement of the procedural information of *although*, a hearer needs to access two assumptions so as to process the utterance smoothly along the lines indicated by *although*:

(69) a. the assumption that would license the suspended inference; and

b. the assumption that would force the elimination of the inferred conclusion.

(Iten 2005:184)

Iten (2005:184) mentions that 'P provides the starting point for the suspended inference, while Q communicates the assumption that would eliminate the conclusion of the suspended inference.' In Iten's (2005:184) analysis, depending on which clause is presented first, the hearer will first access a candidate 'eliminator' assumption (in examples of the form Q *although* P) or a candidate for the suspended inference (in examples of the form *although* P, Q).

Iten (2005:184) takes up standard 'concessive' examples where there is

no noticeable difference in the processing effort that is required because of the different order of the clause.

(70) a. Peter went out **although** it was raining.

b. **Although** it was raining, Peter went out. (op.cit:185)

Iten's (2005:184) account is as follows. The first clause in (69a) expresses a proposition (PETER_x WENT OUT) that is an easily accessible candidate for the 'eliminator' assumption. In (70b), the explicit proposition (IT WAS RAINING) in the first clause makes easily accessible a contextual assumption that licenses the suspended inference (namely, PEOPLE DON'T GO OUT WHEN IT'S RAINING.) Thus, there is no difference in acceptability between them.

By contrast, in 'adversative' examples like (65), the difference in processing paths leads to a difference in processing effort, according to Iten (2005:185). The example (65) is recited below.

(65) a. I need some fresh air **although** it's raining.

b. **Although** it's raining, I need some fresh air. (Iten 2005:184)

Iten (2005:184) states that in (65), the suspended inference is from P to the negation of an implicature of Q. The utterances of (65a) and (65b) is most likely to be given in a scenario in which speaker and hearer are talking about whether or not to go for a walk. The most likely interpretation of these utterances involves suspending the inference from P (*it's raining*) to the

negation of the implicature of Q given in (71).

(71) SPEAKER_x WANTS TO GO FOR A WALK *implicature of Q* (op.cit:185)

The assumption that combines with P to license this inference might be something like (72).

(72) IF IT'S RAINING, X DOES NOT WANT TO DO FOR A WALK (op.cit:185)

Iten (2005:185) finds (64b) more acceptable than (64a). In (64a), the hearer processes Q first. Iten's (2005:185) analysis on the reason for it is as follows. Because he will just have processed the encoded meaning of Q (*I need some fresh air*), the proposition expressed by this clause will be highly accessible and it cannot be ruled out that he will consider first the hypothesis that this is the potential eliminator assumption. There might be wrong inference from P (*it's raining*) to the negation of the proposition of Q which is given in (73).

(73) IF IT'S RAINING, X DOES NOT NEED FRESH AIR. (Iten 2005:186)

In short, the form Q *although* P can cause the listener a little trouble.

Let us go back to the example (60).

(60) **Although** she had tried her best, **however**, she failed.

The suspended inference is from P (*she had tried her best*) to the negation of the proposition of Q.

(74) IF SHE HAD TRIED HER BEST, SHE DID NOT FAIL.

This inference is licensed by a contextual assumption such as (74).

(75) IF PEOPLE TRY THEIR BEST, THEY DO NOT FAIL.

The wrong conclusion should be eliminated because of the explicit proposition Q. The conceptual information of *however* tells that the listener should affirm the previous message, ‘she had tried her best.’ In (74), an inference that ends in elimination is manifest, which is shown in (73). The explicit message conveyed by the segment containing *however* is stronger than the wrong conclusion. For that reason, the elimination of the contradicting assumption accompanies.

4.6. Concluding Remarks

I demonstrated how my proposal accounts for the co-occurrence of *but* and *however*. I reviewed the indication that, although other concessive conjunctive adverbs except *however* can come right after *but*, *however* cannot be placed just after the coordinate conjunction. In reality, it is not always impossible that *however* at the beginning co-occurs with *but*. I showed the result of a research on the number of tokens of both “*But however*” and

“*But...however*” to ascertain the lower acceptability of “*But however.*” As a result, it will be shown that just positioning of *however* cannot cause the difference of the acceptability. Instead, I suggest that *but* has procedural information as the previous studies and *however* has conceptual information.

The co-occurrence of *although* and *however* was also taken up as the same combination of conceptual information and procedural information.

Chapter 5

On a Difference Caused by Positioning of *However*

5.1. Introduction

It is well known that the positioning of *however* is relatively free. The examples shown in (1) are all grammatical sentences.¹

- (1) a. *However*, it runs into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP.
- b. It, *however*, runs into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP.
- c. It runs, *however*, into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP.
- d. It runs into problems with extractions which stop, *however*, in the nearest COMP.
- e. It runs into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP, *however*.

The example (1) shows that the position where *however* occurs is rather unrestricted. Swan (2009:157) says that *however* emphasizes the fact that the second point contrasts with the first, but can the part to be emphasized

1 The example (1a) is the original sentence and I changed the position of *however* in the sentence. The result of native check is showed in (1).

be exactly the same? As I have already indicated in chapter 3, both Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) only analyze sentence-initial *however*, so we will consider whether the positioning of *however* can make a difference.

The following examples show that the answer is YES. Those examples are provided by Quirk et al. (1985:646). We can see that the acceptability is improved when *however* is not adjacent to *but*, although *however* cannot be placed just after the coordinate conjunction.

- (2) a. *You can phone the doctor if you like, *but however*, I very much doubt whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.
- b. ?You can phone the doctor if you like, *but* I very much doubt, *however*, whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

(Quirk et al. 1985:646)

Also, an informant, who shares the judgment above, says (3a) is far more awkward than (13b)².

- (3) a. ? I'm no calligrapher. Are you? *But, however*, I can type like a demon.
- b. I'm no calligrapher. Are you? *But* I can type like a demon, *however*.

² (3) is based on the example by Schourup (2005:92).

(i) "I'm no calligrapher. Are you? *However*, I can type like a demon."

The example (3b), where *however* does not follow right after *but* is also awkward, but it is better than example (3a). The informant told me that the examples in (3) were a little bit formal and thus “*but, however*” is not good. The reason (3a) is not unacceptable can be explained by that, but the reason (3b) is a little better cannot.

One might think that, since *but* and *however* are of the same type, they cannot appear in the same position because it will be too redundant. In the previous chapter, we have already confirmed that it is not always impossible that *however* at the beginning co-occurs with *but*. What I would like to focus on in this chapter is why can (2b) be less verbose and more acceptable than (2a). We will think of what causes the difference of acceptability between the sentence-internal *however* and the sentence-initial *however*. My presumption is that processing effort might have something to do with the difference of acceptability in (2) and (3), but we need to find out how. In section 5.2, I will examine some previous studies on preferred position of *however*. Then, it will be considered why *however* in sentence-internal position often sounds better than *however* in sentence-initial position, as some researchers point out. An additional function of *however* will be referred to in section 5.3. Garner (1998) observes it. However, Garner’s (1998) is not perfect. In section 5.4, I will make alternative proposal. We will see a remaining problem in section 5.5. Section 6 is the summary of this chapter.

5.2. Preferred Position of *However*

Inoue ed. (1960:544) mentions that *however* is commonly positioned in the

middle of the sentence rather than at the beginning of the sentence. Strunk and White (1979:48) claim that *however* “usually serves better when not in the first position.” Strunk and White (1979:49) give an example that “sounds better” when *however* is delayed:

- (4) a. The roads were almost impassable. *However*, we at last succeeded in reaching the camp.
- b. The roads were almost impassable. At last, *however*, we succeeded in reaching the camp. (Strunk and White 1979:49)

Garner (1998:342) also mentions that *however* in the sentence initial position is not preferable. According to Garner (1998:342), *but* is better than *however* at the beginning of a sentence—that is not because *however* is wrong at the beginning but because the three-syllable word followed by a comma “is a ponderous way of introducing a contrast.” Besides, Wilson (1993) also mentions that it is sometimes more graceful later in the sentence.

However, Berube et al. (1996:19) states on *however* beginning a sentence as follows: Some people say you should never begin a sentence with *however* when it means “nevertheless” or “on the other hand.” They are probably in the minority.

- (5) Sailing in rough weather can be very unpleasant. *However*, we found it exciting. (Berube et al. 1996:19)

Berube et al. (1996:19) asked the usage panelists if they observed this rule.

The results were that thirty-six percent said “usually or always,” 19 percent said “sometimes,” and 42 percent said “rarely or never.”

Concerning preferable positioning of *however*, Berube et al. (1996) has a different opinion from Strunk and White (1979) and Garner (1998). Anyway, it is observed in the previous studies that *however* in the middle of a sentence is more preferable than *however* at the beginning of a sentence. The investigation by Berube et al. (1996) shows only that *however* in sentence-initial position can be seen in reality, the probability of which is some 60 percent, although some dictionaries say that it is something to avoid.

In order to confirm if it is true, I conducted a simple survey. Gathering examples of *however*, I found the fact that, in spoken language, *however* tends to be used in sentence-initial position. Let us take a look at the result. Concerning literary style, I counted the number of usage of *however* in a science article of TIME, April 28, 2003. p5-20, and Schourup (2005) pp83-111. The result is as follows.

Figure 1

	Sentence-Initial Position	In the Middle	Sentence-Final Position
An article In TIME	0	2	1
Schourup (2005)	4	5	0
Total	4	7	1

As to colloquial style, I numbered usage of *however* in three scripts of English Journal October 2003, February 2004, and April 2004. The result is showed below.

Figure 2

	Sentence-Initial Position	In the Middle	Sentence-Final Position
1	1	0	0
2	1	0	0
3	1	1	0
Total	3	1	0

1: October 2003 pp4-89 2: February 2004 pp4-81 3: April 2004 pp4-103

Based on the results above, it can be said that *however* has a tendency to be placed at the beginning of the sentence in spoken language.

It is often said that *however* tends to be used in formal writings. Biber et.al. (1999:560-562) does research on the groups of the most common adverbs by semantic domain in British English and American English conversation and in academic prose; occurrences per million words. In Biber et.al. (1999:562), it is shown that *however* can be found mainly in academic prose. The frequency is clearly different.

Also, Biber et.al. (1999:784) shows percentage in the semantic categories, cause/reason, concessive, purpose, result and condition, in conversation, fiction, news, and academic prose, respectively. It is shown that percentage of concessive in conversation is much lower than in the other cases.

Now, I will show the results of investigation on the frequency of *however* in the initial position of a sentence in writings. The frequency in use of it is less than 60 % in fact. ³

³ My academic advisor Mr. Nakamoto gave this useful comment and the results of research concerning the frequency of usage of *however* in the initial position.

1. Timesonline.co.uk

At the beginning of the sentence	In the middle or at the end of the sentence	Total	%
105	74	179	58.65

2. Guardian

At the beginning of the sentence	In the middle or at the end of the sentence	Total	%
94	92	186	50.53

3. Washington Post

At the beginning of the sentence	In the middle or at the end of the sentence	Total	%
89	87	176	50.56

4. Chicago Sun-Times

At the beginning of the sentence	In the middle or at the end of the sentence	Total	%
91	100	191	47.64

Table 1

The average frequency of use was 51.84 %. From these results, the probability of *however* in sentence-initial position can be said to be fifty-fifty, roughly speaking.

We will think about what kind of factor is related to the positioning of *however*

5.3. A Sentence-Internal *However*

Although there is a disagreement on the second restriction between them, Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) have proven that *however* has the constraint on context selection that *but* does not have. However, the object of their research is just limited to *however* in sentence-initial position. They don't capture the whole functions of *however*. As Schourup (2005:107) mentions, "the positioning of *however* may itself affect pragmatic

interpretation of the host utterance.” Thus, the function of *however* in sentence-internal position is open to argument. In 5.3.1, I will critically review Garner’s (1998) analysis on *however* in sentence-internal position. Problematic examples to Garner (1998) will be shown in 5.3.2.

5.3.1. Garner (1998)

Garner (1998) claims that *however* in the middle of a sentence has a different function from that of initial *however*. I will sum up Garner’s (1998) argument as below.

- (6) *however* in the middle of the sentence has a function of indicating that a part of the previous constitutes is emphasized and what are the contrasted elements.

Garner (1998) takes up the examples below and explains as follows.

- (7) a. Jane, *however*, wasn’t able to make the trip.
b. Jane wasn’t able, *however*, to make the trip. (Garner 1998:343)

Garner (1998) states that, in (7a), *however* emphasizes ‘Jane,’ and the interpretation of the sentence is ‘Jane, unlike others, had to miss the trip.’ In (7b), *however* emphasizes ‘wasn’t able,’ and the interpretation of the sentence is ‘Jane, who had been hoping to go, had to miss the trip.’

Garner (1998) would analyze (8) in a similar vein. (The emphases and italics in the examples below are the author’s. In the rest of this

chapter, they are the author's unless there is a notice.)

- (8) Anime has particularly captured the minds of American youth. **A decade ago**, no Japanese anime ranked in the Top 10 children's programming in the United States. **Today**, *however*, "Yu-Gi-Oh!" ranks No. 3 while "Pokemon" clocks in at No. 6, according to Nielsen ratings.

(*The Washington Post*; Monday, December 6, 2004)

In (8), *however* emphasizes 'today,' and this part can be interpreted as 'unlike the situation a decade ago.' In other words, *however* strengthens the difference between 'a decade ago' and 'today.'

Bell (2004) gives a similar observation to Garner (1998) in the analysis on the function of *on the other hand*. According to Bell (2004:2180), contrastive non-correlative "on the other hand" is more likely to appear in the post-subject NP medial position.

- (9) Bourieu gives more credence to class structure, and hence, categories of perception and appreciation are largely determined by one's class position. Giddens, **on the other hand**, views individuals as being more autonomous, or less restricted by their class positions. (*Sociology of Health and Illness*) (Bell 2004:2180)

Bell's (2004:2180) explanation on the example above is as follows: two particular elements are being compared and non-correlative "on the other hand" operates as a focus marker in the post-subject NP position to highlight

the preceding NP as the item that is being compared to an equivalent item in the prior discourse. Bell (2004:2180) argues that non-correlative “on the other hand” which appears after subject NP has scope over the preceding NP, while sentence initial non-correlative “on the other hand” has scope over the preceding discourse. The difference between them is that ‘in real time processing, sentence initial non-correlative “on the other hand” does allow for the possibility that the contrast may be made within the topics of Bourieu as well as by a change of topics. Post-subject non-correlative “on the other hand” restricts those possibilities by changing the topic to Giddens (Bell 2004:2180).’ Bell (2004:2180) remarks that the latter case signals that Giddens are to be contrasted with equivalent items (Bourieu) in the prior discourse. Post-subject non-correlative “on the other hand” is not acceptable in the following example, since the focus making function is not achieved (Bell 2004:2180).

(10) Mary’s aunt Adelaide can’t stand horseracing. ?Adelaide, **on the other hand**, loves greyhound racing. (Bell 2004:2180)

In addition to that, Bell (2004:2181) alleges that “on the other hand” can function as a cancellative marker similar to *but*, *however*, *though*, *still* and *yet*, all of which provide an instruction as to what aspect of information is drivable from the prior discourse, either globally or locally, is to be canceled by the current message.

(11) The main disappointment is in the area of imaginative involvement. Mr. Domingo passes up some great opportunities in his metronomic reading of the “Vestale” excerpt and his relative failure to take advantage of the atmospheric beginning the conductor Eugene Kohn and the Ambrosian singers give him in the “Attila” recitative. **On the other hand**, his beautiful enunciation of certain lines of text provides glimpses of character. (*New York Times*) (Bell 2004:2181)

According to Bell (2004:2180), ‘the hands’ are understandable as negative and positive evaluations of Plácido Domingo’s performance. “On the other hand” ‘signals that the overwhelmingly negative prior evaluation is to be partly canceled or mitigated (Bell 2004:2181).”

Bell (2004:2182) mentions that the key to distinction between contrastive and cancellative “on the other hand” is the speaker’s stance toward the elements compared. In example (9), that stance is neutral, while in example (11) the speaker’s stance is evaluative.

Bell (2004:2182) indicates that *however* in post-subject NP position (but not in sentence initial position) could substitute for “on the other hand” in example (11) without changing the speaker’s neutral stance. This suggests that *however*, like “on the other hand,” can function as a focus marker, and in such contexts escape its core cancellative meaning.

5.3.2. Problems with Garner (1998)

A Problem with Garner (1998) and Bell (2004) is that there are not always explicit contrasts. In (8), the contrasted elements are explicit. However,

I would like to point out that it is not always the case.

- (12) Liberal feminism has demanded greater individual rights for women. Social feminism has demanded greater social obligations, especially for men. For reasons that have to do with our economic system, as well as our political history, liberal feminism has enjoyed relatively more success in the United States than in the more traditional societies of Europe. Its very success has contributed to a dilemma. Women know they can benefit economically by becoming achievers rather than caregivers. **They also, know, however,** that if all women adopt this strategy, society as a whole will become oriented more toward achievement than care.

(The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values.

By Nancy Folbre, The New Press, 2001. p.4)

- (13) Mr Blair deliberately avoided making the vote on terrorism a confidence issue because the plan to detain suspects for up to 90 days was not included in the election manifesto.

But he believes that with education a substantial part of the government programme, there would be no way to avoid a confidence vote if he lost.

Mr Blair, however, has told close colleagues, including Gordon Brown, that he is not engaged on a kamikaze mission, ready to go down to defeat on education or other public service reform rather than give way.

(The Times: November 17, 2005)

In (12), there are no elements to be contrasted with ‘they also, know’ in the

preceding context. In (13), ‘Mr Blair,’ which is followed by *however*, is not contrasted explicitly with anybody else.

It is a prepositional phrase in (14), a verb in imperative mood in (15), and a subordinate conjunction ‘if’ in (16) that are followed by *however* respectively. No items to be contrasted with them were introduced in the preceding context.

(14) Mr. Martin, in a Canadian television interview on Monday, said he would push Ms. Rice to resolve the issue. “When we have a disagreement with the Americans,” he said, “it is not friendship that should get in the way of pointing out to them that friends live up to their agreements.”

Ms. Rice said, “We would like to get this resolved.”

Behind all of this, *however*, officials acknowledge that the American decision to ignore Canada’s legal victories plays directly into the Canadian conviction that the United States simply does not care what Canada thinks. *(The New York Times; October 25, 2005)*

(15) The United States, Europe and Japan constitute about half the global economy. Their recessions would hurt the Asian, Latin American and African countries that export to them. Markets interconnect; weakness spreads. It’s grim.

Note, *however*, that the dollar’s vulnerability is a symptom of something else: the addiction of Europe and Asia to exporting to the United States. *(The Washington Post; November 17, 2004)*

(16) The Iraqis are a proud people but, unlike in Afghanistan, they are also well-educated and have massive oil reserves that give them the prospect of economic self-sufficiency. However delighted they might be to be relieved of Saddam's tyranny, they feel humiliated by foreign occupation, and they should not be expected to be any less anti-American than the rest of the Arab world.

If the Americans ignore these sensitivities then the insurgents, with Saddam out of the way, will seem even more like freedom fighters to ordinary Iraqis. *If, however*, the Americans respond generously and use these events to justify an even earlier departure of occupying forces, the dissidents will quickly lose any popular support.

(*The Guardian*; Monday December 15, 2003)

One might try to save Garner's (1998) account by saying that contrast may or may not be explicit.⁴ Thus, in (12), "they (= women) also know" is implicitly contrasted with "men do not know"; in (13), Mr Blair is tacitly compared with other politicians; in (14), the writer takes into consideration the situation "behind other conditions." The affirmative imperative "note" in (15) would be contrasted with a negative imperative "do not note". In (16), emphasis is put on hypothetical "*if*." The situation expressed by *if*-clause is contrasted with the *if*-clause in the preceding sentence.

This theory, however, does not hold. In (12), it does not matter whether or not men know that "if all women adopt this strategy, society as a whole will become oriented more toward achievement than care"; what is

⁴ See Ota (2004) for this line of thought.

important is that women know that. Mr Blair in (13) is compared with no one in the context; the issue is what he will do and not what another politician would do. The example (13) could be the evidence that *however* does not have the same focus function as “on the other hand.” In (14), other situations than “all of this” are out of question, since “all of this” is a presupposed condition. Emphasis in (15) is not laid on the main verb but on the content of the subordinate clause. Similarly, what is contrasted in (16) is not ‘*if*’ with another conjunctive, but the hypothetical situations expressed by two *if*-clauses in the paragraph.

More interesting are constructions with expletives followed by *however* in that expletives have no lexical content by definition so that they cannot be contrasted in any sense. One might think “there is / are,” that is, the expression of existence is emphasized in the sentence including *however*. However, emphasis in (17) and (18) is not laid on the existence itself, but on the existence of “important cases” or “a distinction.”

(17) Justice Kennedy seems poised to be the court’s crucial vote in cases involving gay rights, the government taking of private property and aspects of the death penalty.

There are, *however*, several important cases in which Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor will put him in the spotlight.

(*The New York Times*; February 1, 2006)

(18) Sir, The Government's drive to raise the amount of time devoted to physical education and sport (reports and leading article, November 25) is welcome. One cannot argue with any initiative aimed at raising activity levels amongst children and young people.

There is, *however*, a distinction between PE and sport. PE is provided for all pupils, whereas sport tends to describe children's activities before, during (breaks) and after school.

(*The Times*; November 27, 2004)

Furthermore, since *however* can be between *there would* and a verb as shown in (19), and since *however* can be inserted between *there* and a verb as you can see in (20), what precedes the adverb cannot be an 'expression of existence or appearance.' Lastly, the expression "there is / are" does not necessarily guarantee the 'presence' of something or someone, as seen in (21).

(19) "We are merging the past and the present." Dawes added that the main objective was "cultural evolution, not culture shock".

He said that some of the opera's most famous parts would be left intact. **There would**, *however*, be a rap version of the aria *Soave sia il vento* (May the wind be gentle), one of Mozart's most renowned compositions.

(*The Sunday Times*; August 14, 2005)

(20)He grudged the time lost between Piccadilly and his old haunt at the Slaughters,' whither he drove faithfully. Long years had passed since he saw it last, since he and George, as young men, had enjoyed many a feast, and held many a revel there. He had now passed into the stage of old-fellow-hood. His hair was grizzled, and many a passion and feeling of his youth had grown grey in that interval. **There**, *however*, stood the old waiter at the door, in the same greasy black suit, with the same double chin and flaccid face, with the same huge bunch of seals at his fob, rattling his money in his pockets as before, and receiving the Major as if he had gone away only a week ago.

(*Vanity Fair*, Chapter LVIII: Our Friend the Major,
by William Makepeace Thackeray)

(21)There is general agreement that splintering the national labor federation has large implications for employer-employee relations and the strength of the Democratic Party, which depends heavily on unions for money and organizing power. **There is**, *however*, no consensus on the specific impact of labor's dissolution.

(*The Washington Post*; Tuesday, July 26, 2005)

Expletive *it* also can be followed by *however*, as shown in (22) and (23).

(22)Whatever the ailment, it does not seem to affect Holdsclaw's mobility. **It would**, *however*, seem to prevent her from rooting her teammates on from the bench.

(*The Washington Post*; September 3, 2004)

(23) An assessment by Defra experts three weeks ago concluded:
“Preliminary discussions indicate that there is not much reliable information on bird migration or mixing within Africa. **It is** *however* reasonable to expect that birds will follow established routes: that is, birds that have migrated to east Africa will return over eastern Europe to their breeding grounds in southern Siberia, while the birds from west Africa will return over the Mediterranean basin to their breeding grounds in north Russia.
(*The Guardian*: February 9, 2006)

We showed in this section that Garner’s (1998) proposal that a part of the constituents followed by *however* is emphasized and contrasted does not hold good. But then how can his example (7) be accounted for?

5.4. A Hypothesis

In the previous section, we found a part of the constituents followed by *however* is not necessarily emphasized and contrasted. Unlike Garner (1998), Greenbaum (1969:65) just says that ‘the positioning of *however* may focus the unit being contrasted.’ Although Greenbaum (1969) takes up the following example, which unit is contrasted and focused is not clearly explained.

(24) Those who owned cars without safety harness were always about to have it fitted. Those with safety harness, *however*, admitted that they did not always use it.
(Greenbaum 1969:65)

So, I would like to make it clear in this section. My proposal is that the following hypothesis should be added to the conceptual information of *however*.

(25) *However* in sentence-internal position emphasizes the part which is closely connected to contradiction.

In other words, *however* plays a role of showing explicitly constituents that are subjects for a contrast or contradiction. In short, by positioning *however* differently, the author gives a hint to find out a contradicting assumption. I suppose that ‘when a sentence opens with *however*, the stress is against [contrast with] all that follows it’ like *but*, as Copperud (1980:185) indicates. Also, when *however* appears at the end of the sentence, emphasis is on the whole sentence.

In speech, it seems that there is a tendency for *however* to be positioned in sentence-initial position as we have seen in section 5.2. That may be because there are other effective ways: intonation and stress. Biber et.al. (1999:897) says that ‘in any clause there is normally at least one point of focus, which is related in speech to the place where nuclear intonation/stress would fall, and whichever clause element includes this point thereby gains some prominence or emphasis.’ I suppose that, in writings, the positioning of *however* helps readers to find out the information structure or in what part there is a contradiction.

5.4.1. Analysis on ‘*but...however*’

In chapter 4, I explained the case where *however* follows right after *but*. In this section, we will consider the remaining problem, that is, why the co-occurrence of *but* and *however* is better when *however* is positioned in the middle of the sentence than when it comes right after *but*. We have already examined the function of *but* in chapter 2, and then Iten’s (2005) hypothesis will be adopted here.

(26) The functions of *but*

What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context. (Iten 2005:147)

(27) Contribution of Conceptual Information of *However*

a. Denial of Expectation

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and directs the readers/listeners to take it as truth. A contradicting assumption derived from what precedes it. The segment which contains *however* conveys the speaker’s or writer’s argument. Accordingly, the information is stronger than the contradicting assumption, and then the latter will be eliminated.

b. Change of Topics/ Floor-Holding Device

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and affirms the content. Unlimited possibilities emerge from the context, and they will be reserved because they are not manifest enough to be eliminated.

Now, let us begin with the example (28). (The wavy lines, underlines and emphases are the author's. In the rest of this section, they are the author's as long as there is no notice.)

(28) The chief diplomatic and military officers of this Government all were instructed to follow the same course. And since that night on March 31, each of the candidates has had differing ideas about the Government's policy, **but** generally speaking, **however**, throughout the campaign we have been able to present a united voice, supporting our Government and supporting our men in Vietnam.

(November 1, 1968, Text of President Johnson's Broadcast to the Nation Announcing a Bombing Halt. Following is a transcript of President Johnson's address to the nation last night as recorded by *The New York Times*)

From the previous segment, *since that night on March 31, each of the candidates has had differing ideas about the Government's policy*, an assumption like (29) becomes manifest. Then, what follows *but* contradicts and eliminates the assumption.

(29) Throughout the campaign, we have not been able to present a united voice, supporting our Government and supporting our men in Vietnam.

On the other hand, *however* helps the reader to find where there is a contradiction. As you can see, the phrase, *generally speaking*, is not

related to the contradiction. Unlike *but*, *however* affirms the content of the previous segment, and an assumption arises from it. The message conveyed by the segment containing *however* is what the speaker to communicate. As a result, the contradicted assumption will be denied because it is weaker information.

Let us go on to the next example. It is quoted from *Washington Post*.

(30) U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HOLDS A HEARING ON THE
NOMINATION OF JOHN ROBERTS TO BE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT

(snip)

HATCH: OK.

Now, the chairman and ranking member have raised some important issues, and I may turn to some of them shortly. **But I believe, however, that we should start with first principles before exploring how those principles should be applied.** (Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings)

(*Washington Post*; Tuesday, September 13, 2005)

In this context, an assumption like (31) would be manifest to the hearer.

(31) we should start with exploring how those principles should be applied.

It will be eliminated since it contradicts what follows *but*. *However* affirms that the content of the previous segment is true. Then, the assumption (31)

becomes manifest in the context. Since what follows *however* expresses the speaker's assertion and therefore is strong information. Incidentally, the contradicting assumption will be eliminated since it is weaker information. Whether 'I believe' or not is not related to the contradiction. So it seems that *however* narrows down the scope of the contradiction.

In some articles, '*but...however*' can be found, too. The example (13) is cited from *The New York Times*.

(32) THIS truth-telling has not always endeared him to Indians. India's newspapers may be filled with outraged revelations about civic inefficiency and corruption. India's self-accusations may often be as harsh as any Mr. Naipaul has made. **But there is, however, a tacit agreement that this is not for outside dissemination, that Western stereotypes of India as a backward country should not be pandered to.** Thus Mr. Naipaul is regarded as the outsider with inside information, the man who betrays. Lonely then, but unassailable, Mr. Naipaul gazes into every shadowy corner of the society, giving us a picture that is both harsh and beautiful, familiar and strange.

(*The New York Times*; December 30, 1990)

From the previous context, an assumption (33) will be manifest.

(33) there is a tacit agreement that this is for outside dissemination, that Western stereotypes of India as a backward country should not be pandered to.

What follows *but* eliminates the contradicting assumption. In contrast, the content of the previous segment is affirmed by *however*. The assumption (33) will be derived from it. The author's view is expressed by the segment containing *however*. Accordingly, the information is stronger than the contradicting assumption. As a result, the elimination of the wrong assumption accompanies. *However* emphasizes what kind of tacit agreement there is by the positioning.

Let us think of the next example.

(34) Of course a single, hastily constructed statistical model is inadequate to prove the existence or estimate the true impact of Little Mo on early primary voting. Other models using different or more highly refined variables might produce different results. **But it's interesting, however, to note that other researchers have detected somewhat similar effects. Political scientist Larry Bartels, who literally wrote the book on political momentum, argued in the late 1980s that many voters use a simple winner/loser calculation to decide which candidate to support in primaries.** He called them "strategic voters." Significantly, these voters will support a winner even if it sometimes means holding their noses and voting for a candidate they don't particularly like.

(*Washington Post*; Polling Director; Monday, January 31, 2000)

In the context, an assumption like (35) will be manifest.

(35) other researchers have detected different effects.

The assumption will be eliminated by what follows *but*. *However* helps the reader to find the contradiction by narrowing down. Whether ‘it is interesting’ or not is not related to the contradiction. The assumption (35) will emerge from the affirmed content of the previous segment. The segment where *however* appears, conveys the author’s allegation, and thus the information is more important than the false assumption. For that reason, the reader should eliminate the assumption.

In the following example, *however* is positioned at the end of the sentence.

(36) The Soviets created a second satellite system in the late 1980s – this one in geostationary orbit, meaning that these satellites remain fixed in one place above the Earth’s surface. Two of these are still functioning, Podvig said, with one sited to cover some of the gaps in the original array of satellite.

But gaps remain, however.

(*Washington Post*; Wednesday, February 10, 1999)

What follows *but* eliminates an assumption like (37), which will become manifest to the reader in the context.

(37) gaps do not remain.

On the other hand, the conceptual information of *however* guarantees a relevance to the previous segment. The assumption derived from the

previous segment contradicts the information in the segment which has *however*. The segment with *however* expresses the speaker's/author's contention. Consequently, the information should be stronger than the contradicting assumption, so the assumption will be eliminated. *However* emphasizes the whole sentence like sentence-initial *however*. Since *however* is adequately far from *but*, there is less friction between *but* and *however*.

Let us take a look at the following example, where *however* appears after the subject.

(38)The District has its killers, as critics love to note, ignoring the steady decline in homicide victims and the improved arrest statistics. And, yes, one murder is too many.

But our city, however, hasn't had anything like Wichita's BTK murderer (bind, torture, kill) who terrorized that city for 30 years.

(*Washington Post*; Saturday, March 12, 2005)

But guides the reader to eliminate an assumption like (39) becomes manifest in the context.

(39)Our city has had something like Wichita's BTK murderer (bind, torture, kill) who terrorized that city for 30 years.

Meanwhile, *however* affirms the content of the previous segment. The reader will derive an assumption from it. Because the speaker's/author's

contestation is declared in the clause where *however* occurs, the information is stronger than the incorrect assumption. Then, the contradicting assumption will be deleted. Besides, *however* emphasizes the predicate, *hasn't had anything like Wichita's BTK murderer (bind, torture, kill) who terrorized that city for 30 years*.

In the next example, *however* appears after emphatic 'do.'

(40) Other studies, most notably by AAA, have found dogs to be the overwhelming choice of animal travel companions, comprising nearly 80 percent of pets on trips (15 percent are cats, and the remainder include birds, fish, ferrets and rabbits).

Starwood was sold on the growing industry trend **but** did, **however**, set a per-dog weight limit of 40 pounds at Westin hotels and 80 pounds at Sheraton and W hotels. (*Washington Post*; Sunday, October 12, 2003)

An assumption such as (40) will become manifest in the context and what follows *but* eliminates it.

(40) Starwood did not set a per-dog weight limit at any hotels.

At the same time, the conceptual information and the positioning of *however* helps the reader to find the assumption that should be derived from affirmed content of the previous clause. The information emphasized by *however* is stronger than the contradicting assumption. So, it will be deleted.

(41)At the Islamic Scholars Union, the mullahs told me that their countrymen had accepted the Saudi mosques for a simple reason -- they couldn't afford to build their own. But Mullah Talat Mantiq bitterly pointed out that in the years before the establishment of the U.N. Oil for Food Program in 1996, when people in the region were starving, the Saudis were building mosques -- **but** were not, however, donating food, clothing or medicine. (Washington Post; Sunday, August 11, 2002)

But guides the reader to eliminate a contradicting assumption which is manifest in the context. In this case, an assumption in (42) will be manifest from the previous context.

(42) The Saudis were donating food, clothing or medicine.

In the meantime, *however* emphasizes what they did not donating, that is, food, clothing or medicine. The content of previous clause is affirmed by *however*, and the reader derives an assumption from it. The assumption will be denied by the information in the segment containing *however*.

However in the following example appears between 'has' and past participle.

(43) Prevention is therefore all-important. This is what justifies the drastic contingency plans now being drawn up by the World Health Organisation and the cost of measures already taken by worried governments. Britain has not yet ordered poultry to be brought indoors — a step that would be very costly for organic farmers, whose birds would lose their free-range status. These now account for 27 percent of total egg production. **But it has, however, already taken other steps that are sensible.**

(*The Times*: August 23, 2005)

In the context, an assumption (44) will be manifest to the reader.

(44) it has not yet taken other steps that are sensible.

What follows *but* contradicts and eliminates the assumption. *However* affirms the content of the previous sentence, and the reader derives an assumption from it. The sentence in which *however* appears conveys the author's asserting. Since the information is stronger than the wrong assumption, the assumption will be eliminated. *However* emphasizes the underlined part, *already taken other steps that are sensible*.

(45) Whether Arirang can provide new momentum for engagement, or attract more tourist bucks, remains to be seen. **But for now, however, it is party time - at least in the surreal city that is Pyongyang.**

(*The Guardian*; Friday May 17, 2002)

The previous context makes an assumption manifest to the reader.

(46) It is not always vigorous in Pyongyang.

What follows *but* will eliminate the contradicting assumption. On the other hand, the conceptual information of *however* tells the reader that the content of the previous segment is true. From the affirmed segment, the assumption (46) will emerge. *However* emphasizes what follows it. What follows *however* conveys stronger information than the contradicting assumption. Hence, the reader will eliminate the assumption. It seems that the phrase, ‘for now’ is less important in the contradiction.

As we have seen so far, the information encoded by *but* and *however* is different and therefore each functions in a different way. Besides, *however* works as an emphasizer. If *however* appears in the sentence-internal position, part of the clause or sentence will be emphasized. The sentence-initial and sentence end *however* emphasizes the whole clause or sentence.

5.5. A Remaining Problem

It was shown in the section 5.3 that Garner’s (1998) proposal that a part of the constituents followed by *however* is emphasized and contrasted is not necessarily effective. Garner (1998), Bell (2004), and Greenbaum (1969) claim that the positioning of *however* is related to focus, but are there any linkages between the information structure and the positioning? I postulate that *however* functions as an emphasizer, but additional research is

necessary.

At a rough estimate, there are likely to be six cases in the positioning of *however*. They are cases where *however* occurs right before or after a contrastive topic/theme, cases where *however* occurs right before or after a non-contrastive topic/theme, and cases where it comes before or after a focus. These examples will be presented below.

Firstly, we will see three cases where a (contrastive) topic/theme is an adjunct and two cases where it is a subject. A (contrastive) topic/theme is underscored with a wavy line and a focused part is surrounded with a square. The examples (47) to (51) are cases of *however* at the beginning of the sentence, while the examples (52) to (56) are cases of *however* in the sentence-internal position. (The wavy lines and squares are the author's. In the rest of this section, they are the author's if there is no notice. The wavy lines indicate a theme/topic and squares show a focus.)

(47) A Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (1)

And then there's a fan from Midlothian, Va., who goes by the name RedskinDan0557 on the Extremeskins.com forum list. Responding to a reporter's question about superstitions, he wrote: "My wife has to fold laundry (her choice, by the way, she is diehard) in our bedroom while watching the game. Every game that she has done this, the Redskins have won."

However, yesterday against the Seattle Seahawks, none of it worked.
The Redskins lost, 20-10. (Washington Post; January 15, 2006)

Let's take a look at the next example, where a topic/theme is an adjunct.

(48) A Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (2)

The lesson of years of combatting terrorism is that it cannot be solved by the means used to fight conventional wars. Persuasion of states which support terrorists can be helped by the application of economic, diplomatic and sometimes military force. *However, in a failed state,* the notional government may not be able to do anything useful even under the most extreme pressure. (*The Guardian*; September 18, 2001)

Now, we will take a look at another example of the case where *however* appears right before a contrastive topic / theme.

(49) A Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (3)

For those inclined to believe the worst about the greed and venality of multinational corporations, many real examples of labor abuses can be found that correspond to the predominant negative images. *However,* for anyone who actually has traveled to China, visited the operations of Western companies, and spoken with Western managers and Chinese workers, it is abundantly obvious that these images do not justly represent the complete story of Western business in China.

(*Profits and Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China*

By Michael A. Santoro, Cornell University Press, p.3)

In the following example (50), a contrastive topic/theme is a subject. In example (51), a contrastive topic/theme is a subject as the example (50).

(50) **A Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (1)**

Has the constitution been finalized?

In theory, yes. Five million copies of an early version of the draft constitution, after several delays, were distributed to Iraqis in early October along with their ration cards. *However*, the final text of the document is still a work in progress, says Nathan Brown, senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

(*The New York Times*; October 6, 2005)

(51) **A Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (2)**

Among Tory voters, Mr Cameron's support as the potential best leader is up from 3 to 33 per cent, where he is level pegging with Mr Clarke, whose rating has dropped by 22 points since early September.

However, Mr Davis has made no real headway, boosting his rating by just four points to 12 per cent.

(*The Times*; October 11, 2005)

Here are cases of *however* in the middle of a sentence. In the example (52), *however* comes after a contrastive topic. A (contrastive) topic/theme is underscored with a wavy line and a focused part is surrounded with a square.

(52) A Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (1)

This chapter explores the connections between masculinity, femininity, self-interest, and care for others. In the United States today, men and women have equal rights before the law. With respect to the care of children and other dependents, however, our cultural norms still reflect greater expectations for women than for men.

(The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values.

By Nancy Folbre, The New Press, 2001. p.4)

The next example is part of the article entitled “*Bargain schools bring fees down---*Pupils are being wooed from established private schools by new firms offering discounts.”

(53) A Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (2)

Average private school fees are £7,668 a year, slightly higher for secondary schools and lower for preparatory schools. Top schools, *however*, can charge infinitely more — St Paul’s boys’ school in London charges £13,500 for day pupils, Westminster more than £15,000 and Winchester an eye-watering £21,000-plus.

This year parents could take some comfort from the lowest average fee increase in six years, 5.8%. The year before, however, the rise was 9.6%.

(The Sunday Times; May 29, 2005)

Let’s look at the next example (54), a contrastive topic/theme is a subject.

(54) **A Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (1)**

Jane, however, wasn't able to make the trip. (Garner 1998:343)

In the next example (55), a contrastive topic/theme is a subject as (54), but it is a pronoun. In (56), *however* appears right after the subject, which is not a pronoun.

(55) **A Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (2)**

MANY have argued that Hamas's winning of a decisive majority in the Palestinian Parliament provides yet another setback for peace and democracy in the Middle East. Some have even suggested that it vindicates Israeli unilateralism. I, however, think the opposite is true: A negotiated and lasting peace may now be closer than many of us could have imagined just weeks ago. (*The New York Times*; March 1, 2006)

(56) **A Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (3)**

After signing his autograph in the book, *Last Post, the Final Word from Our First World War Soldiers*, by Max Arthur, Mr Stone, a winner of 12 medals, was asked what the secret was behind his extraordinary longevity. He said: "A contented mind, clean living and trust in the Lord."

Mr Allingham, however, had a different explanation for his long life. He declared with a grin: "It's down to cigarettes, whisky and wild, wild women." (*The Times*; November 10, 2005)

Secondly, the following examples (57) to (64) are the cases of a

non-contrastive Topic/Theme. Let us start off by looking at the following example. *However* in (57) and (58) appears before the subordinate clause.

(57) **A Non-Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (1)**: Adjuncts play a role of a simple “scene-setter.”

WHEN George Osborne was flying across the Atlantic on Tuesday, the pilot made a little announcement: “Happy Valentine’s Day to everyone,” he said, “especially to Reg, our chief steward, who has been with his partner, Bob, for 20 years now.”

The passengers, including Mr Osborne, applauded. *However*, when the Shadow Chancellor later described this “sweet moment” to a Republican Congressman, he said that there was a “rather horrified” reaction to this casual acceptance of a gay relationship.

(*The Times*; February 17, 2006)

(58) **A Non-Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (2)**

Germany, with its Nazi past, is especially sensitive to possible violations of civil rights or abuses of police power.

However, since the revelation that Hamburg was the site of the Al Qaeda cell mainly responsible for carrying out the September 11th attacks in the United States, Germany has carried out regular surveillance and investigations of Islamic groups.

(*The New York Times*; July 27, 2005)

A pronoun follows after *however* in this case.

(59) A Non-Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (1)

As his own publisher, Vassa kept the book's entire and considerable profit. By February 1792, he was able to lend today's equivalent of \$35,000 and could afford to lose it when the debtor defaulted. He also routinely subscribed to antislavery writings of other authors. *However*, he died in London on March 31, 1797, 10 years before England abolished the slave trade. (*The Washington Post*; February 1, 2006)

In this example, *however* is followed by a proper name which is the subject.

(60) A Non-Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (2)

Far more than wanting smokers to stub their fags out, I want the illiberal liberals now running health policy to butt out of people's personal habits. This week, an unapologetic Tony Blair made clear that he will use the dodgy intelligence on ETS to launch a war against smoking in public. *However*, Mr Blair is still too soft on smokers for some tastes; one leading medical journal wants him to ban tobacco altogether.

(*The Times*; October 16, 2004)

Now, we will see some examples where *however* appears right after a non-contrastive Topic and Theme. In the examples (61) and (62), *however* is positioned after adjuncts.

(61) A Non-Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (1)

On Thursday the front-runner tacked back to the center, promising to negotiate with Mr. Sharon after the elections and reiterating his willingness to "implement" the road map "completely." To do that, *however*, Mr. Abbas will have to persuade Palestinians to abandon the hoary slogans and maximalist demands that he has just been shouting -- and disarm the militants who have been firing salutes in his honor.

(The Washington Post; January 8, 2005)

(62) A Non-Contrastive Topic/Theme = Adjunct (2)

In the 2000 Republican primaries, he was widely believed to have been behind the smear campaign against John McCain in the crucial South Carolina contest.

For all the allegations, *however*, Mr Rove's fingerprints have rarely been found on any of the backroom manoeuvres that have brought him and Mr Bush to the White House.

(The Guardian; October 2, 2003)

The examples (63) and (64) shows the cases where *however* occurs after a non-contrastive subject.

(63) A Non-Contrastive Topic/Theme = subject (1)

Others might shrug. They're only a cartoons. What's the fuss? Cartoons, *however*, can be a powerful means of catalysing and disseminating ideas, be they pertinently satirical or hideously warped.

(The Guardian; February 3, 2006)

(64) **A (Non-Contrastive) Topic/Theme = subject (2)**

John Forbes Nash, Jr., was born almost exactly four years after his parents' marriage, on June 13, 1928. [...] The big, blond baby boy was, as far as anyone still living remembers, apparently healthy, and was soon baptized in the Episcopal Church directly opposite the Martin house on Tazewell Street and given his father's full name. Everyone, *however*, called him Johnny.

(A Beautiful Mind: The Life of Mathematical Genius and Nobel Laureate John Nash, by Sylvia Nasar, Simon & Schuster, 2001, p.30)

Let us have a look at the cases where *however* right before the focus. See (65) to (67).

(65) Judge Dredd, the ruthless American comic book superhero who acts as policeman, judge, jury and executioner in a post-nuclear New York, was made in Britain.

It is, *however*, American collectors who drive the world market for superhero comic books, the lengthy stories aimed at adults, as opposed to the shorter ones for children.

(The Observer; Sunday April 8, 2001)

(66) Already, O'Reilly & Associates, a technical book publisher based in Sebastapol, Calif., has used Mosaic and the Web to create an on-line magazine that includes advertising.

There remain, *however*, significant barriers to using Mosaic.

(The New York Times; December 11, 2000)

(67)The White House is working hard on a relaunch of the presidency next year, beginning with the confirmation of Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court nominee. Then, in the State of the Union address, Mr Bush plans to push for new initiatives, including a more open immigration policy and, perhaps, serious tax reform. The Administration is also keen to talk about the economy, which continues to record robust growth. Republican strategists note that petrol prices, which seemed to be a key element in the President's slumping political fortunes this past summer, have eased; prices at the pump are down 20 per cent since early September.

The long-term outlook still rests, *however*, on Iraq. For Republicans inside and outside the White House, the hope is that successful elections in Iraq next month will enable the US to begin withdrawing troops, getting the issue off the front pages. Mr Bush still believes that democracy in the Middle East can be his shining legacy. But with a view to their electoral fortunes, most Republicans will be quite happy if the public does not hear another word about Iraq.

(*The Times*; November 17, 2005)

In the example (68) to (72), *however* is positioned after a focus.

(68)It has occasionally been thought that the term “parameter” itself should only be used when there is such a notable or “dramatic” range of effects. I will not, *however*, pursue that way of thinking here.

(*Movement and Silence*, by Richard S. Kayne,
Oxford University Press, 2005, p.278)

(69) Jane wasn't able, *however*, to make the trip. (Garner 1998:343)

(70) When Christopher Columbus discovered the Caribbean in 1492, its lush vistas must have dazzled his senses. It was Diego Velázquez, *however*, who would, in 1511, conquer the island for Spain and launch the Spanish Conquest.

(In Black and White: The Life of Sammy Davis, Jr.

By Wil Haygood, Billboard Books, 2005, p.36)

(71) Some had secured their spot by spending the night in sleeping bags while others sat on the sidewalk in neon-colored lawn chairs reading Mr. Clinton's memoir as if they were seaside. Books went on sale at some locations beginning at 12:01 a.m. today.

Joyce Morales, 52, got up at 4:30 this morning and traveled into Manhattan from Staten Island to get on line. "I love Bill Clinton," she said. "I think he was a great president. I got Hillary's book last year." [...]

Not everyone *however*, was fond of Mr. Clinton.

(The New York Times; June 22, 2004)

(72) But before we do that, let us briefly address who this book is for. It aims to introduce the reader to the minimalist approach to the theory grammar. It doesn't start at zero, *however*.

(Understanding Minimalism,

by Norbert Hornstein, Jairo Nunes, and Kleanthes K. Grohmann

Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.1)

The connection between *however* and the information structure should be

examined in the future research.

5.6. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I showed additional cases that the positioning of *however* might affect pragmatic interpretation, that is, other advantages of the revised hypothesis.

For the purpose of crystallize how the difference in the acceptability of each case can occur, I introduced Araki et al. (1985) description on the difference between literary style and colloquial style, because I thought it was very important to distinguish literary style from colloquial style. What I paid much attention to was the possibility that the exaggeration can be overlooked in spoken language and the medium between colloquial and literary style.

I showed the examples where the difference in acceptability cannot always be explained only by the difference between literary style and colloquial style, and I demonstrated how the degree of the acceptability in co-occurrence of *but* and *however* can be explained, based on the revised hypothesis, which is shown again below.

(73) *However* in sentence-internal position emphasizes the part which is closely connected to contradiction.

In addition to that, I demonstrated two advantages of the revised hypothesis. Firstly, some researchers' statement that *however* in sentence-internal position works better than *however* in sentence-initial

position can be explained by the additional function of *however*, that is, the function of an emphaser. Secondly, I touched on the merit of sentence-internal *however*. The scope of emphasis could be found more easily by positioning of *however*. I claimed that part of sentence is emphasized by *however*. The emphasized part should be closely related to the contradiction, but it should be examined whether *however* makes an effect on the information structure.

Chapter 6

On Adversative Connectives *Still* and *Yet*

6.1. Introduction

Discourse connectives *but*, *however*, *still* and *yet* have a point in common between them in that they are all adversative. Above all, the coordinate conjunction *but* and the adverbial connective *however* have a lot of similarities in the functions. As you can see, *but* can be replaced with *however* in the following examples, (1) which shows contrast usage and (2) which shows elimination of an assumption “a politician is dishonest.”

- (1) a. John is tall. **But** Sam is short.
b. John is tall. **However**, Sam is short. (Fraser 1998:302-306)
- (2) a. John is a politician. **But** he is honest.
b. John is a politician. **However**, he is honest. (ibid.)

In addition, in the context shown in (3), the usage of *however*, *still*, and *yet* is acceptable.

- (3) A: She's quite intelligent.
B: **However**, she's not really what the department needs at the moment.
B1: **Still** she's not really what the department needs at the moment.

B2: **Yet** she's not really what the department needs at the moment.

However, there is a difference like this. As you see in the example (4) and (5), *but* can co-occur with either *still* or *yet*, both of which are adversative. Besides that, as the example (6) shows, it is possible that *still* and *yet* can be combined with *and*. (Emphases are the author's. In the rest of this chapter, they are the author's as far as there is no notice.)

(4) She's a funny girl, **but yet** you can't help liking her.

(Higashimori 1992:350)

(5) 'We're young. At least you are. Every undergraduate we've passed today has given you the eye.' '**But still** we're not as young as Jessica and Davet.'

(*Man, Woman and Child* by Erich Segal; Higashimori 1992:347)

(6) a. **And yet** the centrifuges spin defiantly on.

(*The Economist*: July 19, 2007)

b. **And still** he stays silent.

(*The Guardian*: Tuesday September 6, 2005)

In many cases, *but* and *however* can be replaced with each other. In spite of this, it seems difficult for *however* to be combined with either *still* or *yet*. If *however* has almost the same functions as *but*, the combinations of "*however, still*" and "*however, yet*" would be no problem. However, as the example (7) shows, "*however, still*" has low acceptability and "*however, yet*" is unacceptable. The context in (7) is the same as that in (6).

(7) A: She's quite intelligent.

B3: ??**However, still** she's not really what the department needs at the moment.

B4 ***However, yet** she's not really what the department needs at the moment.

In this chapter, I will consider what causes the difference of the acceptability shown above and search for the different points among *but*, *however*, *still*, and *yet*.

6.2. The Previous Studies Based on Relevance Theory

The outline of Relevance Theory was provided in chapter 1. So, I would like to touch it shortly. In Relevance Theory, the intention of the speaker is considered to modify the hearer's cognitive environment (Higashimori and Yoshimura 2003:13). There are three kinds of 'cognitive effects.' Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2000, 2002) claims that *but* and *however* show readers/listeners a procedure of contradiction and elimination, which is one of cognitive effects. It is assumed that this information is "procedural meaning," which indicate how to infer when the hearer gets implicature through an inference starting from explicature. It is distinguished from "conceptual meaning," which are the meanings of nouns and verbs, what is called, content words.

Additionally, there are two kinds of assumptions; 'explicature' which is an explicit meaning directly based on the utterance and 'implicature' inferred from it. Explicature consists of conceptual meanings. I will recite the

examples which we have seen in chapter 4. In (8), Mary's utterance will be explicature as it is. Since it cannot be regarded as the answer to Peter's question, the communication isn't established at this stage. Peter will get the implicature (9b) through the inference and the knowledge of encyclopedia like (9a). Then, communication is completed.

(8) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?

Mary: I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:194)

(9) a. A Mercedes is an expensive car.

b. Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes. (implicature)

Concerning the characteristics of the words with the procedural information, Blakemore (2002:83) says, "It is hard to paraphrase them. If you ask a Native English speaker what *but* means, you will be told how to use it, not the paraphrase." Moreover, "Discourse makers with procedural meanings do not have the adverbs that mean the same things (Blakemore 2002:83-84)." Blakemore (2002:83-34) observes that the phrase 'in other words' has conceptual information since it has the same meaning both in the example (10) of a sentence modifier and in the example (11) of a verb modifier. On the other hand, the discourse connective *well* in (12) and the verb modifier *well* in (13) are not synonyms and therefore *well* has procedural information.

- (10) In other words, you're banned. (Blakemore 2002:84)
- (11) She asked me to try and put it in other words. (ibid.)
- (12) A: What time should we leave? (ibid.)
- B: Well, the train leaves at 11: 23.
- (13) You haven't ironed this very well. (ibid.)

Still and *yet* have temporal usages. Differentiated from temporal adverb *still*, *yet*, adversative connectives *still*, *yet* are considered to have the procedural information of contradiction and elimination of an assumption (Higashimori 1992:347-350).

In Relevance Theory, adversative connectives *still*, *yet* (Higashimori 1992:347-350) and discourse connectives *but*, *however* does not have conceptual information. So they do not contribute to the truth value (Blakemore 2002:12-14, 26-27). They indicate what inference the hearer is expected to make and restrict the inference (Blakemore 2002:95-98). It is thought that they can make a contribution by reducing the efforts needed for the interpretation by encoding the restriction on the inferential process the speaker intends, or by procedural information.

The previous studies on *but* was introduced in chapter 1 and an alternative hypothesis on *however* and the explanation of it was provided in chapter 3 and 4. So, *still* and *yet* will be mainly analyzed in this chapter. Let us have a look at concrete analyses.

6.3. *Still* and *Yet*

From the perspective of Relevance Theory, Higashimori (1992:347-350)

examines *still* and *yet* comparing with the function of *but*. Let us take a look at his analyses in sequence.

In Higashimori (1992:347-348), it is thought that *still* has the procedural information, that is, the denial of expectation and a reminder to the speaker or the hearer. It is said that there are two Reminder Uses as showed in (14).

- (14) a. **Still** as a reminder to the hearer of what he already knows or believes
b. **Still** as a reminder to the speaker of what he already knows or believes
(Higashimori 1992:347)

The example related to (14a) is (15). According to Higashimori (1992), *still* denies the implication inferred from the first proposition by the second one in processing the inference. This is the similarity between *but* and *still*. The difference between *but* and *still* is that *still* requires the hearer's cognitive prerequisite as showed in (16ii).

- (15) It's raining; **still**, we must go out. (Higashimori 1992:346)

- (16) i. Context for interpreting the first conjunct:

If it is raining, *we normally don't have to go out*.

ii. You already know that *we have to go out*.

iii. The second conjunct: *we have to go out*. (ibid.)

Next, the example regarding (14b) is (17). Higashimori (1992:348) claims that *still* functions as the denial of expectation and the second proposition

contradicts the contextual implication of the previous clause, and that the difference between *but* and *still* is that *still* requires the speaker's up-front awareness shown in (18ii).

(17) John's a strange guy. **Still**, I like him. (Schourup & Waida 1988:202)

(18) i. Context for interpreting the first conjunct:

If he is strange guy, *I don't like John*.

ii. I already know or believe that *I like John*.

iii. the second conjunct: *I like John*. (Higashimori 1992:348)

In Higashimori (1992:348-350), it is stated that *yet* has the information related to denial of expectation and the specification of the context where the hearer strongly believes the dependence between the premise from the previous statement and the conclusion. For instance, *yet* can be acceptable in the following context.

(19) Hearer's belief in strong dependency between the antecedent and the consequent of the premise. (op.cit.:349)

Higashimori (1992:348) takes up an example where *still* is unacceptable and *yet* is acceptable in the same context.

(20) He knew Conrad had told him the truth. It was so. **Yet/*Still** it wasn't so. It wasn't so because it couldn't be so.

(Konig & Traugott 1982:175)

Higashimori (1992:350) says that *still* expects the hearer's presupposition '*Conrad would not tell him the truth,*' but the preceding message '*it was so,*' which means '*Conrad told him the truth,*' entirely contradicts the proposition following it. Consequently, the interpretation of the whole utterance does not work out and then *still* is unacceptable. On the other hand, *yet* is acceptable as the hearer believes that association between the antecedent of the premise and the consequent is strong.

(21) i. Context for interpreting the first (conjunct):

If he knew Conrad told him the truth, then it must always be true.

ii. You believe this premise is strong. <i.e. the dependency between (he knew Conrad told him the truth) and (it must always be true) is strong.>

iii. Context for interpreting the second conjunct: If it wasn't so, then it cannot always be true. (Higashimori 1992:349)

6.4. Problems

As you see in (1) and (2), the function of *however* and *but* is similar to each other. As you see in (3) to (5), *still* and *yet* can co-occur with the coordinative conjunctions *but* or *and*. Higashimori (1992) cannot give an account for the distinction that the co-occurrence of *however* and *still* is less acceptable although *but still* and *but yet* are grammatical.

Besides that, Higashimori (1992) delivers himself of an opinion that *yet* has the procedural information on how to infer, which directs the hearer to eliminate a contradicted assumption derived from the prior segment, but

Blakemore's (2002:106-108) observation shows that there is a possibility that *yet* has nothing with the elimination of an assumption.

(22) a. Her husband is in hospital **and** she is seeing other men.

b. Her husband is in hospital **but** she is seeing other men.

(23) Her husband is in hospital **and (yet)** she is seeing other men.

(24) It is normally the case that a woman whose husband is in hospital will devote herself to his care.

(25) a. If the woman's husband is in hospital, she will not be having a very good time.

b. The woman's husband is in hospital. (first segment of (22b))

c. The woman isn't having a very good time.

Blakemore (2002:106-108) says that *and* is not related with the elimination of an assumption. In (22b), the hearer is instructed to delete (25a) as well as the inference shown in (25c). On the other hand, the sentence (22a) has the same semantic content as (23) and expresses "surprise" based on the assumption (24), but it does not require the hearer to delete the assumption (24). The example (23) is not involved with elimination and therefore *yet* does not include the function of elimination.

Concerning the contradiction and elimination of an assumption, Higashimori and Yoshimura (2003:17) state that, when new information and old information contradict each other, the weaker information will be deleted of the two. Higashimori and Yoshimura (2003:17) take up an example: the person B saw the person A coming out of the library with a Russian book.

Because of this, the person B forms an assumption that ‘the person A knows Russian.’ Several days later, the person B heard the person A saying, “I wish I knew Russian.” Eventually, the person B understands that the person A does not know Russian. The assumption formed before is eliminated and the cognitive environment is modified.

Yet as well as *and* carries the information that the previous segment and the subsequent one are equal to one another in information value. That might be why they are not involved with elimination of an assumption.

There is one more problem. It is considered that the adversative usage of *however*, *still* and *yet* has no connection with other usage of them. I suppose that there remains a matter of debate. We need consider whether the other usages shown below bear no relevance to the adversative usage or they have the meaning in common with them.

(26) We have to finish, **however** long it takes. (LDOCE, 4th Edition)

(27) Do you **still** have Julie's phone number? (ibid.)

(28) I haven't asked him **yet**. (ibid.)

6.5. Proposal

As mentioned in 6.1, *but* and *however* is the words which play a similar role. Therefore, some grammarians advise to avoid using both of them in a sentence because it is redundant. In chapter 3, however, it was shown that the co-occurrence of *but* and *however* is often seen in publications. It means that the co-occurrence of them does not necessarily ruin a sentence. Rather, it could be expected to give a special effect. Thinking in that way, I

considered what makes the co-occurrence possible there.

(29) I don't want to be blunt; **but however**, I tempted to tell him to either start the project (In the midst of Christmas season!) or forget it.

(Washington Post; Thursday, December 1, 2005)

Based on Higashimori and Yoshimura's (2003:113-116) analysis, I suggested that *but* has a conceptual information and *however* bears conceptual information. Let me briefly repeat their analysis. They weigh the differences between *sort of* and *like*. They allege that the former has the conceptual information of *not entirely*, while the latter has only procedural information which tells the hearer to extend the scope of the modified word. It is because the type of information is different that *sort of* and *like* can co-occur as follows.

(30) a. Gradually it *sort of like* brings people out of themselves and do you know what I mean, they learn to do things.

(Higashimori and Yoshimura 2003:115)

b. *Sort of, like* when your combing your hair, innit erm, in the bath keeps on, do my hair, do my hair. (op.cit.:116)

c. Well you put another word in between each letter of the other word *sort of like*. (ibid.)

Getting from Higashimori and Yoshimura's (2003:113-116) analysis on the co-occurrence of *like* and *kind of*, which have similar meaning, I made the

following proposal in chapter 3.

- (31) 1. *But* has procedural information.
2. *However* has conceptual information.

In chapter 2, we have already reviewed literature on the function of *but*. Examining some previous studies on it, I concluded that Iten's (2005) suggestion is the most persuasive. I will recite it again below.

(32) The functions of *but*

What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context. (Iten 2005:147)

In chapter 4, following Quirk *et al.* (1985:641), I suggested that *however* has the conceptual information, **HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE**.

- (33) He didn't like the food. **However, [However true that may be]**, he didn't complain about it. (Quirk *et al.* 1985:641)

The conceptual information of *however*, **HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE**, directs the hearer to accept the preceding content as the truth. The contradicting assumption inferred from the previous segment is weaker than the information conveyed by the segment containing *however*. As a result, the incorrect assumption will be eliminated. The conceptual information of *however* contains the pronoun 'that' which assures a relevance to the previous

information and therefore the restriction on the context in (34) suggested by Blakemore and Schourup is not needed.

(34) The restriction on the context for *however*

However affirms the explicit content of the preceding segment and simultaneously connects it to an assumption inferentially.

So, how does the conceptual information of *however* work during the process of interpretation? I will repeat the sum-up of contribution of conceptual information of *however* below.

(35) Contribution of Conceptual Information of *However*

a. Denial of Expectation

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and directs the readers/listeners to take it as truth. A contradicting assumption derived from what precedes it. The segment which contains *however* conveys the speaker's or writer's argument. Accordingly, the information is stronger than the contradicting assumption, and then the latter will be eliminated.

b. Change of Topics/ Floor-Holding Device

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and affirms the content. Unlimited possibilities emerge from the context, and they will be reserved because they are not manifest enough to be eliminated.

Along with the same line of the analysis on the co-occurrence of *but* and *however*, why it is allowed to use the expressions *but yet*, and *but still* could be explained, by assuming that one has conceptual information and the other has only procedural information.

- (36) 1. *But* has procedural information
2. *still*, and *yet* have conceptual information

Additionally, the combination of the words that has conceptual information will be barred out only if it is redundant. Hereinafter, we will look at the conceptual information of *still* in 6.5.1, *yet* in 6.5.2. In 6.5.3, I will consider the possibility of *however*'s being combined with *still* and *yet*.

6.5.1. The Conceptual Information of *Still*

In this section, we will look at *still*. Let us look at the following examples.

- (37) a. A: We're ravenous. Can we have that pizza in the fridge?

B: Sure. **But** there's not very much left.

- b. A: We're ravenous. Can we have that pizza in the fridge?

?B: Sure. **Still** there's not very much left.

- (38) a. I've been sent a copy of the grant proposal. **But** it's in Dutch.

- b. I've been sent a copy of the grant proposal. ?**Still** it's in Dutch.

(Blakemore 2000:480)

As you can see, (a) and (b) appear in exactly the same context, where *but*

cannot be replaced with *still*. Those examples shows differences of function between *but* and *still*.

Then, what is the conceptual information of *still*? Crupi (2004:138) defines the core meaning of *still* including the usages of a connective and an adverb as below.

(39) *Still* in both its adverbial and conjunctive roles demonstrates a contrast semantic value of CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE. (Crupi 2004:136)

(40) *Still* introduces information that is contrary to the most recent contextual assumptions, but connected to information that has been presented at some earlier point in the text or to common knowledge already available to the reader. (op.cit.:120)

This observation shows that the temporal use is not separated from the adversative usage of it. In Michaelis (1993:217) and Greenbaum (1983:94), there are descriptions saying that *still* has similar meaning to *nevertheless* and, at the same time, the temporal meaning. I suppose that the two usages should be considered to share the relevant information. Furthermore, if we apprehend the meaning of *still* like that, it follows that *still* encodes the conceptual meaning. (See the section 6.2 on conceptual meaning.)

As we saw above, it has been noted that positioning of *still* can change the nuance of it. With that, I will argue that the positioning of *still* has the function below.

(41) The constituent or a part of the constituent preceded by **still** is in its scope and is interpreted as focus which specifies the part of CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, despite the EXPLICIT or IMPLICIT preceded segment.

Concretely speaking, the operator domain of sentence-initial *still* just a proposition (S) and the scope of *still* in the middle can be either only Verb Phrase or both Verb Phrase and a proposition.

Now, let us look at examples in (42) and (43).

(42) a. Mom has starved herself for a month, **and** she's **still** thirty pounds overweight. (Michaelis 1993:217)

b. Mom has starved herself for a month, **and still** she's thirty pounds overweight.

(43) a. She hated the noise, **but** she **still** lived there for several months.

(op.cit.:218)

b. She hated the noise, **but still** she lived there for several months.

As you can see in (42), there is a case where *and* in P *and* Q may be construed as an adversative conjunction. Blakemore & Carston (2005: 580-581) observe that both P and Q function as premises in the context P *and* Q, while only P works as a premise in the context P *but* Q. As to interpretation of words, Blakemore (2002:107) mentions as follows.

(44) The recovery of this interpretation will depend on the hearer's ability to access the contextual assumption. (Blakemore 2002:107)

Then, let us look at examples. In the examples (42a) and (42b), *and* conveys that the premise P '*Mom has starved herself for a month*' and the premise Q '*she is thirty pounds overweight*' are both true. Blakemore (2002:107) says that the interpretation of *and* depends on whether the hearer can access the following context assumption.

(45) It is normally the case that a woman who has starved herself for a month will lose her weight.

The conceptual information of *Still*, CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, tells the hearer that the preceding segment '*Mom has starved herself for a month*' is a factor that can change the situation '*she is always overweight*,' but it does not change. Then, the inference shown in (46) will be derived from the assumption (45).

(46) Although she was expected to lose her weight, she is too fat as before.

Let us look at the examples (43a) and (43b). The procedural information of *but* will tell the hearer that what is mentioned by *but*-clause eliminate the contradicting assumption which becomes manifest in the context. Moreover, the conceptual information of *still*, CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE tells the hearer that the previous segment '*she hated the noise*' is an element

which can ‘*she lived there,*’ but there is no change in the situation.

The procedural information of *but* guides the hearer to get an assumption like (47). In addition, the hearer will make an inference like (48) based on the assumption (47) and the conceptual information that *still* conveys. The assumption (47) will be eliminated by the segment following *but*.

(47) If people hate the noise, they will leave.

(48) Although there was a good reason she left, she lived there as before.

When *still* appears in the middle of the sentence, the scope of it will be a verb phrase and *still* has temporal meaning simultaneously as well. Higashimori (1992:348) states that *still* requires the speaker or the hearer to have the knowledge of the unchanging situation in advance. However, he does not explain why it does. Assuming that *still* has the conceptual meaning CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, we can say that the conceptual information of *still* demands such recognition.

6.5.2. The Conceptual Information of *Yet*

In Higashimori (1992), the adversative usage of *yet* is isolated from other usages of it. As I mentioned above, Crupi (2004) points out that there is a possibility that the temporal use and the adversative use are linked to each other. Crupi (2004:120) says that the basic function of *yet* including the conjunctive use and the adverbial use is to stress a contrast which is important for the writer’s purpose of communication.

(49) *Yet*, SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST between information A and information B.

(Crupi 2004:138)

(50) 1. Both components of the contrast must be explicitly present in a text containing *yet* in order for that context to be characterized as conjunctive.

2. Where only one component of an implied contrast is present in the text, *yet* is ranked as an adverb. (op.cit.:163)

In the meantime, how is the temporal meaning of *yet* related with the conceptual meaning, SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST? Crupi (2004:128) argues that negative sentences are associated with the contrast with affirmative sentences corresponding to them. In short, '*it isn't raining*' is intrinsically contrasted with the corresponding affirmative sentence, '*it is raining*.' Crupi (2004:128) claims that *yet* plays a role in emphasis on the importance of the existing contrast in the negative context with the counterpart, for example, in the sentence '*it isn't raining yet*.'

Let us come back to analyses on the adversative connectives. As I glanced in the section 6.4, *yet* per se is not directly involved with the elimination of an assumption. Crupi (2004:127) makes a further comment that *yet* can contribute to various messages such as predication, surprise and disappointment by the characteristics of placing great emphasis on the contrast. Based on the analyses of Crupi (2004), the scope of *yet* at the beginning of the sentence, which has adversative meaning, is a whole sentence. So, in this case, *yet* emphasizes the contrast between the preceding information A and the information B following A. Additionally, it conveys

the information ‘A and B are both true although they are incompatible.’

(51) Ana Castillo's family has been on this soil for generations, **and yet** she is drawn to the hard questions of immigration.

(*Washington Post*: Sunday, Aug. 19, 2007)

To begin with, *and* tells us that the premise P ‘*Ana Castillo's family has been on this soil for generations*’ and the premise Q ‘*she is drawn to the hard questions of immigration*’ are both true. *Yet* emphasizes the contrast between the premise P and the premise Q and tells the hearer that P and Q both true, although they do not go together. Then, the assumption like (53) will be derived from the two propositions. From the assumption, the interpretation that the following content can be surprising will be thrown up. However, *yet* as well as *and* does not carry a connotation of elimination of an assumption.

(52) It is normally the case that a family who has been on the same soil for generations will not move.

Meanwhile, in the example (53), *but* bears the procedural information that indicates the hearer to make an inference resulting in contradiction and elimination of an assumption and therefore the assumption like (54) will be inferred. Subsequently, the segment following *but* will negate the assumption. *Yet* underscores the contrast between the previous content and the follow-on one and directs the hearer to understand that the former and the latter are true together although they convey contradictory information. It

seems that *yet* does not imply the deletion of an assumption.

(53) It's very fine weather for a walk, **but yet** I don't think I'll go out.

(Otsuka. ed. 1969:506)

(54) If it's very fine weather for a walk, the speaker wants to go out.

Now, let us think about the example (20) taken up in 6.3, where *yet* is acceptable and *still* is not acceptable in the same context. I will quote the example (20) again here as (55).

(55) He knew Conrad had told him the truth. It was so. **Yet** /***Still** it wasn't so. It wasn't so because it couldn't be so.

(Konig & Traugott 1982:175)

The conceptual information of *yet* functions to stress the contrast between the proposition P and the proposition Q and passes on the information that P and Q are truthful at the same time while they are difficult to be compatible. The precedent division '*it was so*' is incompatible with the successive one '*it wasn't so*.' Therefore, *yet* matches this kind of context. On the other hand, the conceptual information of *still*, CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, amounts to tell the hearer that the event mentioned right before can be taken as a factor that might change it. It might be possible to think the prior part '*it was so*' as an element which can put the situation following it '*it wasn't so*' into another situation, but this context has no connection with the consequence that nothing changes. If he tried to tell the truth, the behavior will be an element

that can change the situation where he did not tell the truth. However, if he told the truth, there would be no situation where he did not. For that reason, *still* is not appropriate in this example.

6.5.3. On Co-occurrence *However*, *Still* and *Yet*

It could be because of the combination of the procedural information and conceptual information that *but still* and *but yet* are okay. On another front, in the combination of *however* + *still/yet*, they all have conceptual information and the combination is redundant. That is why the combinations are less acceptable.

Let us look at the next examples. With regard to the possibility of the combination of *still* and *however*, it differs depending on whether *still* and *however* are next to each other or *still* appears in adverb position separated from *however*. This kind of cases can be captured by the hypothesis that *still* has the conceptual information.

The scope of *still* at the beginning of a sentence is the whole sentence and *still* does not take on temporal meaning, and there will be only interpretation of adversative *still* derived from its conceptual information CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, that is, ‘the situation does not change even if the event mentioned ahead can be a factor that will change it.’

- (56) a The hotel was terrible. **Still**, we were lucky with the weather.
b. ??The hotel was terrible. **Still, however**, we were lucky with the weather.

c. *The hotel was terrible. **However, still**, we were lucky with the weather.

d. ?The hotel was terrible. **However**, we were **still** lucky with the weather.

(57) If the hotel was terrible, the trip would be terrible.

In the example (56), *still* requires the awareness in advance, '*we were lucky with the weather.*' The conceptual meaning of *still* CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE leads the hearer to the implicature shown in (58) along with the assumption (57).

(58) The speaker tries to make the hearer remember the good points of the trip and to say it was not so terrible.

Meanwhile, the conceptual meaning of *however* tells that something that does not go together will be said by the segment following *however*, while the preceding proposition should be affirmed. The hearer access the assumption (57) based on the previous segment, which is not indicated by *however*. From the conceptual meaning of *however* and the assumption in (57), the interpretation (59) comes about.

(59) It is true that the hotel is terrible, but the trip was not so terrible.

Plus, in this example, it can be said that the fact of being blessed with a fine weather during the trip is old information the speaker and the hearer share

from the words, ‘*we were lucky with the weather.*’ Thus, *however* gives the impression of the speaker’s reminding the hearer of a good point of the trip just like *still*.

In this way, the assumptions which the hearer accesses based on the prior context are the same, and the combination of them is redundant in that the speaker makes the hearer remember the merit of the trip. That is the reason they are difficult to co-occur.

In the case of *however*’s preceding *still* in the middle of the sentence, the scope of *still* is a verb phrase and *still* has both adversative and temporal readings. Therefore, the combination of them is less acceptable because of the redundancy, but it is not ungrammatical.

Now, the conceptual information of *yet* functions to stress the contrast between the propositions P and Q and tells the hearer that they are both veracious though P and Q is difficult to go together. What we should be careful here is that *yet* does not have a direct connection to the elimination of the inferred assumption. On the other hand, the conceptual meaning of *however* affirms the previous message and tells the hearer that the message following *however* will be unexpected, judging from the derived assumption. The example (7) will be quoted in (60) again here.

(60) A: She’s quite intelligent.

- a. ***However, yet** she’s not really what the department needs at the moment.
- b. ??**Yet, however,** she’s not really what the department needs at the moment.

(61) If she is quite intelligent, we should appoint her to the position.

On the basis of the conceptual information of *however* and the assumption (61) yielded by the precedent segment, the interpretation (62) will accrue.

(62) It is true that she is quite intelligent, but we should not appoint her to the position.

The conceptual information of *yet* will yield the interpretation (63) together with the assumption (62).

(63) It is a good reason we should appoint her to the position that she is quite intelligent, but it is also a good reason we should not that she's not really what the department needs at the moment.

In both cases, the assumptions that the hearer will access are the same. In addition to that, it is redundant that B's utterance affirms A's statement and that B's message contradicts A's according to the assumption inferred from A's words. Those make the combination of them less acceptable.

6.6. Summary

Relevance Theory showed that the adversative connectives have the procedural information of contradiction and elimination of an assumption. As problems with those previous studies, I pointed out that they cannot capture the lower acceptability of '*however still*' and '*however yet*' even

though *but* has many functions in common with *however*, and ‘*but still*’ and ‘*but yet*’ are grammatical and no problem. This problem could be solved by the explanation that *but* has procedural information and *still*, *yet*, *however* have conceptual information.

Still carries the conceptual information CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, and *yet* holds the conceptual information SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST. Accordingly, the combinations of ‘*but still*’ and ‘*but yet*’ are all right. *However* contains the conceptual information HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE. It implies that the prior proposition should be affirmed and tells the hearer that a contrasting thing will be said after that. As for the combinations of ‘*however, still*’ and ‘*however yet*,’ each of them has different conceptual information, but the interpretations, which each of them helps the hearer to get, are almost the same. Because of that, they are considered to be redundant. Therefore, they are less acceptable.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

The purpose of this research is to reconsider and crystallize functions of the adversative coordinate conjunction *but* and the other discourse connectives, *however*, *still* and *yet*, based on Relevance Theory. In Relevance theory, there are two types of meaning; the conceptual and the procedural. It is assumed that the connectives bear procedural information. However, I made an assertion that adversative connectives *still*, *yet*, and *however* should have conceptual information.

To accomplish the goal of my research: to reconsider and crystallize functions of adversative coordinate conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs, roughly speaking, three main problems were presented. The first question is why *however* is more restricted than *but*. The second question is what makes it possible that adversative connectives *however*, *still* and *yet* can be used with the co-ordinate conjunction *but*. The third question is whether *however* in the middle of the sentence has another function.

In chapter 2, I reviewed the previous studies on the coordinate conjunction *but*. Making investigation of literature on *but*, I found that Iten (2005) provides a persuasive proposal. I used Iten's (2005) proposal in order to analyze examples of the co-occurrence of other adversative connectives *however*, *still* and *yet*. Iten's (2005) hypothesis is shown below.

(1) The functions of *but*

What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context. (Iten 2005:147)

As the previous studies in Relevance Theory, Blakemore's (2002) and Schourup's (2005) analyses took up on functions of *but* and *however* in Chapter 3. They assumed that *but* and *however* both encode procedural information that guides the reader/listener to the inference which ends in contradiction and elimination of an assumption. Only *however* has the following context specification.

- (2) The assumption A is inferentially contingent on the explicit content of a previous utterance segment. *However* affirms this content to ensure its availability for deriving A. (Schourup 2005:102)

Where does this context specification come from? My proposal could give an answer to the question. I hypothesized that the conceptual information of *however* is **HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE**. The pronoun 'that' connects the segment which has *however* to the one followed by it. My alternative suggestion is below.

- (3) He didn't like the food. **However, [However true that may be]**, he didn't complain about it. (Quirk *et al.* 1985:641)

The objects of the previous studies in Relevance Theory are functions of

discourse connectives in rather short discourse segments, often even only looking at utterance pairs. I argued that it is more significant to capture the functions of discourse connectives not from a local viewpoint but from a global one, based on Crupi (2004) and Lenk (1998). I indicated that there are some cases that those previous studies cannot explain. Some examples of Change of Topics and Floor-Holding Device provided by Lenk (1998) are problematic to Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005). I showed that my alternative proposal could cover such examples.

(4) Contribution of Conceptual Information of *However*

a. Denial of Expectation

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and directs the readers/listeners to take it as truth. A contradicting assumption derived from what precedes it. The segment which contains *however* conveys the speaker's or writer's argument. Accordingly, the information is stronger than the contradicting assumption, and then the latter will be eliminated.

b. Change of Topics/ Floor-Holding Device

However guarantees a relevance to the explicit content of the preceding segment and affirms the content. Unlimited possibilities emerge from the context, and they will be reserved because they are not manifest enough to be eliminated.

Another problem with Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2005) is that they cannot explain the co-occurrence of adversative connectives clearly.

That issue was discussed in chapter 4 and 6 and I made an alternative proposal.

(5) 1. *But* has procedural information.

2. *However, still, and yet* have conceptual information.

In chapter 6, I claimed that *but* has procedural information, and *still, yet* and *however* have conceptual information. Relevance Theory showed that the adversative connectives have the procedural information of contradiction and elimination of an assumption. As problems with those previous studies, I indicated that they cannot capture the lower acceptability of '*however still*' and '*however yet*' even though *but* has many functions in common with *however*, and '*but still*' and '*but yet*' are grammatical and no problem. This problem could be solved by the explanation that *but* has procedural information, and *still, yet* and *however* have conceptual information.

Still carries the conceptual information CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, and *yet* holds the conceptual information SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST. The core meanings of them were proposed by Crupi (2004).

(6) *Still* in both its adverbial and conjunctive roles demonstrates a contrast semantic value of CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE. (Crupi 2004:136)

(7) *Still* introduces information that is contrary to the most recent contextual assumptions, but connected to information that has been presented at some earlier point in the text or to common knowledge already available to the reader. (op.cit.:120)

(8) *Yet*, SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST between information A and information B.

(Crupi 2004:138)

(9) 1. Both components of the contrast must be explicitly present in a text containing *yet* in order for that context to be characterized as conjunctive.

2. Where only one component of an implied contrast is present in the text, *yet* is ranked as an adverb. (op.cit.:163)

I suggested that the positioning of *still* can change the scope of it. The adversative meaning and temporal meaning will be caused from the difference of the scope.

(10) The constituent or a part of the constituent preceded by **still** is in its scope and is interpreted as focus which specifies the part of CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE, despite the EXPLICIT or IMPLICIT preceded segment.

Accordingly, the combinations of ‘*but still*’ and ‘*but yet*’ are all right. *However* contains the conceptual information HOWEVER TRUE THAT MAY BE. It implies that the prior proposition should be affirmed and tells the hearer that a contrasting thing will be said after that. As for the combinations of ‘*however, still*’ and ‘*however yet,*’ each of them has different conceptual information, but the interpretations, which each of them helps the hearer to get, are almost the same. Because of that, they are considered to be redundant. Therefore, they are less acceptable.

There is one more problem: it is impossible for any previous studies to explain what the difference between “*but however...*” and “*but ...however is.*” To explicate such a subtle difference, I tried to apply scope theory of adverbs to that of conjunctive adverbs in chapter 4.

(11) *However* in sentence-internal position emphasizes the part which is closely connected to contradiction.

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論文内容要旨

博士論文題目

A Functional Approach toward Sentence Connectives in English:

A Case Study on Adversatives

(英語における文接続の機能論的研究)

(---反意の接続詞と接続副詞を中心に---)

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1. 研究の目的

談話連結詞の but、however、still、yet は反意を示す点で共通している。中でも、等位接続詞 but と接続副詞の however には機能に多くの類似性が見られる。(論者が用例に強調を加筆)

(1) a. John is tall. **But** Sam is short.

b. John is tall. **However**, Sam is short. (Fraser 1998:302-306)

(2) a. John is a politician. **But**, he is honest.

b. John is a politician. **However**, he is honest. (ibid.)

(3) A: Chris is enjoying being a bachelor.

B: **But** Chris is female.

?B1: **However**, Chris is female. (ibid.)

それゆえに、何冊かの辞書では、but と however の共起は余剰性が高く容認可能性が低いとされている。(4) の用例は but の直後に however が続くことは容認されないこと、直後でなくとも、容認可能性は低いことが示されている。(論者が用例に強調を加筆)

(4) a*You can phone the doctor if you like, **but however**, I very much doubt whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.

b. ?You can phone the doctor if you like, **but** I very much doubt, **however**, whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night. (Quirk et al. 1985:646)

しかし、実際にはそれほど堅くない談話においては but と however の共起を確認できる。(論者が用例に強調を加筆)

(5) When she was only fifteen, there was a gentleman at my brother Gardiner' s in town, so much in love with her, that my sister-in-law was sure he would make her an offer before we came away. **But however** he did not.

(Jane Austen (1813/1906). *Pride and Prejudice*,
p64. Edinburg: J. Grant)

(6) The District has its killers, as critics love to note, ignoring the steady decline in homicide victims and the improved arrest statistics. And, yes, one murder is too many.

But our city, **however**, hasn' t had anything like Wichita' s BTK murderer (bind, torture, kill) who terrorized that city for 30 years.

(*Washington Post*; Saturday, March 12, 2005)

このように共起が許されるということは、同じ反意を表わす言葉であっても、but と however の機能には何らかの違いがあると考えられる。では、But と however の間のどんな違いが、(4) に示す違いを生んでいるのか？また、but と however の共起において but と however はそれぞれどのように機能するのか？

さらに、等位接続詞 but は、反意の接続副詞 still や yet との共起が可能である。(論者が用例に強調を加筆)

(7) She's a funny girl, **but yet** you can't help liking her. (Higashimori 1992:350)

(8) 'We're young. At least you are. Every undergraduate we've passed today has given you the eye.' 'But still we're not as young as Jessica and Davet.'

---Segal, Man (op.cit:347)

共起を可能にする反意の接続副詞 still、yet と but との相違点は何かを探る。

ところで、接続詞と違って、接続副詞は副詞と同様に文中に生起する位置が比較的に自由であることが知られている。(論者が用例に強調を加筆)

- (9) a. **However**, it runs into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP.
b. It, **however**, runs into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP.
c. It runs, **however**, into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP.
d. It runs into problems with extractions which stop, **however**, in the nearest COMP.
e. It runs into problems with extractions which stop in the nearest COMP, **however**.

果たして、接続副詞の生起する位置が異なる文は、全く同じ意味を表しているのか。(4)の例は however の生起位置によって、容認可能の度合が変化することを示しているが、文中の however には付加的な機能があるのではないか。

以上、主に、これらの問題について考察を行った。

2. 研究の方法

「等位接続詞は文と文とを連結して、より高次の文（重文）を構成するが、テクストレベルでは接続副詞がこれに類似した連結の機能を有している。『現代英文法辞典』 p. 329)」それぞれの機能を明確にするため、類似の意味と機能を持つ等位接続詞と接続副詞を対比させながら考察を進める。『現代英文法辞典』では等位接続詞を意味上から (a) 連結接続詞 (b) 離接的接続詞 (c) 反意的接続詞 (d) 原因の接続詞の四つに分類している。接続副詞の意味上の分類は一樣ではないが、ここでは、『英語語法大辞典』を基に接続副詞を等位接続詞と同様に 4 つに分類して、比較検討を行う。この論文では、反意的接続詞の分析を行う。主として、but と however を考察する。

3. 研究の結果

3.1. but と however の先行研究

Blakemore (2002:122) は however には but にはない文脈効果が導かれるべき文脈についての制約があると述べている。

- (10) 文脈効果が導かれるべき文脈についての制約: 話者によって受け入れられる関連性を保証する想定を含む文脈、かつ、その認知効果が想定 A の削除を含まない文脈

(Blakemore 2002:122)

その一方で、Schourup (2005:102) は Blakemore (2002) の第二の制約は複雑で一部否定的な制約であるとして、これに代わるよりシンプルな代案を提案している。

(11) 先行する談話セグメントの明示的内容を肯定すると同時に、その肯定内容に対して、矛盾想定を推論的に結びつける。 (Schourup 2005:102)

第二の制約に関わるのは、but の修正 (correction) と抗議 (protest) の用法が however にはないことだ。

(12) a. He isn't clever, **but** hardworking. (Blakemore 2002:110)

b. ?He is not clever; **however**, hardworking. (op.cit.:117)

(13) [speaker, who is in shock, has been given a whisky]

a. **But** I don't drink.

b. ? **However**, I don't drink. (op.cit.:118)

(14) A : We had a very nice lunch. I had an excellent lobster.

B : **But** what about the money?

B' : ? **However**, what about the money? (op.cit.:119)

(15) A: She's had a very difficult time this semester.

B: **However**, I think she should hand in at least some of the work. (op.cit.:119)

両者は(12)－(15)の例について、それぞれ次のように説明している。まずは、(12a)を見てみよう。Blakemore(2002:111－12)は先行部分の否定の表記と but 自体によって生じる矛盾と削除の両方によって、2度同じ想定が削除される文脈であるので、however は不適切になると述べている。具体的には、最初の segment の否定文はその肯定文を accessible にする。そして、but の手続き的意味によって、矛盾と削除に終わる想定もまた、(16)と解釈される。(16)の想定は、最初の segment で否定されるだけでなく、but の手続き的意味によってもまた、否定される。

(16) He is clever.

それに対して、Schourup(2005:95)では、(12b)の correction(修正)の読みが排除されるのは、先行部分を肯定するならば、聞き手が he is clever を he is hardworking によって置きかえることはないからとなる。つまり、先行部分を肯定したならば、he is clever という想定には結びつかないことになる。先行部分が先行部分から accessible になる想定 of he is clever を否定することは、but の場合は問題がない。なぜなら、but は削除された想定を推論する際に先行部分の明示的な内容を聞き手に活用するよう強いることはないからだ。

(13)については、Blakemore(2002:121)では、意図された発話の関連性は(17)の想定 of 削除で使い果たされ、別の方法で関連性を達成するその他の情報は一切伝えていないため、however の場合は容認可能性が低くなると述べている。

(17) The speaker of (13) can be expected to drink the whisky that is being offered.

(Blakemore 2002:121)

簡単にいえば、however の使用には、先行部分との間に関連がある文脈が必要だが、but にはそのような文脈指定はないということだ。Schourup(2005:93)では、先行部分が明示的でないために、排除される。つまり、先行部分を肯定し、そこから想定を導くことができないので、不適切になる。

(14)と(15)はどちらも抗議(protest)の用法だが、一方では、問題なく however が使え、もう一方で

は容認可能性が低くなっている。Blakemore(2002:119)によれば、(14)は先行部分とは関連がない文脈であるため、however の容認可能性が低くなり、では、関連がある文脈なので、容認可能となる。その一方で、Schourup(2005:93-94)は、(15)の先行部分の I had an excellent lobster は主観的な感想であり、それを肯定することが難しいため、容認可能性が下がると述べている。そして、この主観的は I had an excellent lobster を削除すれば、however の使用に何の問題もなくなると述べている。このような容認可能性の変化を Blakemore (2002)はとらえることができない。

but と however 違いについてまとめると、but と however は矛盾と削除の手続き的意味を共有しているが、however には第二の制約として文脈指定があるということになる。

(18) but と however の共有する手続き的意味

文脈効果の種類についての制約：ある想定 of 矛盾と削除

(19) However の第二の制約

先行する談話セグメントの明示的内容を肯定すると同時に、その肯定内容に対して、矛盾想定を推論的に結びつける。
(Schourup 2005:102)

3.2. still と yet の先行研究

関連性理論に基づき、Higashimori (1992:347-350) は but のほかに still、yet を分析している。最初に、3.2.1. で still について、次に、3.2.2 で yet について取り上げる。

3.2.1. still の手続き的意味

Still は denial of expectation (予測の打ち消し) と聞き手または話し手の reminder (思い出させるための合図) という手続き的意味を持っているという。そして、Reminder Use には次の2つがあると述べている。(Higashimori 1992:347-348)

(20) a. **Still** as a reminder to the hearer of what he already knows or believes

b. **Still** as a reminder to the speaker of what he already knows or believes

(Higashimori 1992:347)

(20a)に関する例が(21)である。

(21) It' s raining; **still**, we must go out. (op.cit:346)

Higashimori(1992)によれば、still はちょうど denial of expectation (予測の打ち消し) のように、第二の命題(the second proposition)が最初の節の文脈含意(implication)を否定する。これは but との共通点だと述べている。But と still の違いは still には ii に示されるような聞き手の認知的前提条件が含まれていなければならない点だ。

(22) i. Context for interpreting the first conjunct:

If it is raining, *we normally don' t have to go out.*

ii. You already know that *we have to go out.*

iii. The second conjunct: *we have to go out.*

(ibid.)

次に、(20b)に関する例が(23)になる。

(23) John' s a strange guy. Still, I like him. (Schourup & Waida 1988:202)

Higashimori (1992:348) は denial of expectation (予測の打ち消し) として、第二の命題と最初の節の文脈含意が命題全体を矛盾させると述べている。Higashimori (1992:348)はさらに but との違いは still は (ii) に示される話し手の前もっての認識が必要な点だと述べている。

(24) i. Context for interpreting the first conjunct:

If he is strange guy, *I don' t like John.*

ii. I already know or believe that *I like John.*

iii. the second conjunct: *I like John* (Higashimori 1992:348)

3.2.2. yet の手続き的意味

Higashimori(1992:348-350) によれば、yet は denial of expectation に関わる手続き的意味と聞き手が先行部分と前提の結論の依存関係を強く信じていることを示す文脈指定を持っている。Yet が acceptable になるのは、次のような文脈である。

(25) Hearer' s belief in strong dependency between the antecedent and the consequent of the premise. (Higashimori 1992:349)

Higashimori (1992:348) は still が unacceptable で、yet が acceptable になる例を挙げている。

(26) He knew Conrad had told him the truth. It was so. Yet / *Still it wasn' t so. It wasn' t so because it couldn' t be so. (Konig & Traugott 1982:175)

Higashimori (1992:350)によれば、still が使われる場合は聞き手が前もって Conrad would not tell him the truth. (コンラッドは彼に真実を話さなかった。) 信じている文脈になっている時だ。しかし、先行部分の it was so は Conrad told him the truth (コンラッドが彼に真実を話した。) という意味であり、完全に矛盾しています。故に、発話全体の解釈は相いれない。そのようなわけで still は不適切となる。その一方で、yet は聞き手が仮定(the premise)の前提(the antecedent)と結論(the consequent)の繋がりが強いと信じているので、適切となる。

(27) i. Context for interpreting the first (conjunct):

If he knew Conrad told him the truth, then it must always be true.

ii. You believe this premise is strong. <i.e. the dependency between (he knew Conrad told him the truth) and (it must always be true) is strong.>

iii. Context for interpreting the second conjunct: If it wasn' t so, then it cannot always be true. (Higashimori 1992:349)

3.3. 問題点

However、Still、yet は等位接続詞の but や and と共起可能であるが、それはなぜか。それらが共通して矛盾と削除の手続き的意味を持つならば、共起できないのではないか？また、but と however が

共起する際、however の位置によって容認可能性の度合いが変わることも説明することができない。

3.4. 提案

この問題を解決するために、関連性理論に則って、次のような修正案を提案する。

- (35) 1. but は手続き的意味をもつ。
2. still, yet は概念的意味を持つ。
3. However は概念的意味を持つ。また、文頭以外では、部分的に強調する。

そうすると、but still, but yet という連鎖は but の手続き的意味と still や yet の概念的意味の連鎖となり、問題がない。それぞれの機能に異なっている点があるため、連鎖が可能になっていると考えられる。それでは、3.4.1. で still の概念的意味について、3.4.2 で yet の概念的意味について、そして、however の概念的意味について 3.4.3 で見ていく。

3.4.1. Still の概念的意味

still の概念的意味とは何でしょうか？Still の概念的意味として、Crupi (2004)説を取り上げる。Crupi (2004:138)は still の接続詞と副詞の用法を含めた core meaning は次のようなものと述べている。

- (38) *Still* introduces information that is contrary to the most recent contextual assumptions, but connected to information that has been presented at some earlier point in the text or to common knowledge already available to the reader. (Crupi 2004:120)
(39) Conjunctive use of *still* produces the message effect END DETOUR. (ibid.)
(40) *Still* in both its adverbial and conjunctive roles demonstrates a contrast semantic value of CONTINUATION, NO CHANGE. (Crupi 2004:136)

この分析の優れているところは、接続詞として分類されることもある文頭位置だけでなく、副詞としての文中の still にも逆接があることを一貫性して説明できる可能性がある。「still は、文頭以外の位置で用いられるときは、Nevertheless に近い意味を持っているが、同時にまた、その時間的な意味も多少残している (Michaelis (1993:217)、Greenbaum (1983:94))」という観察がある。手続き的意味を持っているとするならば、このような両義性を説明できない。

3.4.2. Yet の概念的意味

Yet の概念的意味として、Crupi (2004)説を取り上げる。Crupi (2004:120)は yet の接続詞と副詞の用法を含めた the basic meaning (基本的な意味)は書き手のコミュニケーションの目的にとって重要である対比を強調すると述べている。

- (45) *Yet*, SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST between information A and information B. (Crupi 2004:138)

- (46) 1. Both components of the contrast must be explicitly present in a text containing *yet* in order for that context to be characterized as conjunctive.
 2. Where only one component of an implied contrast is present in the text, *yet* is ranked as an adverb. (op.cit.:163)
- (47) *Yet* will occur more frequently than *but* or *still* in contexts where both information A and information B receive additional elaboration in the subsequent text. (op.cit.:156)

Crupi (2004:127)は、*yet* が重要性を与える対比の性質によって、さまざまなメッセージ(予想、驚き、失望)に貢献できると述べているが、*yet* は先行の情報 A が後続の情報 B の対比を強調するという概念的意味を持っているので、先行の情報 A とは対照的な内容が続くことを聞き手・読み手に伝える。*Yet* はこのようにして推論に貢献し、結果的に想定との矛盾と削除という認知効果が得られるのではないかと考える。

3.4.3. However の概念的意味

Ouirk (1985:641)に基づき、*however* は *However true that may be* という概念的意味を持つと考える。

- (51) He didn't like the food. **However, [However true that may be],** he didn't complain about it. (Ouirk 1985:641)

「前に述べられたことがどんなに本当であっても」という *However* の概念的意味は推論に貢献し、その肯定内容から導かれた想定を削除するという認知効果を生むと考えられる。「前に述べられたことがどんなに本当であっても」という *However* の概念的意味は先に述べられたことを肯定することを含意しているため、Blakemore や Schourup のように第二の制約を必要としない。

- (52) *However* の第二の制約

先行する談話セグメントの明示的内容を肯定すると同時に、その肯定内容に対して、矛盾想定を推論的に結びつける。 (Schourup 2005:102)

but と *however* の共起の問題については、*but however* の場合は、*but* の手続きの意味と *however* の概念的意味が導く推論の過程が似ているため、容認可能性の度合いが落ちると考えられる。しかし、*however* は *but* にはない強調にかかわる機能を持っているため、くだけた会話などの場面では、*however* と *but* の共起が容認されると考えられる。

- (53) a *You can phone the doctor if you like, **but, however,** I very much doubt whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night.
 b. ?You can phone the doctor if you like, **but** I very much doubt, **however,** whether you will get him to come out on a Saturday night. (Quirk et al. 1985:646)

(54b)の例では、*however* が文中に生起することにより、何が強調されているかを見つけやすくしているので、容認可能性が上がると考えられる。